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Commodity markets are a crucial sector of the real economy of each nation. In addition, 
there is a viable derivatives market in which participants trade both for hedging and 
speculative purposes, especially given the recent entry of investment banks and hedge 
funds. These new participants have become increasingly active in commodity markets at 
the same time when a boom and bust occurred in commodity prices around the financial 
crisis 2007/08. This led to growing interest in research, politics, and media, who 
question the role of speculators and index traders in commodity markets. Since 2008, 
the number of published articles about the impact of speculation and index trading on 
pricing in commodity markets has considerably risen. These studies examine whether 
speculators or index traders influenced commodity prices in a way that led to the 
excessive movements during the financial crisis 2007/08 or possibly decoupled com-
modity futures prices from their fundamental value. However, findings lack unequivocal 
evidence on the role of speculators and index traders on pricing in commodity futures 
markets. The explanatory power of these studies suffers from data limitations and 
methodological weaknesses, which impede to find clear causalities. This thesis aims to 
contribute to the field of “Pricing and Speculation in Commodity Markets” by applying 
new methodologies and by providing new approaches. Thereby, it attempts to give 
further insight whether commodity prices actually decoupled from their fundamentals 
for reasons of speculative and index trading activity. 
The first study „The Impact of Speculation on Precious Metals Futures Markets” 
(co-authored by Elina Pradkhan) analyzes the impact of speculative activity on precious 
metals’ futures returns and volatility. While a large number of studies examine the 
impact of speculative activity in energy or soft commodity markets, precious metals are 
rarely considered. Mutafoglu et al. (2012) examine whether precious metals’ spot prices 
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can be forecasted by traders’ positions in futures markets. Fassas (2012) analyzes the 
impact of investment flows in exchange-traded products on precious metals’ spot prices. 
Since trading in futures markets is expected to influence futures prices first, we focus on 
the direct impact of speculative activity on returns and volatility in precious metals’ 
futures markets. The impact of speculative activity on precious metals’ futures markets 
is measured by distinguishing between short- and long-term dynamics, and volatility. 
All models take into account macroeconomic factors and hedging pressure. 
Our results demonstrate that speculative activity does not affect precious metals’ 
futures prices in the short run. However, long-term dynamics of speculative activity 
influence precious metals’ futures returns on a monthly base. In particular, this holds 
true for gold and silver. Moreover, the magnitude of the monthly based long-term 
impact on gold and silver more than doubled from the first (January 2000 to June 2006) 
to the second subperiod (June 2006 to December 2013). Longer time horizons, bi-
monthly and quarterly, offer weak evidence for an impact of speculative activity on 
precious metals’ futures returns. With respect to platinum, the impact of speculative 
activity on the conditional variance stabilized in the second subperiod. In the palladium 
futures market, a destabilizing impact can be observed in the first subperiod. The de-
stabilizing effect of speculative activity is present in the gold and silver futures market 
during the first subperiod, yet to a much lower degree. 
The second study „Price Discovery and Trading Activity in Commodity Futures 
Markets” (co-authored by Elina Pradkhan) examines how trading activities of different 
market participants influence the contribution of the futures market to price discovery 
and the rate of convergence between spot and futures markets for 16 selected com-
modity futures markets. The relationship between spot prices and futures prices is 
frequently examined in single commodity markets, mainly for metals and soft com-
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modities. Contrary to former approaches, we analyze the relationship between spot 
prices and futures prices by including commodities of all subgroups (energies, metals, 
and softs). Having a large number of commodities, it is possible to cross-sectionally 
analyze if trading activity has an impact on the contribution of futures markets to price 
discovery and the rate of convergence between spot and futures markets. 
The results from the cross-sectional regression show that the trading activities of 
different market participants do not significantly contribute to price discovery in com-
modity futures markets. On a yearly base, trading pressure of hedgers (net short 
positions) and speculators (net long positions) positively influences the futures markets’ 
contribution to price discovery. Since the degree of the positive impact is similar for 
hedging and speculative pressure, we assume that it is the interaction between hedgers 
and speculators that positively contributes to price discovery in futures markets. Con-
sidering the rate of convergence between spot and futures prices, we find that specu-
lators improve while index traders impair the rate of convergence. 
The third study „The Impact of Market Participants’ Interaction on Futures Prices: 
Comparing Three U.S. Wheat Futures Markets” analyzes the impact of the market 
structure on wheat futures prices. Several studies examining the impact of speculative 
activity or index trading on commodity prices solely focus on the relationship between 
speculators’ or index traders’ positions and commodity prices among different com-
modities (see, e.g., Sanders and Irwin, 2011; Aulerich et al., 2013; Irwin et al., 2009). 
Therefore, important commodity-specific factors are ignored such as the role of supply 
and demand of a commodity or macroeconomic indicators. I focus on wheat, for which 
three species with different futures contracts exist: soft red winter wheat, hard red 
winter wheat, and hard red spring wheat. First, the fundamental development of the 
three considered wheat species is compared. As price developments of hard red spring 
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wheat futures, in contrast to the other two wheat species, are not justified by the 
fundamentals, the different market structures of the three wheat futures contracts are 
analyzed by the Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (DCOT) report. The DCOT 
report splits all market participants of futures markets into five trader categories. The 
impact of different market participants and their interaction is analyzed by using a 
model that also takes into account other factors influencing the wheat futures price; i.e. 
the U.S. dollar exchange rate, the oil price, and the equity market. 
The findings reveal that the price of hard red spring futures did not decouple from 
its fundamental development for reasons of speculative activity. The dominant presence 
of commercials, i.e. physical traders, who engage in commercial activities of the com-
modity, combined with a low participation of other traders led to the decoupling of 
futures prices. Thus, the detailed comparison of the three wheat species demonstrates 
that the market structure of commodity futures markets is of great importance for 
pricing. 
The fourth study „The Information Content of Fundamental News vs. Traders’ 
Positions on Grain Futures Markets: Evidence from WASDE and COT Reports” 
analyzes the impact of fundamental news on corn, wheat, and soybean futures prices 
compared to the impact of the publication of traders’ positions from the Commitments 
of Traders (COT) report. One advantage of an event study approach is that price 
reactions in futures markets are examined on a daily base and that the analysis is not 
restricted to the weekly data from the COT report. Additionally, an event study for this 
purpose overcomes another weakness faced by most related studies: the importance of 
fundamental data for commodity prices. While most studies ignore fundamentals, I 
directly compare futures price reactions on World Agricultural Supply and Demand 
Estimates (WASDE) from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) with 
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the publication of traders’ positions from the COT report. Considering the “finan-
cialization” of commodity markets and the developments of commodity prices during 
the financial crisis 2007/08, the whole sample ranging from January 1996 to June 2014 
is divided into two subsamples. Besides, price reactions are computed for various 
developments of fundamental news and traders’ positions: for all, for positive and for 
negative developments, and for extremely positive and extremely negative develop-
ments separately. 
The findings of the event study can be summarized as follows: fundamental news 
from the WASDE report remain an important source for pricing in grain futures 
markets. Nevertheless, a shift of importance from fundamental news to the publication 
of COT traders’ positions is observed in corn and wheat futures markets. Furthermore, 
price reactions to the publications of traders’ positions occur on the day of data col-
lection of traders’ positions. Traders imitating the position changes of large traders seem 
to anticipate the tendencies contained in the COT report. 
The fifth study „Traders‘ Motivation and Hedging Pressure in Commodity Futures 
Markets” (co-authored by Kamal Smimou) aims to reveal the motives behind the 
position changes of different market participants. In addition, we examine how the 
interaction between the different traders affects prices in commodity futures markets. 
Several studies analyzing the motivations of traders focus on individual trader 
categories and subgroups of commodities. In contrast to these approaches, we examine 
all trader categories listed in the DCOT report according to their motivations to trade. 
Important aspects are past returns, hedging pressure, and proxies for the U.S. dollar 
exchange rate, the equity market, the bond market, and financial sentiment. The data 
sample we use for this approach includes all commodity markets with available DCOT 
reports: 22 commodities from each commodity-subgroup (energies, metals, and softs). 
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Moreover, the interaction between the different trader categories and the influence on 
commodity futures returns resulting from this interaction is examined in a second step. 
We take into account observed factors affecting the motivation of different trader 
categories when analyzing the interaction effects. 
We find that speculators are driven by momentum trading and hedging pressure. 
Moreover, speculators are short-term oriented profit seekers who revise their positions 
frequently. Hedgers exhibit persistence in their trading behavior and they are contrarian 
traders. Among the financial factors, a U.S. dollar index captures a considerable share 
of traders’ positions variability. The interaction analysis demonstrates that on average 
speculators and hedgers appear to be the most important traders influencing pricing in 
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The Impact of Speculation on Precious Metals Futures 
Markets 
David Bosch, Elina Pradkhan 
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Abstract 
Existing research finds little evidence that speculative activity in futures markets 
has any impact on precious metals’ spot prices. We examine whether speculators’ 
positions predict returns and return volatility in precious metals futures markets. 
We use two proxies for speculative activity: non-commercial traders and money 
managers. Money managers are a subcategory of non-commercial traders that is 
associated with professional speculators. Our analysis distinguishes between 
short- and long-term dynamics. Whereas we cannot confirm any short-term 
impact of speculators on returns and conditional volatility in the period after 2006, 
the weekly changes in non-commercial traders’ positions appear to have a destabi-
lizing impact on subsequent conditional volatility in gold, silver and palladium 
futures markets in the period prior to June 2006. Moreover, we cannot rule out a 
long-term, potentially destabilizing, impact on returns when accumulated posi-
tions of speculators over monthly horizons are considered. 
Keywords: Precious Metals Futures Markets, Speculation, Granger causality. 




Price Discovery and Trading Activity in Commodity 
Futures Markets 
David Bosch, Elina Pradkhan 
Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Futures Markets (26.12.2015) 
 
Abstract 
We analyze whether and how the trading activity of different trader types 
impacts the contribution of the futures market to the price discovery process 
and the rate of convergence between spot and futures markets for a broad range 
of commodity futures markets over the 1999-2014 period. There is strong 
evidence that speculators (commodity index traders) increase (reduce) the rate 
of convergence between spot and futures markets. By contrast, there is only 
scarce evidence that trading activity of any trader category affects the contri-
bution of the futures market to price discovery process that is computed based 
on the permanent-transitory decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). 
Keywords: Price Discovery, Rate of Convergence, Speculators, Hedgers, Index Traders. 





The price discovery process describes how fundamental information is incorporated into 
asset prices. If a commodity is traded in several markets, price discovery takes place in 
at least one of these markets. Prices in different markets share one or more common sto-
chastic trends, while intermarket arbitrage prevents prices from drifting apart from the 
common trends. One of these stochastic common factors is the implicit efficient price, 
which is unobservable and reflects the fundamental value, whereas prices observed in 
individual markets additionally contain temporary effects such as inventory adjustments 
as well as bid and ask spreads (Baillie et al, 2002; Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo, 
2010). New information in one or several markets determines the efficient implicit 
price. 
Traditionally, three strands of literature on price discovery in commodity spot and 
futures markets can be distinguished. The first approach analyzes temporal precedence 
based on the framework of Garbade and Silber (1983). Garbade and Silber (1983) dev-
elop a model of simultaneous price dynamics where current spot and futures prices are 
related to their lagged values. Based on this methodology, price discovery processes 
have been examined for crude oil, heating oil and gasoline (e.g. Schwarz and Szakmary, 
1994), feeder cattle (e.g. Oellermann et al., 1989) and live hogs (e.g. Schroeder and 
Goodwin, 1991). The second strand of literature relies on the Granger causality frame-
work and relates returns on spot (futures) markets to past returns on futures (spot) 
markets. For instance, Bekiros and Diks (2008) and Hernandez and Torero (2010) 
examine linear and non-linear causality between spot and futures returns for crude oil 
and agricultural commodities. Narayan et al. (2013) account for structural breaks and 
find strong evidence of predictability of spot by futures returns in crude oil, gold, silver 
and platinum markets. Lee and Zhang (2011) examine the relation between spot and 
futures crude oil markets based on a vector error correction model (VECM) that allows 
for a quantile-varying cointegrating vector and find that the causal relationship depends 
on the maturity of futures contracts and spot market performance. Wang and Wu (2013) 
extend the cointegration analysis by incorporating the idea that fixed adjustment and 
transaction costs impede a linear convergence towards a long-run equilibrium. Using a 
threshold VECM, they show that crude oil futures prices drive spot prices only for 
short-term horizons (weekly frequency), whereas for longer-term horizons (monthly and 
quarterly data) both spot and futures markets contribute to the formation of the long-run 
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equilibrium. The third strand of literature implements the price discovery measures of 
Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995). As opposed to Hasbrouck (1995) 
who assumes that price volatility reflects information flows and assigns a higher 
information share to the market that contributes more to the total price variance, 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) decompose the price discovery process into common and 
temporary factors and consider only the contributions of individual markets to the com-
mon factor in the price process. Ivanov (2013) explores the contribution of spot, futures 
and exchange-traded funds to the price discovery process of gold, silver and oil using 
intraday data at one minute interval from March 2009 to August 2009. Based on the 
Hasbrouck’s (1995) information shares, Ivanov (2013) finds that exchange-traded funds 
dominate the price discovery for gold and silver, while futures prices are information-
dominant in case of oil. Using the methodology of Gonzalo and Granger (1995), 
Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) examine the contributions to the price discovery 
process of spot and futures markets for non-ferrous metals (aluminium, copper, lead, 
nickel and zinc). They find that the futures market dominates the spot market in terms of 
price discovery in most liquid commodity markets, whereas spot prices are more infor-
mation-dominant in the least liquid lead market. In the equilibrium model of Figuerola-
Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010), cointegration naturally arises in the presence of finite 
elasticity of supply of arbitrage services and endogenously modelled convenience 
yields. By contrast, Dolatabadi et al. (2015) use a fractionally cointegrated VAR 
analysis. They find more evidence in favor of the spot market leading the price disco-
very process than Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010): Price discovery takes 
exclusively place in the spot (futures) market for copper, lead and zinc (aluminum and 
nickel). 
Our study is most closely related to the study of Chen et al. (2014), who invest-
tigate the impact of various trader positions from the CFTC report on price discovery in 
currency futures markets. Their measure of information efficiency is based on infor-
mation shares of Hasbrouck (1995), Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and Lien and Shrestha 
(2009). They find that rising hedging (speculative) activity has a negative (positive) 
impact on the contribution of the futures market to price discovery. The decomposition 
of trading activity in its expected and unexpected components confirms these findings 
for the total trading activity in case of hedgers: Both expected and unexpected changes 
in net positions of hedgers lower the information share of the futures market. 
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We focus on the contribution of futures markets to the price discovery process 
based on the model of Garbade and Silber (1983) and the price discovery measure of 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Gonzalo and Granger (1995) decompose the price process 
into transitory and permanent components. Contributions of each market to the price 
discovery process are exclusively determined by the permanent component of the price 
discovery process. The derivation is based on adjustment parameters of the underlying 
vector error correction model. In this case, the price discovery process is assumed to be 
determined by a market’s adjustment to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. An 
additional measure of market efficiency is the rate of convergence of spot and futures 
prices of Garbade and Silber (1983). It is inversely related to the elasticity of supply of 
arbitrage services. The lower the rate of convergence, the faster the prices in spot and 
futures markets converge. 
Our major contribution to the existing research is not the identification of the role 
of futures markets in the price discovery process (which has been extensively examined 
in the empirical research), but the focus on the impact of trading activity in futures 
markets on the price discovery process. Hence, our research aim is closely related to the 
study of Chen et al. (2014), who explore the influence of speculators, hedgers and small 
traders on the contribution to the price discovery process of currency futures markets for 
EUR-USD and JPY-USD. To our knowledge, no comparable analysis has been con-
ducted in the context of commodity futures markets. Whereas the impact of speculative 
and hedging activity on futures and spot returns and volatility in agricultural, energy and 
metal commodity markets has been extensively examined in the existing literature, the 
impact of different trader categories on the contribution of the futures market to price 
discovery has been so far neglected by the empirical research. We consider a broad 
range of commodities: agricultural, energy and precious metals markets. The analyzed 
commodities differ in several important aspects such as storage costs, durability, indus-
trial profile and hedging potential. Moreover, various proxies for trading activity are 
considered: open interest, index traders and trader categories from the Commitments of 
Traders (COT) and Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (DCOT) reports of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 
Our major hypotheses are as follows. The trading activity of speculators who are 
commonly assumed to provide liquidity to hedgers may “correct” the mispricing 
induced by hedging pressure as suggested by the backwardation theory of Hirshleifer 
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(1990). Indeed, rational arbitrageurs are supposed to recognize market inefficiencies, 
alleviate noise-driven price movements and restore prices back to their fundamental 
values (De Long et al., 1990). This idea has been confirmed for currency markets by 
Chen et al. (2014). In the theoretical model of Goldstein and Yang (2015), private 
information of financial traders increases the contribution of the futures market to the 
price discovery process not only because of risk sharing, but also as a consequence of 
private information about demand shocks. In this case, we expect a positive effect of 
speculative activity on the contribution of the futures market to the price discovery 
process and on the speed of convergence between spot and futures markets. 
However, whether speculators always perform the role of liquidity providers for 
hedgers is arguable. In the model of Goldstein and Yang (2015), the spot price is 
determined by supply and demand shocks. Solely risk-averse hedgers are informed 
about supply shocks. Demand shocks are partially known to risk-averse financial traders 
who receive diverse private signals. Whether the financial traders provide or demand 
liquidity depends on their information: If financial traders are well informed about 
demand shocks, hedgers provide liquidity to speculators, while in case of volatile supply 
shocks financial traders provide liquidity to hedgers. Recent research reveals that hed-
gers may also provide short-term liquidity to speculators who engage in momentum 
trading (e.g. Sanders et al., 2004; Cheng and Xiong, 2014; Kang et al., 2014): Momen-
tum trading is not related to private information. It cannot be excluded that some specu-
lators act as irrational noise traders who overreact to new information (Chen et al., 
2014). In this case, the speculative activity would contribute little to price discovery: On 
the contrary, noise traders would lead futures prices further apart from fundamental 
values. Therefore, the contribution of the futures market to the price discovery process 
would decrease. Similarly, the activity of uniformed speculators in futures markets 
would have a detrimental effect on the speed of convergence between spot and futures 
markets. 
A competitive and liquid market is an important prerequisite for the price dis-
covery process. Given that price discovery depends on how new information is incor-
porated into commodity prices, futures market liquidity is assumed to affect the contri-
bution of the futures market to the price discovery process and market efficiency. For 
instance, Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) document that the futures market plays 
a more decisive role in the price discovery process in more liquid metal markets such as 
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aluminium and copper, whereas the contribution of the futures market to the price dis-
covery process is substantially lower in the less liquid lead market. Similarly, Garbade 
and Silber (1983) confirm the importance of liquidity of the futures market for the price 
discovery process for agricultural commodities. Similar results can be observed for 
Canadian and Brazilian agricultural commodities (Brockman and Tse, 1995; Mattos and 
Garcia, 2004). However, the more recent evidence of Adämmer et al. (2015) suggests 
that efficient price discovery takes even place in thinly traded futures markets. In 
general, open interest as a proxy for market liquidity, is supposed to be positively 
related to the contribution of the futures market to the price discovery process and 
should increase the speed of convergence. Our cross-sectional analysis would capture 
not only the time-series changes in market liquidity in an individual commodity market, 
but also the liquidity differences across a wide range of 16 commodity markets. How-
ever, if a minimum threshold of trading activity is already sufficient for the efficient 
price discovery in the futures market, as suggested by Adämmer et al. (2015), we may 
not find any effect of market liquidity on the contribution of the futures market to the 
price discovery. Similar reasoning applies to the speed of convergence between spot and 
futures markets. 
Our study is structured as follows. Data and methodology are summarized in 
Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
2 Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
Our estimation period ranges from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2014. Table 1 
shows the spot and futures markets that are used for our analysis. All spot and futures 
prices (denominated in USD) are collected from Datastream with the exception of WTI 
crude oil, for which the spot price is collected from the website of the International 
Energy Agency (IEA). 
Futures contracts are chosen on the basis of size and global importance. The 
CFTC disclosure of trader positions is also an important selection criterion. Spot mar-
kets are chosen such that the time delay between futures and spot price determination is 
minimized. For energy commodities and grains, the time delay between spot and futures 
markets is negligible as all spot markets are located close to the corresponding futures 
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markets. Regarding soft commodities, only for sugar, the location of the spot and 
futures market differs in time zones: The time delay between Sao Paulo and New York 
amounts to one hour. Since we rely on daily data, the time discrepancy of one hour is 
not supposed to distort the empirical results. 
However, the problem related to the time discrepancy between spot and futures 
markets is more severe for precious metals. While the London Bullion Market is the 
most important spot market for gold and silver, the New York Commodity Exchange 
(COMEX) is the relevant futures market. To overcome the time difference between 
London and New York, spot prices of the less (economically) important Handy & 
Harman spot market are used. Handy & Harman is located in New York and the spot 
prices are also used in the empirical research on the relationship between spot and 
futures markets (e.g. Garbade and Silber, 1983; Narayan et al., 2013). The spot prices 
for platinum and palladium are obtained from the afternoon fixing of the London 
Platinum & Palladium Market (LPPM). The afternoon fixing begins in London 2:00 
p.m. local time, the NYMEX settlement starts at 12:58 -1:00 p.m. for palladium and 
1:03-1:05 p.m. for platinum, both in local time. With a time delay of five hours between 
London and New York, the time difference between the two prices amounts to a max-
imum of four hours, depending on how long the fixing process lasts. Thus, when the 
afternoon fixing begins at 9:00 a.m. New York time, the spot prices are already known 
at the settlement time at the NYMEX. Hence, a downward bias for the importance of 
the spot market for price discovery arises since the futures price provides “fresher” 
information. However, the contributions to the price discovery process for platinum and 
palladium show a high variation in their yearly values.1 This speaks against an extreme 
bias induced by the time delay, which would be expected to produce a constantly domi-
nating futures price in the price discovery process throughout the examined time period. 
Another reason, which reduces the scope of the time delay problem, is that we are not 
interested in the absolute values per se, but in the relative link between the efficiency of 
the futures market (relative to the spot market) and trader positions. 
In order to derive contributions of spot and futures markets to price discovery, we 
create continuous spot and futures price series. For the calculation of futures returns, we 
adopt the following rolling procedure: In order to ensure that only the most liquid 
futures contracts are used, the switching to the second-nearby contract takes place when 
                                                            
1 The results on the yearly PD shares are available on demand. 
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its open interest exceeds that of the first-nearby contract. Based on the derived daily 
returns ܴ௧, we construct continuous spot and futures price series ௧ܲ as                       
௧ܲ ൌ ௧ܲିଵ ∗ ሺ1 ൅ ܴ௧ሻ with the start value ଴ܲ ൌ 100 as of January 1, 1999. The loga-
rithms of spot and future prices, ݌௧, are used in the analysis of price discovery based on 
the procedure of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). For the derivation of the rates of conver-
gence, the actual spot and futures prices are used (denominated in the USD). 
Positions 
The data on trader positions is collected from COT and DCOT reports of the CFTC. 
Each Tuesday, the CFTC collects the data and publishes it on Friday. The COT report 
divides all traders into three categories: commercials, non-commercials and non-repor-
tables. Commercials use futures markets for hedging purposes, while non-commercials 
are typically associated with speculation. Non-reportable traders do not reach the repor-
ting level, which is determined by the CFTC. They are small traders who engage in 
either commercial or non-commercial business. On average 70 to 90 percent of all open 
positions are reportable positions.2 In our sample, the small traders’ share of total open 
interest ranges from 6.7 to 25.2 percent (Table 2). The DCOT report provides a more 
detailed classification of commercial and non-commercial traders into four categories: 
producers/merchants/processors/users, swap dealers, money managers and other repor-
tables.3 
2.2  Methodology 
Price Discovery 
We use two measures for the efficiency of the price discovery process: the rate of con-
vergence between spot and futures prices as well as the contribution of the futures 
markets to the price discovery process of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) assume that the difference-stationary price process ݌௧ can 
be decomposed into a transitory component ݌௧෥  and a permanent component ܣଵ ௧݂: 
݌௧ ൌ ܣଵ ௧݂ ൅ ݌௧෥  (1). 
                                                            
2 See: http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTraders/ExplanatoryNotes/index.htm 
3 A detailed description of different trader categories of the DCOT report is available in Section 3.3. 
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Both the transitory and permanent components can be represented as linear combi-
nations of the initial process ݌௧. Whereas shocks to the transitory component are not 
considered to be relevant to the price discovery process, it is the permanent component 
that is assumed to play the decisive role in the price discovery process and determines 
contributions to the price discovery of different markets (Figuerola-Ferretti and 
Gonzalo, 2010). The permanent component is defined as the product of the ሺ݇ ൈ 1ሻ-
vector ௧݂ of ݇ common factors and the loading matrix ܣଵ. Based on the assumption that 
only shocks to the permanent component ܣଵ ௧݂ affect the long-run forecast of ݌௧, the 
common factor ௧݂ can be derived as a linear combination of  ݌௧: 
௧݂ ൌ ߙᇱୄ ݌௧  (2), 
where ߙୄ measures each market’s contribution to the common factor. It is the ሺ2 ൈ 1ሻ-
vector that is orthogonal to the vector of adjustment parameters ߙ′ ൌ ሺߙଵ, ߙଶሻ in the 
following vector error correction model (VECM): 
∆݌௧ ൌ ߙߚᇱ݌௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ Γ௜Δ݌௧ି௜௡௜ୀଵ ൅ ݁௧	with	݁௧ ∼ ሺ0, Ωሻ, Ω ൌ ቆ σଵ
ଶ ρσଵσଶ
ρσଵσଶ σଶଶ ቇ  (3). 
In our bivariate model with spot and futures prices ݌௧ ൌ ቀ௣భ௣మቁ, ߙୄ is computed as  
ߙᇱୄ ൌ ሺ ఈమିఈభାఈమ ,
ିఈభ
ିఈభାఈమሻ  (4). 
The terms ఈమିఈభାఈమ and 
ିఈభ
ିఈభାఈమ measure the contributions of markets one and two, i.e. 
spot and futures markets, respectively, to the common factor that represents the price 
discovery process (Baillie et al., 2002; Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo, 2010). Relying 
on the vector of adjustment parameters means that only the markets’ adjustments to the 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium are relevant for price discovery. The market 
that adjusts least is assumed to play a minor role in the price discovery process (Baillie 
et al., 2002). 
Cabrera et al. (2009) argue that one of the drawbacks of the permanent-transitory 
(PT) decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) as shown in Eq. (4) is that the 
factor weights ఈమିఈభାఈమ and 
ିఈభ
ିఈభାఈమ may take negative values. Interpreting negative factor 
weights in terms of contributions to the price discovery process is problematic. There-
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fore, Cabrera et al. (2009) argue that it is not the sign, but the relative magnitude of the 
factor weights that reflects the price discovery process. Their procedure for the calcu-
lation of the vector of factor weights ߙ෦ୄ  is as follows: 
ߙ෦ୄ ൌ ሺܾܽݏ൫ܣଵ∗ᇱ൯ ∗ ߡሻିଵܾܽݏሺܣଵ∗ሻ  (5), 
where the matrix ܣଵ∗  is the matrix that is orthogonal to the matrix of adjustment 
parameters in the vector error correction model and ߡ is the ሺ݊ ൈ 1ሻ vector of ones 
(Cabrera et al., 2009). 
In our bivariate model, Eq. (4) simplifies to: 
ߙ෦ୄ ൌ ൣܾܽݏሺߙᇱୄ ሻ൫ଵଵ൯൧
ିଵܾܽݏሺߙୄሻ  (6). 
A disadvantage of the permanent-transitory decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger 
(2002) is that the matrix of price innovations is not taken into account while computing 
the markets’ contributions to the price discovery process (Baillie et al., 2002). Another 
frequently used measure to capture contributions to price discovery of different markets 
is the information share of Hasbrouck (1995). Hasbrouck (1995) assumes that the 
implicit efficient price of a security traded in multiple markets is common to all markets 
and its variations can be traced back to different markets. Using a vector moving aver-
age representation, Hasbrouck (1995) decomposes the price vector ݌௧ into a non-stocha-
stic vector of initial values, a transitory zero-mean covariance stationary process and the 
random walk component that is common to all prices. The price discovery process is 
defined in terms of innovations to the common factor term or, more precisely, as the 
variance of innovations to this common random walk component. Information share is 
the contribution of the market to the total efficient price innovation variance. The under-
lying assumption is that price volatility reflects information flows. Hence, a higher 
information share is assigned to the market that contributes more to the total price 
variance. Baillie et al. (2002) show that the permanent-transitory decomposition of the 
price process of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and the information share of Hasbrouck 
(1995) may yield comparable results only in the absence of a contemporaneous cor-
relation between the disturbances in the individual markets: While the PT measure of 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) depends solely on the vector of adjustment parameters, the 
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IS measure of Hasbrouck (1995) depends on the correlation between the two prices 
(Baillie et al., 2002). 
We rely on the model of Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) who show that 
departing from the standard cointegration vector (1,-1) allows accounting for long-run 
backwardation or contango. This is especially important for commodity markets. We do 
not use the information share of Hasbrouck (1995) for two reasons: Firstly, as argued by 
Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010), there is no straightforward procedure to elimi-
nate the contemporaneous correlations of the error terms from the vector moving aver-
age representation for the calculation of the information shares of Hasbrouck (1995). 
Hasbrouck (1995) deals with this issue by calculating upper and lower bounds for his 
information share. The modified measure of Lien and Shrestha (2009) overcomes the 
problem of the two bounds of the traditional information share of Hasbrouck (1995). 
However, the information share of Hasbrouck (1995) and its modified version of Lien 
and Shrestha can only be used in situations where the spot and futures price series are 
cointegrated with a one-to-one cointegrating relationship. For commodity markets that 
are characterized by switches from contango to backwardation and vice versa, the 
assumption of a constant cointegrating vector is not fulfilled. The model of Figuerola-
Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) allows departing from the standard cointegration vector   
(1, -1) and therefore accounts for long-run backwardation or contango.4 Although this 
procedure does not explicitly account for switches between backwardation and contango 
market regimes, it at least captures the idea of long-run backwardation and contango. 
We derive our price discovery measures on an annual basis and, thus, at least partially 
alleviate the problem related to the switches between backwardation/contango regimes. 
We compute the measures for the contribution to the price discovery process of 
spot and futures markets as specified by Eq. (4) based on the vector error correction 
model (Eq. (3)). Since the cointegration between spot and futures price series is an 
underlying assumption of the vector error correction model, as a first step, the Johansen 
test is used to test whether cointegration between spot and futures prices exists during 
the entire time span from 1999 to 2014. In this case, the Johansen trace and/or maxi-
mum eigenvalue tests indicate one cointegrationg relationship (at least 20 percent 
                                                            
4 Lien and Shrestha (2014) modify the information share to allow deviations from one-to-one coin-
tegrating vector and the results are consistent with the information shares derived based on the 
permanent-transitory decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Their generalized information 
share is particularly suitable for an analysis of interrelated, not necessarily almost identical markets 
(Lien & Shrestha, 2014). 
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significance level) for CBOT and Minneapolis wheat, soybeans, oats, gold, corn, cotton 
and natural gas.5 For these commodity markets, the contributions of spot and futures 
markets to the price discovery process are computed for every individual year of the 
1999-2014 sample period based on Eq. (6). For the remaining commodities, the coin-
tegration is tested on an annual basis and, only if the Johansen test detects cointegration 
at (at least) 20 percent significance level, the contributions of spot and futures markets 
to the price discovery process are calculated. 
Rate of convergence 
To measure the rate of convergence between spot and futures prices, we use the model 
of Garbade and Silber (1983): 
ܾܽݏ݅ݏ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߜܾܽݏ݅ݏ௧ିଵ ൅ ݁௧ (7), 
which is an AR (1)-model with ܾܽݏ݅ݏ௧ ൌ ݂ݑݐݑݎ݁ݏ	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ െ ݏ݌݋ݐ	݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ (Garbade and 
Silber, 1983; Moosa et al., 2002; Zhang and Wang, 2013). According to Garbade and 
Silber (1983), ߜ is inversely related to the elasticity of supply of arbitrage services. 
Thus, the lower (higher) the value of ߜ, the faster (slower) the rate of convergence and 
therefore the greater (lower) the elasticity to substitute the futures by spot market posi-
tions. Hence, it can be also interpreted as a measure to evaluate the risk transfer function 
for hedgers. If spot and futures prices do not converge until the expiration of a contract, 
hedgers may suffer from the price discrepancy between spot and futures price at expi-
ration of a futures contract and the price risk of their physical holdings would not be 
optimally offset. Since lower values of ߜ are associated with quicker convergence, we 
define the measure as inverse rate of convergence (IC). 
As we are interested in the relationship between the rate of convergence and the 
trading activity in terms of a cross-sectional analysis, we focus on the last 20 trading 
days until expiration of a contract in order to ensure the comparability for 16 different 
commodity markets. The number of contracts within a year varies largely among com-
modities. While for all energy futures contracts, contracts for each month are available, 
most grains futures (e.g. wheat and corn) have only five contracts per year. The longer 
the period until expiration, the more the IC measure may be distorted: For some com-
                                                            
5 The optimal lag order has been determined based on the Akaike criterion. Depending on the commodity 
markets, we augment Eq. (2) by different trend specifications (if required). 
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modities such as the three energy commodities, several contracts would approach the 
expiration at the same time, whereas for other commodities such as grains only one 
contract is near expiration. 
Fama/Mc Beth (1973) cross-sectional regressions 
The focus of our analysis is the impact of different trader categories on the price dis-
covery in the futures market and the convergence between spot and futures markets. 
Three different measures for the trading activity are considered: the share of long and 
short positions in the total open interest, i.e. the share variable, the pressure variable 
(i.e. the price pressure that is defined as the net long (short) positions relative to the total 
interest for speculators and small traders (hedgers)) and the propensity to trade, i.e. the 
PY variable, that is defined as the sum of the absolute differences from period ݐ to ݐ െ 1 
scaled by the total positions in period ݐ and ݐ െ 1: 
 
Share of Speculators:6 
ܵ݌݁ܿ௧ ൌ ௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ା௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ା௦௣௥௘௔ௗ௜௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ଶ∗௧௢௧௔௟	௢௣௘௡	௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧೟   (8). 
Share of Traders: 
݄ܵܽݎ݁௧௞ ൌ ௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ା௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ଶ∗௧௢௧௔௟	௢௣௘௡	௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧೟   (9). 
Trading Pressure: 
ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃	ܲݎ݁௧௟ ൌ ௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟௧௢௧௔௟	௢௣௘௡	௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧೟   (10). 
Hedging Pressure: 
ܪ ௧ܲ ൌ ௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟௧௢௧௔௟	௢௣௘௡	௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧೟   (11). 
 
                                                            
6 In the COT report, spreading positions are only reported for non-commercial traders. Those are the 
number of positions long and short in different maturities, namely calendar spread positions. 
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Propensity to trade:7 
ܲ ௧ܻ ൌ ௔௕௦ሺ௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభሻା௔௕௦ሺ௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభሻ௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభା௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభ   (12), 
with ݇ ൌ ݄݁݀݃݁ݎݏ, ݏ݈݈݉ܽ	ݐݎܽ݀݁ݎݏ and ݈ ൌ ݏ݌݁ܿݑ݈ܽݐ݋ݎݏ, ݏ݈݈݉ܽ	ݐݎܽ݀݁ݎݏ. The relative 
importance of a trading group (i.e. the share variable) is supposed to reflect the influ-
ence of the magnitude of the total positions of traders, both long and short positions, 
relative to the market. By contrast, the variable pressure reflects the net long or short 
positions of traders relative to the total market (i.e. open interest). As opposed to the 
market share of a particular trader group, the trading pressure captures whether the 
trader group is net long or net short, i.e. whether it is associated with buying or selling 
pressure. The propensity to trade describes how actively the traders adjust their 
positions (Kang et al., 2014). The positive correlation between trading pressure and 
propensity to trade may indicate a positive relationship between net positions and their 
changes. 
The cross-sectional analysis of the impact of traders on the measures for price 
discovery (PD) and for the inverse of the rate of convergence (IC) is based on the Fama 
and Mc Beth (1973) procedure: 
ܲܦ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ௉஽ܶܯ௜,௧௝ ൅ ݁௧ (13a). 
ܫܥ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚூ஼ܶܯ௜,௧௝ ൅ ݁௧ (13b), 
with ܲܦ௜,௧ for the measure of the contribution of the futures market to price discovery in 
ݐ for commodity ݅ (computed based on Eq. (4) and (6)), and ܫܥ௜,௧ as the measure for the 
inverse of the rate of convergence in ݐ for commodity ݅ (calculated based on Eq. (7)). 
ܶܯ௜,௧௝  represents the different trading measures in ݐ and commodity market ݅. For each 
year from January 1999 to December 2014 the PD and IC values are calculated. Then, 
both are regressed cross-sectionally over the ݅ ൌ ሼ1,… , 16ሽ commodity futures markets 
on the yearly averages of the ݆ trading measures for the three trader categories. The 
results of the yearly cross-sectional regressions can be found in Table A.1 – A.8. The 
long-term relationship of the PD and IC values with trading measures is calculated 
                                                            
7 ܲ ௧ܻ is calculated for each trader category in this way. All the ݆ trading measures are yearly averages of 
weekly data on trader positions. 
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according to Fama and McBeth (1973) as the average of the yearly values for ߚ௉஽ and 




  (14), 
where ߪఉ೘ is the standard deviation of the yearly coefficients ߚ௉஽ and ߚூ஼ and ݊ the 
number of yearly cross-sectional regressions. Additionally, the averages of the t-values 
from the yearly cross-sectional regressions are reported. 
3 Results 
3.1 Price Discovery and Trading Activity: Descriptive Statistics 
Price Discovery Process 
Table 2 shows the averages of the different measures that are used to measure the price 
discovery process: the contribution to the price discovery process of the futures markets 
PD (Panel A) and the convergence measure IC that is inversely related to the speed of 
convergence between spot and futures markets (Panel B). 
The higher the PD values the greater is the contribution of the futures market to 
the price discovery process relative to the spot market. A value of one would mean that 
the futures market alone determines the price discovery process, whereas a value of zero 
would indicate that price discovery takes place entirely in the spot market. A PD mea-
sure of 0.5 would reflect that both markets contribute equally to the price discovery 
process of a commodity. Panel A in Table 2 shows that the contributions of the futures 
market to the price discovery process, averaged over the 1999-2014 period, take only 
intermediate values: They range from 0.426 for Minneapolis wheat to 0.762 for silver. 
In general, the futures market plays a leading role in the price discovery process: PD 
measures above 0.5 are observed in 13 out of 16 commodity markets. The leading role 
of the futures market in the price discovery process may be explained by the fact that 
futures markets capture new information in a more efficient way than spot markets due 
to higher liquidity and transparency and lower transaction costs. The leading role of the 
futures market for heating oil and natural gas is consistent with the evidence of Shrestha 
(2014). Only in case of Minneapolis wheat, corn and crude oil, the spot market domi-
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nates the futures market in the price discovery process. The results for the CBOT corn 
market are at variance with the evidence of Kuiper et al. (2002) who confirm a leading 
role of the futures market. However, the difference may be due to the different sample 
periods. The differences among the three energy markets (heating oil, crude oil and 
natural gas) deserve some discussion: The spot markets for heating oil and natural gas 
are more or less localized markets. However, the international status of the crude oil 
spot market is characterized by a participation of large informed oil companies and 
refineries (Shrestha, 2014). 
The highest contribution of the futures market to the price discovery process can 
be observed for the four precious metals (Table A.1). This is not surprising given that 
the used gold and silver spot markets (Handy & Harman Base) are economically less 
important. Furthermore, time delays exist in the price fixing between spot and futures 
markets in case of platinum and palladium. There is a high variation in the PD measures 
among the agricultural commodities: In case of Kansas wheat, oats and cocoa, the 
futures market clearly dominates the price discovery process. For CBOT wheat, 
soybeans and cotton, the contribution of the futures market to the price discovery 
process is only marginally higher than that of the spot market. 
The convergence measure (IC) in Panel B of Table 2 reflects how quickly spot 
and futures prices converge during the 20-days-period preceding the expiration date of 
the futures contract. Importantly, the IC measure is inversely related to the speed of 
convergence: Low values of the IC measure indicate a high convergence between the 
spot and futures prices. For instance, a value of one would imply that spot and futures 
prices do not converge at all. The closer the IC measure is to the value of zero, the faster 
spot and futures prices converge towards expiration of the contract. Precious metals are 
the commodity group that is characterized not only by the highest contribution of the 
futures market to the price discovery process, but also by lowest IC values (Table A.1). 
While metals are on average the fastest to converge, the grains markets display the 
highest IC measures and, thus, converge rather slowly. Softs are also typically charac-
terized by high IC measures: Sugar has the highest value (IC=0.943), which indicates a 
very low rate of convergence between spot and futures prices. The three energy com-
modities account for intermediate values of the both measures for price discovery/ 
convergence (Table A.1). 
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Although there is no clear-cut theoretical link between the contribution of the 
futures market to the price discovery according to the permanent-transitory decom-
position of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and the rate of convergence of Garbade and 
Silber (1983), the relationship between both variables is generally negative. Markets 
with the highest contributions of the futures market to the price discovery (gold, silver, 
platinum and palladium) are also those characterized by the lowest IC measures, i.e. the 
highest speed of convergence. Commodities with comparatively low contributions of 
the futures market to the price discovery (e.g. wheat, MW, corn, sugar) are among those 
with the highest IC measures, i.e. lowest rates of convergence. A notable exception is 
the Kansas wheat where both the contribution of the futures market to the price dis-
covery and the IC measure are among the highest. 
 
Trading activity 
Panels C-F of Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the different measures of 
trading activity. For speculators, the average share of the total open interest is around 26 
percent. Exceptionally, the relative importance of speculators for Minneapolis wheat, 
oats and heating oil futures markets is substantially lower. Hedgers’ share ranges bet-
ween 50 and 60 percent, whereas long and short positions of small traders account on 
average for 15 percent of the total open interest. The low values of the relative impor-
tance of speculators in Minneapolis wheat and oats futures markets seem to be compen-
sated by small traders who are strongly represented in these two grains markets with 
25.2 and 23.1 percent of the total open interest, respectively. Only precious metals 
futures markets are characterized by a pronounced price pressure coming from net long/ 
short positions of speculators/hedgers. Net long positions of small traders are on aver-
age around zero. In the precious metals and oats futures markets, net long positions 
amount to 10 percent of open interest. 
The propensity to trade is on average the highest for speculators, indicating that 
they trade more “impatiently” compared to hedgers and small traders. Trading activity 
of hedgers is characterized by the lowest values for the propensity to trade measure, 
which can be explained by the fact that hedgers do not regularly revise their positions as 
they are mainly interested in hedging their physical commodity exposure over inter-
mediate time horizons. This is usually done at low frequencies instead of frequent revi-
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sions of positions, as it is typical for speculators. Open interest is a common proxy for 
market depth. The largest markets by number of open contracts are crude oil, corn, 
natural gas, sugar and soybean futures markets (Panel F, Table 2). 
As far as the relationship between different measures for trading activity is 
concerned, Table A.2 shows that the used measures for trading activity are not inter-
changeable. Only for hedgers, there is a strong positive link between net short positions 
scaled by open interest and the propensity to trade. Net positions scaled by open interest 
(i.e. “buying” or “selling” pressure) and the propensities to trade are positively cor-
related, whereas the relationship between the relative importance of a trading group in 
the total trading activity (i.e. the share variable) and the propensity to trade is negative 
for all three trader groups. The positive correlation between the trading pressure and 
propensity to trade may indicate a positive relationship between net positions and their 
changes. 
Recent studies point out that a high correlation between hedgers and speculators 
may make it difficult to distinguish between the price effects of the two trader groups 
(e.g. Bosch and Pradkhan, 2015). Table A.3 shows the correlations between different 
trader groups (speculators, hedgers and small traders) for different proxies for trading 
activity (i.e. the share, pressure and propensity to trade variables) computed for 16 
commodity markets based on the 1999-2014 averages. Whereas the correlations bet-
ween the propensities to trade of different trader categories are comparatively moder-
ate, the correlation between the relative importance of speculators and hedgers amounts 
to -0.64. The problem is especially severe in case of the net trader positions (i.e. trading 
pressure) of speculators and hedgers as well as hedgers and small traders. In these cases 
the correlations amount to 0.95 and 0.74, respectively. In addition, Table A.4 shows the 
correlations between the different measures for trading activity in individual commodity 
markets. A consideration of individual commodity markets also supports the idea that 
trading activities of the examined trader groups (speculators, hedgers, small traders) are 
highly correlated. As opposed to Table A.3, Table A.4 shows that propensities to trade 
of different trader categories are highly correlated in most commodity markets. Given 
the high correlations between the trading activities of different trader categories, it 
would be difficult to discern which trader category influences the price discovery. For 
instance, a significant coefficient estimate on the net short positions of hedgers in the 
Fama-MacBeth regressions may be the consequence of a significant impact of net long 
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positions of speculators, given that the correlation between net long positions of specu-
lators and net long positions of hedgers is close to one. 
3.2 Interaction between Price Discovery and Trading Activity (COT 
report) 
Table 3 summarizes the results for the Fama-MacBeth estimations where the contri-
bution of the futures market to the price discovery process is regressed on various mea-
sures of trading activity. There is no evidence that either trader category impacts the 
contribution of the futures market to the price discovery. However, Table A.6 shows 
that speculative and hedging pressure is positively related to price discovery, yet exclu-
sively at the level of individual years (2006, 2008, 2012, 2014). Interestingly, the net 
long positions of small traders also seem to increase the leading role of the futures 
market in the price discovery process for the years 2006 and 2008 (Table A.6). 
However, given the high correlation between speculative and hedging pressure, as 
shown in Table A.3 and A.4, it is not possible to deduce which trader category (either 
speculators or hedgers or small traders) enhances the price discovery process. It is 
possible that not an individual trader category, but the interaction of all trader types that 
has a positive effect on the role of the futures market in the price discovery process. 
Furthermore, Table A.7 reveals that the propensity to trade of hedgers had a strong 
positive effect on price discovery during the 2008/09 financial crisis. In this period, 
commodity prices experienced extreme conditions with prices moving from a long-term 
high to a long-term low for most commodities. During this period, hedgers were forced 
to frequently revise their positions in order to keep the physical holdings hedged in an 
environment of extreme price swings. As hedgers provide additional liquidity supply in 
extreme market conditions, the commodity futures market could have profited from a 
more active participation of hedgers. Consequently, this improves price discovery in 
futures markets.8 
The absence of any significant impact of traders’ positions on the contribution of 
the futures market to the price discovery process in commodity futures markets is at 
variance with the evidence of Chen et al. (2014) for currency futures markets. Chen et 
al. (2014) find that the speculative/hedging activity is positively/negatively related to 
contribution of the currency futures markets to the price discovery that is measured by 
                                                            
8 Importantly, the estimation results for individual years should not be given much emphasis: The number 
of observations for estimations at the level of individual years is 14 at maximum, often even lower: PD 
shares are calculated only for those commodities where spot and futures prices are cointegrated. 
28 
 
the information share of Hasbrouck (1995). We do not use the information share of 
Hasbrouck (1995) that may not be suitable in case of commodity markets that 
frequently switch between contango/backwardation regimes. The information share of 
Hasbrouck (1995) and the information share computed based on the permanent-transi-
tory decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) should yield identical results only 
under the assumption that there is no contemporaneous correlation between the distur-
bances in the individual markets (Baillie et al., 2002). Moreover, our estimations are 
carried out on an annual basis, whereas Chen et al. (2014) use high frequency data to 
derive the information shares and carry out the estimations on a weekly basis. The use 
of high frequency data allows incorporating the time-varying component of the price 
discovery process that may be better matched with weekly changes in trader positions. 
Relying on annual data also allows capturing the time-varying component of price 
discovery, but to a lesser extent. 
The size of the futures market measured by open interest seems completely un-
related to price discovery (Table 3). With the exception at the level of individual years, 
the coefficient estimate on open interest is significant (Table A.8). However, the 
negative effect of open interest on the contribution of the futures market to price disco-
very in years 2008 and 2009 is not compatible with our initial hypothesis that a higher 
market depth facilitates market efficiency and price discovery in the futures markets. 
Table 4 summarizes the cross-sectional results for the rate of convergence. As 
opposed to the permanent-transitory measure, there is more evidence that trading 
activity impacts the rate of convergence. For speculators, there is the strongest evidence 
that their trading activity (either the relative importance or net long positions) increases 
the speed of convergence between spot and futures markets. Hedging pressure also 
increases the rate of convergence, but this effect is only marginally significant. The 
trading activity of small traders does not appear to impact the rate of convergence. This 
may not be surprising given that the economic significance of this trader category is 
substantially lower than that of hedgers and speculators. An additional reason why non-
reportable traders may not play an important role in the price discovery process may be 
that this trader category is comprised of heterogeneous traders with different prefer-
ences and trading strategies. In this case, the effect of the trading activity of non-
reportable traders as a group may be rather insignificant as opposed to hedgers and 
speculators who represent more homogeneous trader groups.  
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Considering the individual years (Tables A.9-A.10) confirms the estimation 
results on the aggregate basis. In addition, we detect a significant negative effect of net 
long positions of small (i.e. non-reportable) traders during the 2004-2012 period. 
However, due to high correlations between the three trader categories (Table A.3), the 
negative coefficient estimate on the IC measure cannot be interpreted as evidence that 
small traders increase the convergence between spot and futures markets. 
At the level of individual years9 (Table A.9), hedgers and small traders have a 
positive effect on the IC measure, i.e. a higher share of small traders is associated with a 
slower rate of convergence during the 1999-2001 period, whereas a higher share of 
traders reduces the rate of convergence during the 2006-2008 period. Remarkably, 
hedgers’ propensity to trade has an opposite effect on the convergence between spot and 
futures markets during the 2006-2008 period (Table A.11). Hence, just having more 
hedgers in a market is no guarantee for futures contracts to converge, actively trading 
hedgers are needed for a quicker convergence at least in some years. Similar results, but 
much weaker, are found for small traders. For the open interest, there is no significant 
impact on the rate of convergence even at the level of individual years (Table A.12). 
This finding indirectly supports the importance of the interaction between the traders: 
Market size measured by open interest plays a minor role for the pricing behavior of a 
futures market regarding price discovery and rate of convergence. There are even cases 
(in year 2000, 2008, and 2009) where a higher open interest leads to a deterioration of 
price discovery in futures markets. Extreme market conditions, at least for 2008 and 
2009, could be a further reason. The larger the futures market, the more likely it is that a 
larger amount of unprofessional traders participate in the futures market. For small 
investors it is much more common to invest in large futures markets (e.g. energy com-
modities as well as gold and silver) or grains (e.g. corn, soybeans and CBOT wheat). 
While active hedgers contribute positively to price discovery, unprofessional small 
investors could be the market’s share that hinder price discovery by passive investing. 
Thus, a higher contribution to price discovery is left over for spot markets, where small 
investors do not participate. 
                                                            
9 The results for individual years should be treated with caution: The number of observations for 
estimations at the level of individual years is 14. 
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3.3 Disaggregated Commitments of Traders Report and Index Investment 
Data 
The fact that the used proxies for hedgers and speculators, i.e. the commercial and non-
commercial traders of the COT report, are highly aggregated across different trader 
types may counteract our purpose to find out which trader category is associated with 
informational trades and, thus, enhances the efficiency of the futures market. For inst-
ance, professional speculators such as hedge funds are more likely to benefit from 
private information on fundamentals than the smaller less informed speculators, e.g. 
other reportables. However, the non-commercial category of the COT report aggregates 
both trader categories. Similarly, the commercial trader category of the COT report 
encompasses both the producers/merchants/processors/users (PMPUs) and the swap 
dealers. PMPUs represent the typical hedgers who hedge their physical commodity 
exposures. Swap dealers often act as counterparties to the commodity index investors 
who have no physical commodity exposure. Consequently, they are less likely to gather 
information on commodity fundamentals. Whereas commodity index investment is 
typically associated with non-informational trading, producers/merchants/processors/ 
users may benefit from private information on fundamentals. To account for the differ-
ences within the commercial and non-commercial trader category, we also consider the 
subgroups of these trader categories as provided by the DCOT report. 
The DCOT report disaggregates the commercial and non-commercial traders into 
producers/merchants/processors/users, swap dealers, money managers and other repor-
tables. PMPUs, a subgroup of the commercial trader category of the COT report, are 
involved in “the production, processing, packing or handling of a physical commodity” 
and enter futures markets in order to hedge the associated risks (CFTC, 2009). Swap 
dealers that are classified as commercial traders in the COT report use futures markets 
to hedge risks related to their dealing in swaps for a commodity (CFTC, 2009). 
According to CFTC (2009), the swap dealers’ counterparties are typically speculative 
traders and traditional PMPUs. The non-commercial trader category is decomposed into 
money managers and other reportables. The money managers (or managed money) 
category encompass registered commodity trading advisors, registered commodity pool 
operators and unregistered funds that are engaged in managing and conducting orga-
nized futures trading on behalf of clients (CFTC, 2009). Although this trader category is 
commonly associated with professional speculators such as hedge funds, which try to 
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gather information on commodity fundamentals and trade on the discovered (private) 
information, several studies identify trend following as one of the main investment 
strategies of commodity trading advisors (Baltas and Kosowski, 2013; Hutchinson and 
O’Brian, 2014). Trend following is at variance with the idea that trading activity of 
professional speculators carries private information and, thus, enhances contribution to 
price discovery of the futures market and convergence between spot and futures 
markets. Other reportables represent “a wide array of other non-commercial 
(speculative) traders” (CFTC, 2009). 
In addition, we also account for commodity index investors. Due to the immense 
growth of index investment in the last decade, the CFTC has reacted to the need for 
transparency and supplies data on index traders’ positions on a quarterly basis going 
back to December 2007. From June 30, 2010 onwards, they provide monthly data. All 
investors engaged in index trading activities, such as index funds, swap dealers, pension 
funds, hedge funds, mutual funds, exchange traded funds or other exchange traded 
products, are required to report their positions to the CFTC. The study of the U.S. 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (USS PSoI, 2009) documents that 
the activity of index investors leads to a divergence between spot and futures prices and 
that spot and futures prices do not converge near expiration anymore in the wheat 
futures markets. As index traders are typically associated with passive long investment 
and driven by motives such as portfolio diversification, they can be seen as uninformed 
traders: They invest in broad commodity indices (e.g. the Standard & Poor’s-Goldman 
Sachs Commodity Index and the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index or sub-indices) 
and usually do not analyze individual commodities in detail. By contrast, Stoll and 
Whaley (2010) do not find any link between the lack of convergence and commodity 
index investment: They demonstrate that despite the fact, that convergence of the wheat 
futures contract has actually worsened, it can still be effectively used as a tool to 
manage risk in commodity business. Although commodity index traders are commonly 
associated with noise traders (USS PSoI, 2009), Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) argue that 
commodity index investors provide price risk insurance to hedgers and, thus, reduce the 
cost of hedging. In this respect, the trading activity of commodity index investors would 
fulfill the role of traditional speculators. 
Tables 5-7 summarize the results on the impact of the individual trader categories 
on the contribution of the futures market to price discovery and the inverse rate of con-
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vergence. The following trader categories are considered: money managers and other 
reportables, producers/merchants/processors/users (PMPUs) and swap dealers, non-
reportables as well as commodity index traders. The decomposition of commercial and 
non-commercial traders in subcategories (money managers and other reportables, 
PMPUs and swap dealers) adds little to the previous results as shown in Table 3: There 
is no evidence that any trader category impacts the contribution of the futures market to 
the price discovery process (Table 5, Panel A in Table 7). When the individual years are 
considered, the coefficient estimates on the share variable are only marginally signi-
ficant for money managers and PMPUs for individual years. For the trading pressure 
variable, there is some evidence that positions of money managers and non-reportables 
increase the contribution of the futures market to price discovery at the level of indivi-
dual years. This would be consistent with the idea that professional speculators trade on 
private information and correct any potential mispricing (Table A.13). For the pro-
pensity to trade of swap dealers, there is only controversial evidence at the level of 
individual years: If significant, the sign of the propensity to trade variable changes sign 
across individual years (Panel C, Table A.13). For commodity index traders, there is 
solely controversial evidence on the price discovery process: The relative importance 
and the rising net long positions of index traders, i.e. the share and pressure variables, 
reduce the price efficiency of the futures market, whereas their propensity to trade is 
positively related to the futures market efficiency (Table A.15). These results are 
especially puzzling given that they can be observed for the same year 2014. Theore-
tically, a higher volatility of positions, i.e. a frequent adjustment of positions, of com-
modity index traders that are typically associated with non-information trading may 
bring additional noise and should reduce the contribution of the futures market to the 
price discovery process. The observed positive coefficient estimate on the index traders’ 
propensity to trade is not consistent with this idea. 
As opposed to the lack of statistical significance regarding the contribution of the 
futures market to price discovery, statistically significant results are obtained for the 
inverse measure of convergence (Table 6; Panel B, Table 7). For money managers, there 
is strong evidence that the relative importance and rising net long positions reduce the 
inverse rate of convergence, i.e. that they increase the convergence between spot and 
futures markets. The positive effect on convergence would be consistent with the idea 
that professional speculators trade on private information on commodity fundamentals 
and, thus, increase the efficiency of commodity futures markets (Panel B, Table 6). In 
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addition, we observe a negative relationship between rising net long positions of other 
reportables and the inverse rate of convergence (Panel D, Table 6). These results are 
compatible with results on professional speculators (money managers). In this respect, 
the results on the decomposition of non-commercial traders into professional specu-
lators (money managers) and other speculative traders (other reportables) are consistent 
with the results on non-commercial traders (Table 4): Different types of speculators are 
associated with a higher rate of convergence between spot and futures markets, which 
would speak in favor of the informational content of the trading activity of all types of 
speculators. These appear to correct mispricing and increase the convergence between 
spot and futures markets. 
Strikingly, we observe an opposite effect for hedgers: The relative importance of 
the PMPUs, i.e. the share variable, is positively related to the inverse rate of conver-
gence, i.e. the PMPUs appear to deter the convergence between spot and futures 
markets (Panel A, Table 6). Similar results can be achieved for another subcategory of 
the commercial traders, the swap dealers: Their positions, i.e. the trading pressure vari-
able, have a negative effect on the rate of convergence (Panel C, Table 6). Hence, both 
subcategories of the “commercial trader” category appear to reduce the rate of conver-
gence between spot and futures markets. This evidence is not consistent with the predi-
ction that trading activity of hedgers is driven by private information. The results on the 
PMPUs and swap dealers are also not compatible with the results on the “commercial 
trader” category before it has been decomposed in its subcategories: Panel B in Table 4 
shows that the hedging pressure variable is negatively related to the inverse rate of 
convergence, i.e. that rising short positions of hedgers increase the convergence 
between spot and futures markets. Although the positive sign on the share variable in 
Panel B in Table 4 is statistically not significant, it is consistent with the results on the 
PMPUs as shown in Panel A in Table 6. 
The relative importance of commodity index traders (i.e. the share variable) and 
their trading activity (i.e. the trading pressure variable) increase the inverse rate of 
convergence (Panel B, Table 7). This evidence is consistent with the idea that the rising 
participation of commodity index traders whose trading activity is typically related to 
diversification. Additionally, it is not supposed to reflect fundamental information, 
which may impede the convergence between spot and futures markets. 
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It is worth pointing out that our results may be contaminated by endogeneity 
concerns. From our regression specifications that relate measures of price discovery 
over the period ݐ to the trading activity over the same period, we cannot infer with 
precision whether a significant coefficient estimate on the trading activity variable 
reflects the impact of trading activity on price discovery or the impact of price discovery 
(i.e. the efficiency of futures markets) on trader participation in futures markets.10 
However, our adopted interpretation in terms of an impact of traders on price discovery 
is more intuitive. Omitted variable bias may also impair the validity of causal evidence: 
Empirical research suggests that there exist important linkages and spillovers 
(Silvennoinen and Thorp, 2013; Mensi et al., 2013; Gao and Liu, 2014). If the activity 
of the examined trader groups is correlated with macroeconomic or financial variables, 
the significant coefficient estimate on trading activity may simply reflect the impact of 
these omitted variables on the price discovery process. 
4 Conclusion 
We analyze the price discovery process in a broad range of commodity futures markets 
(agricultural, energy and precious metals markets) over the 1999-2014 period. Fol-
lowing Chen et al. (2014) who investigate the impact of various trader positions from 
the CFTC report on price discovery in currency futures markets, we explore how the 
trading activity of different trader types (hedgers, speculators, index traders) impacts the 
contribution of the futures market to price discovery and the rate of convergence 
between commodity spot and futures markets. 
There is only scarce evidence that any trader category affects the contribution of 
the futures market to the price discovery process when the total sample period is consi-
dered. Statistically significant effects are only detected at the level of individual years. 
In this case, there is some evidence that commercial and non-commercial traders en-
                                                            
10  For instance, a positive relationship between the rate of convergence and speculative activity may be 
interpreted as evidence of the informational content of the trading activity of speculators who correct 
mispricing and increase convergence between spot and futures markets. At the same time, an alter-
native interpretation of a positive relationship between the rate of convergence and speculative acti-
vity cannot be ruled out: If markets are highly inefficient, speculators may be less likely to enter 
futures markets, as predicted by the model of De Long et al. (1990) who show that risk-averse arbitra-
geurs are less likely to enter markets and engage in arbitrage in the presence of noise since they are in 
danger to incur losses when they liquidate their investments in mispriced assets. Similarly, a negative 
relationship between hedging activity and the rate of convergence between spot and futures markets 
may be interpreted either as an indication that hedging activity contains noise and reduces market 
efficiency or as an indication that producers are less likely to hedge via futures markets if spot and 
futures markets do not converge. 
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hance the price discovery process in futures markets. However, given the high cor-
relation between speculative and hedging pressure, we cannot identify which trader 
category is responsible for this effect. A possible explanation may be that it is the inter-
action of both trader types that has a positive effect on the contribution of the futures 
market to the price discovery process. When the decomposition of non-commercial 
traders in subcategories is considered, there is some evidence that positions of money 
managers and non-reportables increase the contribution of the futures market to price 
discovery at the level of individual years. This result would be consistent with the idea 
that professional speculators trade on private information and correct any potential 
mispricing. Yet, this evidence is only marginally significant. For commodity index 
traders whose activity is frequently associated with noise, there is only controversial 
evidence: The relative importance and the rising net long positions of index traders 
reduce the contribution of the futures market to the price discovery process. By contrast, 
their propensity to trade is positively related to the futures market efficiency. 
There is strong evidence that the relative importance and rising net long positions 
of money managers and rising net long positions of other reportables increase the rate of 
convergence between spot and futures markets. These results are consistent with the 
idea of the informational content of trading activity of all types of speculators. They 
correct mispricing and increase convergence between spot and futures markets. By 
contrast, we obtain only controversial results for hedgers. Producers/merchants/ 
processors/users and swap dealers, i.e. the two subcategories of the commercial trader 
category, reduce the rate of convergence between spot and futures markets. This evi-
dence is at variance with the prediction that trading activity of hedgers is driven by 
private information. On the other hand, rising short positions of commercial traders 
appear to increase the convergence between spot and futures markets. The relative 
importance of commodity index traders and their trading activity are negatively related 
to the rate of convergence between spot and futures markets. This is consistent with the 
allegation that a rising participation of commodity index traders, whose trading activity 
is typically related to diversification and is not supposed to reflect fundamental infor-
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Table 1: Futures and Spot Price Data 
Futures Prices Corresponding Spot Prices 
Energy  
WTI Light Crude Oil (NYMEX) - CL WTI Crude FOB Oil Spot Cushing (IEA) 
Natural Gas (NYMEX) - NG Natural Gas Henry Hub 
NY Harbor Heating Oil (NYMEX) - HO Heating Oil No. 2 FOB New York Harbor 
Metals  
Gold (COMEX) - GC Gold, Handy & Harman Base 
Silver (COMEX) - SL Silver, Handy & Harman Base 
Platinum (NYMEX) - PL Platinum, LPPM (afternoon fixing) 
Palladium (NYMEX) - PA Palladium, LPPM (afternoon fixing) 
Grains  
Corn (CBOT) - C Corn, No. 2 Yellow (USDA) 
Soybeans (CBOT) - S Soybeans, No. 1 Yellow (USDA) 
Wheat (CBOT) - W Soft Red Winter Index, MGEX 
Wheat (KCBOT) - KW Hard Red Winter Wheat, Kansas City Terminal 
Wheat (MGEX) - MW Hard Red Spring Wheat, Minneapolis Terminal 
Oats (CBOT) - O Oats, No. 2 Milling Minneapolis 
Softs  
Cocoa (ICE)11 - CC Cocoa-ICCO 
Cotton No. 2 (ICE)2 - CT Cotton, 1 1/16 Strict Low -Middling, Memphis 
Sugar No. 11 (ICE)2 - SB Sugar, Crystal, Sao Paulo12 
Note: Table 1 lists all futures contracts used in the analysis with their corresponding futures markets, 
abbreviations and spot prices. NYMEX – New York Mercantile Exchange, COMEX – New York 
Commodity Exchange, CBOT – Chicago Board of Trade, KCBOT – Kansas City Board of Trade, MGEX – 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange, ICE – Intercontinental Exchange, WTI – West Texas Intermediate, FOB – 
free on board, EIA –International Energy Agency, USDA – United States Department of Agriculture, 
LPPM – London Platinum and Palladium Market, ICCO - International Cocoa Organization. 
  
                                                            
11 Since September 2007 ICE, former NYBOT. 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, averages of all measures 
 W KW MW C S O CT CC SB CL HO NAT GC SI PL PA 
Panel A: price discovery (PD) 
PD measure 0.545 0.709 0.426 0.472 0.524 0.596 0.506 0.644 0.571 0.455 0.713 0.557 0.633 0.762 0.702 0.636 
Panel B: inverse rate of convergence (IC) 
ME measure 0.912 0.725 0.792 0.831 0.748 0.843 0.866 0.628 0.943 0.519 0.692 0.594 0.083 0.119 0.269 0.245 
Panel C: Speculation measures 
Share 0.307 0.228 0.151 0.246 0.260 0.186 0.272 0.246 0.210 0.233 0.170 0.292 0.330 0.312 0.352 0.324 
Pressure -0.015 0.127 0.092 0.103 0.121 0.166 0.044 0.078 0.098 0.059 0.038 -0.076 0.225 0.249 0.435 0.329 
PY 0.069 0.092 0.138 0.073 0.086 0.127 0.098 0.085 0.097 0.077 0.126 0.087 0.087 0.084 0.104 0.091 
Panel D: Hedger measures 
Share 0.478 0.538 0.573 0.508 0.494 0.567 0.588 0.648 0.624 0.594 0.628 0.499 0.495 0.452 0.504 0.547 
Pressure -0.022 0.112 0.109 0.030 0.098 0.307 0.083 0.115 0.144 0.061 0.088 -0.028 0.313 0.404 0.534 0.391 
PY 0.043 0.043 0.051 0.033 0.043 0.062 0.050 0.032 0.040 0.031 0.041 0.031 0.058 0.058 0.071 0.059 
Panel E: Small Trader measures 
Share 0.149 0.195 0.252 0.190 0.181 0.231 0.106 0.067 0.131 0.076 0.150 0.081 0.121 0.175 0.139 0.121 
Pressure -0.007 -0.015 0.016 -0.073 -0.022 0.141 0.040 0.037 0.046 0.002 0.050 0.048 0.088 0.155 0.099 0.062 
PY 0.053 0.070 0.087 0.032 0.046 0.094 0.082 0.116 0.077 0.085 0.063 0.066 0.080 0.059 0.100 0.113 
Panel F: Open Interest1
Open Interest 2.925 1.112 0.392 9.031 3.827 0.119 1.349 1.347 4.986 10.372 2.219 7.032 3.281 1.104 0.234 0.152 
Note: Table 2 reports the arithmetic averages of the yearly values of the price discovery measure and the inverse rate of convergence (Panel A & B), and the arithmetic averages of the trading measures 
(Panel C – F) based on weekly data. All averages are calculated for the time period January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2014.  W=CBOT Wheat, KW=Kansas City Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, 
C=Corn, S=Soybeans, O=Oats, CT=Cotton, CC=Cocoa, SB=Sugar, CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating Oil, NG=Natural Gas, GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium. PY= propensity to 
trade. 1- number of open interest divided by 100.000.
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Table 3: Cross-sectional results of several trading activity (COT) measures on price discovery 
Coeff. t-stat (FM) Avg. t.stat max min Avg. Adj. 
R² 
Panel A: Speculators 
Share 0.514 0.35 0.18 2.065 -1.379 -0.02
Speculative Pressure 0.210 0.50 0.69 0.938 -0.461 0.05 
Prospensity to trade -0.144 -0.06 0.15 4.283 -5.436 -0.03 
Panel B: Hedgers 
Share 0.151 0.16 0.17 1.698 -1.466 0.01
Hedging Pressure 0.242 0.80 0.97 0.844 -0.318 0.07 
Prospensity to trade 3.285 0.42 0.46 26.406 -5.709 0.04 
Panel C: Small Trader 
Share -0.328 0.42 0.46 1.900 -2.210 0.01
Speculative Pressure 0.877 1.34 1.05 1.904 -0.567 0.04 
Prospensity to trade 0.889 0.43 0.48 5.218 -3.024 -0.01 
Panel D: Open Interest 
Open Interest -0.013 0.60 -0.77 0.064 -0.086 0.06
Note: Table 3 reports the coefficients, the t-statistic according Fama-McBeth (FM, 1973), the arithmetic average of the t-statistics from 
the yearly cross-sectional results, the maximum and the minimum of all yearly calculated coefficients, and the arithmetic average of the 
yearly adjusted R² from the cross-sectional regression. 
Table 4: Cross-sectional results of several trading activity (COT) measures on inverse of convergence 
Coeff. t-stat (FM) Avg. t.stat max min Avg. Adj. 
R² 
Panel A: Speculators 
Share -1.921** -2.55 -2.05 -0.701 -3.246 0.18
Speculative Pressure -0.889** -2.43 -2.22 0.040 -1.519 0.21
Prospensity to trade 0.552 0.17 0.37 4.526 -6.258 0.00 
Panel B: Hedgers 
Share 0.876 0.92 0.96 2.849 -0.437 0.04
Hedging Pressure -0.746* -2.05 -2.49 0.048 -1.274 0.26
Prospensity to trade -7.219 -1.43 -1.37 2.018 -15.920 0.08 
Panel C: Small Trader 
Share 1.214 1.73 0.93 2.360 0.310 0.01
Speculative Pressure -1.931 -1.46 -1.83 0.278 -4.102 0.16
Prospensity to trade -2.937 -1.16 -0.94 1.084 -8.875 0.01
Panel D: Open Interest 
Open Interest 0.005 0.22 0.44 0.027 -0.048 -0.02 
Note: Table 4 reports the coefficients, the t-statistic according Fama-McBeth (FM, 1973), the arithmetic average of the t-statistics from 
the yearly cross-sectional results, the maximum and the minimum of all yearly calculated coefficients, and the arithmetic average of the 
yearly adjusted R² from the cross-sectional regression. **, * denote significance at 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
 43 
 
Table 5: Cross-sectional results of several trading activity (DCOT) measures on price discovery 
 Coeff. t-stat (FM) Avg. t.stat max min Avg. Adj. 
R² 
Panel A: PMPU 
Share -0.010 -0.02 -0.14 0.852 -0.981 -0.01 
Hedging Pressure 0.172 0.32 0.27 1.093 -0.460 0.02 
Prospensity to trade 0.925 0.15 0.19 12.704 -6.218 -0.01 
Panel B: Managed Money 
Share 0.056 0.06 0.23 1.540 -1.551 -0.02 
Speculative Pressure 0.295 0.44 0.81 1.288 -0.607 0.14 
Prospensity to trade 1.078 0.75 0.45 3.857 -1.107 -0.04 
Panel C: Swap Dealer 
Share 0.531 0.56 0.48 1.443 -1.100 -0.01 
Speculative Pressure -0.306 -0.65 -1.24 0.431 -0.893 0.12 
Prospensity to trade 1.860 0.60 0.69 6.073 -2.852 0.20 
Panel D: Other Reportables 
Share 0.507 0.26 0.16 3.709 -2.053 -0.06 
Speculative Pressure 0.970 0.55 0.73 3.109 -2.191 0.09 
Prospensity to trade -0.231 -0.22 -0.24 0.719 -2.626 -0.05 
Panel C: Non Reportables 
Share -0.037 -0.03 -0.16 1.897 -1.847 -0.02 
Speculative Pressure 0.295 0.44 0.81 1.288 -0.607 0.14 
Prospensity to trade 1.719 0.82 0.91 5.157 -0.745 0.04 
Note: Table 5 reports the coefficients, the t-statistic according Fama-McBeth (FM, 1973), the arithmetic average of the t-statistics from 
the yearly cross-sectional results, the maximum and the minimum of all yearly calculated coefficients, and the arithmetic average of the 
yearly adjusted R² from the cross-sectional regression. 
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Table 6: Cross-sectional results of several trading activity (DCOT) measures on inverse of convergence 
Coeff. t-stat (FM) Avg. t.stat max min Avg. Adj. 
R² 
Panel A: PMPU 
Share 0.93** 2.16 1.30 1.49 0.21 0.06
Hedging Pressure -0.46 -1.10 -0.76 0.11 -1.08 0.00
Prospensity to trade -1.58 -0.18 -0.47 10.51 -12.14 0.05
Panel B: Managed Money 
Share -2.31*** -3.00 -2.18 -1.41 -3.47 0.20
Speculative Pressure -1.31*** -5.91 -2.68 -1.12 -1.78 0.29
Prospensity to trade 0.63 0.23 0.37 2.76 -4.90 0.00
Panel C: Swap Dealer 
Share -1.07 -0.73 -0.86 0.86 -3.19 0.02
Speculative Pressure 1.38*** 8.46 3.75 1.55 1.08 0.43
Prospensity to trade -4.71 -1.24 -1.74 -0.23 -10.29 0.13
Panel D: Other Reportables 
Share -2.71 -1.25 -0.87 1.73 -5.22 0.01
Speculative Pressure -2.61*** -3.61 -1.65 -1.25 -3.28 0.11
Prospensity to trade 0.34 0.35 0.19 1.87 -1.29 -0.06
Panel E: Non Reportables 
Share 1.06* 1.79 0.63 2.28 0.39 -0.04
Speculative Pressure -2.94*** -3.96 -2.47 -2.06 -4.02 0.25
Prospensity to trade -4.31* -1.68 -1.19 -0.89 -8.77 0.04
Note: Table 6 reports the coefficients, the t-statistic according Fama-McBeth (FM, 1973), the arithmetic average of the t-statistics from 
the yearly cross-sectional results, the maximum and the minimum of all yearly calculated coefficients, and the arithmetic average of the 
yearly adjusted R² from the cross-sectional regression. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Cross-sectional results of several trading activity (Index Investment) measures on price 
discovery and inverse of convergence  
 Coeff. t-stat (FM) Avg. t.stat max min Avg. Adj. 
R² 
Panel A: Price Discovery 
Share -0.342 -0.59 -1.30 0.645 -1.023 0.19 
Speculative Pressure -0.728 -0.60 -0.93 1.451 -1.930 0.12 
Prospensity to trade 4.136 1.02 1.18 8.356 -1.858 0.16 
Panel B: Inverse of Convergence 
Share 0.735*** 3.32 3.32 2.010 1.028 0.37 
Speculative Pressure 1.400* 1.79 1.66 2.067 -0.071 0.18 
Prospensity to trade -6.548 -0.83 -1.34 3.167 -18.740 0.17 
Note: Table 7 reports the coefficients, the t-statistic according Fama-McBeth (FM, 1973), the arithmetic average of the t-statistics from 
the yearly cross-sectional results, the maximum and the minimum of all yearly calculated coefficients, and the arithmetic average of the 






Table A.1: Averages for price discovery and inverse of convergence measures 
 Average contribution of the 
futures market to the price 
discovery process 
Average inverse rate of 
convergence 
Agriculture 0.555 0.810 
Energy 0.575 0.602 
Precious Metals 0.683 0.179 
Note: Table A.1 shows the average PD and IC shares for different commodity groups. 
Table A.2: Correlations between different measures for trading activity 
 Speculators Hedgers Small traders 
Share & Pressure 0.47 -0.23 -0.01 
Share & PY -0.62 -0.33 -0.31 
Pressure & PY 0.11 0.87 0.46 
Note: Table A.2 reports the correlations the correlations between different measures of trading activity 
for speculators (COT non-commercial traders), hedgers (COT commercial traders) and small traders 
(COT non-reportable traders): the share variable (Eq. (9)-(11)), the pressure variable (Eq. (12)-(14)) and 
the propensity to trade (Eq. (15)). 
Table A.3: Correlations between different trader categories (1999-2014 cross-section) 
 Share Pressure PY 
Speculators & Hedgers -0.64 0.95 0.40 
Speculators & Small Traders -0.45 0.48 0.33 
Hedgers & Small Traders -0.24 0.74 0.36 





Table A.4: Correlations between different trader categories for individual commodities 
 WHC WHK WHM COR SOY OAT COT COC SUG CRU HEA NAT GOL SIL PLA PAL 
Panel A: Share Variable 
Speculators & 
Hedgers -0.577 -0.908 -0.771 -0.473 0.239 -0.363 -0.725 -0.928 -0.768 -0.980 -0.851 -0.979 -0.575 -0.778 -0.742 -0.922 
Speculators & 
Small Traders -0.551 -0.769 -0.505 -0.819 -0.808 -0.030 -0.547 -0.547 -0.686 -0.861 -0.747 -0.562 -0.578 0.254 -0.752 -0.741 
Hedgers & 
Small Traders 0.879 -0.005 -0.268 -0.722 -0.320 0.507 -0.489 -0.417 -0.274 -0.352 0.339 0.561 -0.483 0.636 -0.401 -0.642 
Panel B: Trading Pressure Variable
Speculators & 
Hedgers 0.724 0.788 0.933 0.945 0.777 0.678 0.993 0.971 0.878 0.990 0.840 0.978 0.971 0.959 0.968 0.965 
Speculators & 
Small Traders 0.241 -0.504 -0.822 -0.013 -0.219 -0.264 0.042 -0.243 -0.192 0.556 0.129 0.239 0.292 0.726 0.185 0.611 
Hedgers & 
Small Traders 0.844 0.134 -0.561 0.315 0.444 0.530 0.163 -0.003 0.301 0.666 0.647 0.435 0.511 0.890 0.427 0.798 
Panel C: Propensity to Trade 
Speculators & 
Hedgers 0.896 0.799 0.859 0.905 0.858 0.633 0.831 0.724 0.936 0.836 0.568 0.701 0.866 0.742 0.790 -0.124 
Speculators & 
Small Traders 0.324 0.556 0.659 0.158 0.151 0.032 -0.102 0.604 0.453 0.111 0.717 0.694 0.509 -0.041 0.662 0.533 
Hedgers & 
Small Traders 0.146 0.614 0.595 -0.005 0.142 -0.186 -0.021 0.623 0.467 0.295 0.611 0.348 0.608 0.359 0.357 0.268 
Note: Table A.4 reports the correlations between trading activity of different trader groups computed based on annual values for each of 16 commodity markets.
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Table A.5: Yearly cross-sectional results of traders’ share (COT) on price discovery 
 Spec t-stat Adj. R² Hedge t-stat Adj. R² NR t-stat Adj. R² 
1999 0.147 0.13 -0.12 1.698 1.80 0.20 -2.210** -2.41 0.35 
2000 0.157 0.22 -0.11 -0.050 -0.10 -0.11 0.127 0.15 -0.11 
2001 -1.379* -1.91 0.19 0.885 1.70 0.15 -1.302 -1.14 0.03 
2002 -0.620 -0.62 -0.05 0.350 0.49 -0.06 0.075 0.07 -0.08 
2003 0.122 0.08 -0.11 0.979 0.85 -0.03 -1.436 -1.32 0.07 
2004 0.451 0.48 -0.08 -1.466 -1.44 0.09 0.759 0.74 -0.04 
2005 2.065** 2.40 0.28 -1.166 -1.25 0.04 -1.838 -1.71 0.14 
2006 0.319 0.38 -0.06 -0.200 -0.31 -0.06 0.875 1.06 0.01 
2007 0.541 0.60 -0.05 -1.320 -1.67 0.11 -1.001 -0.90 -0.01 
2008 1.224* 1.84 0.17 -0.346 -0.41 -0.07 -0.671 -0.57 -0.06 
2009 -1.289 -1.06 0.01 1.488 1.47 0.09 1.180 0.63 -0.06 
2010 0.250 0.31 -0.08 0.307 0.44 -0.07 -0.390 -0.38 -0.08 
2011 0.746 0.88 -0.02 -0.621 -0.80 -0.03 -1.841 -1.70 0.15 
2012 0.030 0.03 -0.09 0.289 0.30 -0.08 1.900 1.40 0.08 
2013 -0.645 -0.62 -0.07 0.950 0.83 -0.03 0.881 0.59 -0.07 
2014 0.031 0.05 -0.11 0.644 0.90 -0.02 -0.360 -0.35 -0.10 
Note: Table A.5 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional regressions of COT traders’ 




Table A.6: Yearly cross-sectional results of trading pressure (COT) on price discovery  
 Spec 
pressure t-stat Adj. R² HP t-stat Adj. R² 
NR 
pressure t-stat Adj. R² 
1999 0.472 0.97 -0.01 0.418 1.13 0.03 0.795 0.85 -0.03 
2000 -0.240 -0.51 -0.08 0.260 0.75 -0.05 1.072** 2.30 0.30 
2001 0.321 0.39 -0.08 0.037 0.06 -0.10 -0.567 -0.47 0.65 
2002 0.210 0.46 -0.06 0.219 0.79 -0.03 0.675 1.14 0.02 
2003 -0.461 -0.69 -0.06 -0.050 -0.11 -0.11 0.946 0.88 -0.02 
2004 0.178 0.52 -0.07 0.193 0.84 -0.03 0.621 1.18 0.03 
2005 0.217 0.51 -0.07 0.118 0.38 -0.08 0.035 0.04 -0.09 
2006 0.684** 2.76 0.31 0.508** 2.89 0.33 1.134** 2.15 0.19 
2007 -0.426 -1.24 0.04 -0.214 -0.77 -0.03 0.382 0.47 -0.06 
2008 0.696* 2.16 0.23 0.635** 2.62 0.33 1.837** 2.30 0.26 
2009 0.287 0.51 -0.07 0.286 0.62 -0.06 0.944 0.62 -0.06 
2010 0.370 1.75 0.15 0.331* 1.87 0.17 0.787 1.17 0.03 
2011 -0.440 -1.66 0.14 -0.318 -1.30 0.06 0.408 0.40 -0.08 
2012 0.938** 2.58 0.32 0.844** 2.72 0.35 1.761 1.28 0.05 
2013 0.081 0.19 -0.11 0.129 0.33 -0.10 1.904 0.90 -0.02 
2014 0.477** 2.29 0.30 0.471** 2.69 0.38 1.293 1.63 0.14 
Note: Table A.6 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional regressions of COT trading 





Table A.7: Yearly cross-sectional results of traders‘propensity to trade on price discovery 
 PY Spec  t-stat Adj. R² PY hedge t-stat Adj. R² PY NR  t-stat Adj. R² 
1999 -1.806 -1.45 0.11 -1.424 -0.45 -0.10 2.300 0.66 -0.07 
2000 -0.578 -0.56 -0.07 0.169 0.05 -0.11 0.296 0.22 -0.11 
2001 1.214 0.69 -0.05 -4.580* -1.94 0.20 -0.911 -0.41 -0.08 
2002 1.702 1.20 0.03 3.060 0.67 -0.04 0.855 0.52 -0.06 
2003 -5.436 -1.58 0.13 -5.703 -1.21 0.04 1.194 0.47 -0.08 
2004 0.318 0.22 -0.09 3.257 1.20 0.04 -3.024 -1.01 0.00 
2005 -2.598 -1.29 0.05 -0.505 -0.12 -0.09 -1.760 -0.57 -0.06 
2006 -3.629 -1.38 0.06 2.694 1.00 0.00 0.892 0.36 -0.06 
2007 -1.847 3.17 -0.05 -1.889 -0.47 -0.06 -0.631 -0.26 -0.07 
2008 1.228 0.35 -0.08 10.447** 2.98 0.40 2.261 1.51 0.10 
2009 4.283 1.34 0.07 26.406** 2.50 0.32 1.008 0.27 -0.09 
2010 -0.590 -0.22 -0.09 3.787 0.62 -0.05 4.274** 3.00 0.40 
2011 0.363 0.09 -0.10 -3.612 -0.67 -0.05 0.242 0.08 -0.10 
2012 0.998 0.43 -0.07 8.507 1.54 0.10 1.932 0.70 -0.04 
2013 1.468 0.52 -0.08 2.020 0.25 -0.10 0.088 0.02 -0.11 
2014 2.606 0.82 -0.03 9.924 1.50 0.11 5.218* 2.06 0.24 
Note: Table A.7 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional regressions of COT traders’ 




Table A.8: Yearly cross-sectional results 
of open interest on price discovery 
 OI t-stat Adj. R² 
1999 -0.006 -0.09 -0.12 
2000 -0.086** -2.80 0.41 
2001 0.064 1.18 0.03 
2002 -0.048 -1.07 0.01 
2003 0.038 0.57 -0.07 
2004 -0.028 -0.80 -0.03 
2005 0.008 0.19 -0.09 
2006 -0.017 -1.31 0.05 
2007 0.013 1.03 0.00 
2008 -0.033** -3.10 0.42 
2009 -0.060* -1.95 0.20 
2010 -0.014 -1.25 0.05 
2011 0.015 1.06 0.01 
2012 -0.023 -1.79 0.15 
2013 -0.019 -0.98 0.00 
2014 -0.010 -1.13 -0.03 
Note: Table A.8 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the 
yearly cross-sectional regressions of open interest on the price discovery measure. 
**, * denote significance at 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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Table A.9: Yearly cross-sectional results of traders’ share (COT) on inverse of convergence 
Spec t-stat Adj. R² Hedge t-stat Adj. R² NR t-stat Adj. R² 
1999 -1.007 -1.02 0.00 -0.210 -0.24 -0.07 2.360* 2.12 0.19 
2000 -1.277 -1.71 0.11 0.036 0.06 -0.07 2.261** 2.23 0.21 
2001 -1.252 -1.61 0.10 0.070 0.12 -0.07 2.186* 1.91 0.15 
2002 -0.701 -0.55 -0.05 -0.217 -0.24 -0.07 1.139 0.88 -0.02 
2003 -1.708 -1.41 0.06 0.383 0.36 -0.06 1.250 1.04 0.01 
2004 -1.760 -1.50 0.08 0.689 0.70 -0.04 0.472 0.37 -0.06 
2005 -2.030 -2.59 0.28 1.046 1.24 0.03 1.040 1.01 0.00 
2006 -3.208*** -3.73 0.46 1.841** 2.29 0.22 0.310 0.25 -0.07 
2007 -3.246*** -3.45 0.42 2.849*** 3.00 0.35 0.955 0.65 -0.04 
2008 -2.522*** -3.66 0.45 2.343*** 3.16 0.37 0.755 0.51 -0.05 
2009 -1.542 -1.72 0.12 0.701 0.82 -0.02 0.527 0.37 -0.06 
2010 -2.648** -2.60 0.28 1.124 1.11 0.01 1.209 0.68 -0.04 
2011 -1.879 -1.58 0.09 0.807 0.71 -0.03 0.394 0.22 -0.07 
2012 -1.833* -1.97 0.16 1.712 1.61 0.10 0.975 0.53 -0.05 
2013 -2.678** -2.43 0.25 1.283 0.93 -0.01 2.281 1.35 0.05 
2014 -1.454 -1.21 0.03 -0.437 -0.32 -0.06 1.319 0.74 -0.03 
Note: Table A.9 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional regressions of COT traders’ share 
on the inverse of convergence. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Table A.10: Yearly cross-sectional results of trader’s pressure (COT) on inverse of convergence 
Spec 
pressure t-stat Adj. R² HP t-stat Adj. R² NR pressure t-stat Adj. R² 
1999 -0.481 -1.03 0.00 -0.379 -1.07 0.01 -0.721 -0.74 -0.03 
2000 0.040 0.06 -0.07 0.048 0.10 -0.07 0.076 0.09 -0.07 
2001 -0.906 -0.99 0.00 -0.346 -0.53 -0.05 0.278 0.24 -0.07 
2002 -0.523 -0.91 -0.01 -0.250 -0.70 -0.04 -0.256 -0.32 -0.06 
2003 -0.589 -1.10 0.01 -0.542 -1.41 0.06 -1.733 -1.66 0.10 
2004 -1.519*** -4.94 0.61 -0.950*** -4.16 0.52 -1.455* -2.09 0.18 
2005 -0.825** -2.52 0.26 -0.591** -2.49 0.26 -1.371* -1.84 0.14 
2006 -0.902** -2.40 0.24 -0.756*** -3.01 0.35 -2.139*** -3.19 0.38 
2007 -1.003** -2.32 0.23 -0.995*** -3.38 0.41 -2.961*** -3.87 0.48 
2008 -1.147** -2.50 0.26 -1.005** -2.85 0.32 -2.034* -1.85 0.14 
2009 -1.141*** -3.86 0.48 -1.012*** -4.65 0.58 -2.718*** -3.07 0.36 
2010 -1.048*** -3.32 0.40 -1.022*** -4.37 0.55 -3.119*** -3.38 0.41 
2011 -0.852* -2.07 0.18 -0.854** -2.42 0.25 -2.591* -1.78 0.13 
2012 -1.232** -2.57 0.27 -1.274*** -3.35 0.41 -3.965** -2.76 0.31 
2013 -0.975* -2.12 0.19 -0.962** -2.34 0.23 -4.102 -1.75 0.12 
2014 -1.117** -2.92 0.33 -1.044*** -3.12 0.37 -2.086 -1.32 0.05 
Note: Table A.10 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional regressions of COT trading 
pressure on the inverse of convergence. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table A.11: Yearly cross-sectional results of traders’ propensity to trade on inverse of convergence 
 PY Spec  t-stat Adj. R² PY hedge t-stat Adj. R² PY NR  t-stat Adj. R² 
1999 0.528 0.36 -0.06 -2.724 -0.95 -0.01 -0.847 -0.40 -0.06 
2000 2.338 1.74 0.12 -5.956 -1.28 0.04 -1.480 -0.75 -0.03 
2001 -0.529 -0.37 -0.06 -7.319*** -3.04 0.35 -4.095* -1.81 0.13 
2002 -2.162 -1.08 0.01 -8.801 -1.61 0.10 -3.279 -1.68 0.11 
2003 4.526* 2.02 0.17 2.018 0.40 -0.06 -0.701 -0.26 -0.07 
2004 0.995 0.50 -0.05 -2.788 -0.70 -0.03 1.084 0.34 -0.06 
2005 2.094 1.14 0.02 -3.060 -0.88 -0.01 -0.450 -0.16 -0.07 
2006 2.956 0.74 -0.03 -6.742* -1.86 0.14 -2.325 -0.66 -0.04 
2007 -5.679 -1.37 0.06 -13.918** -3.20 0.38 -3.527 -1.07 0.01 
2008 2.020 0.50 -0.05 -13.091** -2.41 0.24 -1.050 -0.50 -0.05 
2009 2.125 0.77 -0.03 -4.054 -0.42 -0.06 -2.830 -1.21 0.03 
2010 3.021 0.80 -0.02 -9.956 -0.93 -0.01 -6.769*** -2.36 0.23 
2011 -6.258 -1.16 0.02 -12.007 -1.72 0.12 -4.443 -0.97 0.00 
2012 2.708 0.93 -0.01 -9.827 -1.36 0.05 -2.340 -0.65 -0.04 
2013 3.419 1.01 0.00 -1.358 -0.17 -0.07 -5.066 -1.19 0.03 
2014 -3.262 -0.55 -0.05 -15.920 -1.75 0.12 -8.875 -1.66 0.11 
Note: Table A.11 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional regressions of COT traders’ 
propensity to trade on the inverse of convergence. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Table A.12: Yearly cross-sectional results 
of open interest on inverse of convergence 
 OI t-stat Adj. R² 
1999 -0.048 -0.97 0.00 
2000 -0.009 -0.17 -0.07 
2001 0.010 0.18 -0.07 
2002 -0.011 -0.21 -0.07 
2003 -0.034 -0.62 -0.04 
2004 -0.001 -0.03 -0.07 
2005 0.000 -0.01 -0.07 
2006 0.012 0.64 -0.04 
2007 0.011 0.57 -0.05 
2008 0.022 1.16 0.02 
2009 0.018 0.80 -0.02 
2010 0.026 1.38 0.06 
2011 0.017 0.88 -0.02 
2012 0.018 0.97 0.00 
2013 0.017 0.88 -0.02 
2014 0.027 1.53 0.08 
Note: Table A.12 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and 
adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional regressions of open 





Table A.13: Yearly cross-sectional results of trading measures (DCOT) on price discovery 
PMPU  t-stat Adj. R² MM   t-stat Adj. R² SW   t-stat Adj. R² OR   t-stat Adj. R² NR   t-stat Adj. R² 
Panel A: Share Variable 
2007 -0.981 * -2.063 0.189 0.325 0.324 -0.068 1.443 1.443 0.072 2.060 0.822 -0.024 -1.004 -0.900 -0.014 
2008 -0.107 -0.203 -0.087 1.540 * 2.151 0.232 0.491 0.509 -0.066 -0.045 -0.021 -0.091 -0.677 -0.576 -0.059 
2009 0.852 0.942 -0.010 -1.551 -1.067 0.012 1.157 0.746 -0.042 -2.053 -0.496 -0.074 1.196 0.639 -0.057 
2010 0.463 1.000 0.000 0.342 0.406 -0.075 -0.671 -0.915 -0.014 -0.639 -0.266 -0.084 -0.387 -0.374 -0.077 
2011 -0.680 -1.442 0.089 0.531 0.596 -0.062 1.093 1.264 0.051 2.320 0.861 -0.024 -1.847 -1.710 0.149 
2012 0.426 0.761 -0.036 0.243 0.226 -0.086 -1.100 -0.798 -0.031 -0.958 -0.411 -0.074 1.897 1.400 0.074 
2013 -0.008 -0.010 -0.111 -1.054 -0.952 -0.009 1.345 0.883 -0.022 3.709 0.933 -0.013 0.884 0.591 -0.070 
2014 -0.042  -0.090 -0.110 0.075   0.118 -0.109 0.486   0.742 -0.047 -0.338   -0.175 -0.107 -0.359   -0.352 -0.096 
Panel B: Trading Pressure Variable 
2007 -0.412 -1.112 0.017 -0.607 -1.511 0.084 -0.004 -0.012 -0.077 -0.082 -0.065 -0.077 0.375 0.457 -0.060 
2008 0.436 1.082 0.014 0.979 ** 2.888 0.380 -0.492 -1.598 0.115 -0.203 -0.160 -0.088 1.832 ** 2.274 0.258 
2009 0.636 0.018 0.018 0.255 0.367 -0.085 0.189 0.273 -0.092 2.084 0.911 -0.016 0.944 0.629 -0.058 
2010 0.234 0.633 -0.053 0.415 1.642 0.124 -0.501 -2.101 0.221 1.336 1.369 0.068 0.802 1.170 0.030 
2011 -0.460 -0.945 -0.010 -0.494 -1.473 0.096 0.431 1.164 0.031 -2.191 * -2.024 0.220 0.411 0.399 -0.083 
2012 1.093 2.730 0.350 1.288 ** 2.526 0.310 -0.388 -0.691 -0.045 2.858 ** 2.362 0.276 1.754 1.280 0.051 
2013 -0.244 -0.483 -0.083 -0.125 -0.249 -0.104 -0.787 -1.259 0.055 3.109 * 2.017 0.235 1.831 0.860 -0.027 
2014 0.096  0.241 -0.104 0.651 * 2.250 0.289 -0.893 *** -5.681 0.758 0.851   1.415 0.091 1.288   1.622 0.140 
Panel C: Propensity to Trade 
2007 0.746 0.190 -0.074 1.526 0.630 -0.045 -1.710 * -2.008 0.178 -2.626 ** -2.289 0.232 -0.745 -0.308 -0.069 
2008 7.621 * 2.165 0.235 -0.184 -0.060 -0.091 6.073 ** 3.014 0.403 0.058 0.038 -0.091 2.235 1.530 0.100 
2009 12.704 1.452 0.091 3.857 1.600 0.124 0.236 0.439 -0.079 0.246 0.146 -0.098 0.752 0.187 -0.096 
2010 -6.218 -1.032 0.005 -1.107 -0.653 -0.050 2.829 1.628 0.121 -0.422 -0.268 -0.084 4.271 ** 3.051 0.409 
2011 -2.297 -0.432 -0.080 0.999 0.380 -0.084 -2.852 ** -2.997 0.420 0.211 0.169 -0.097 0.249 0.085 -0.099 
2012 -3.777 -0.624 -0.054 0.893 0.498 -0.067 4.842 ** 2.582 0.321 0.284 0.168 -0.088 1.816 0.662 -0.049 
2013 -1.484 -0.183 -0.107 1.156 0.627 -0.065 1.887 0.544 -0.076 -0.322 -0.166 -0.108 0.014 0.004 -0.111 
2014 0.104  0.023 -0.111 1.488   0.604 -0.068 3.576 ** 2.316 0.304 0.719   0.251 -0.103 5.157 * 2.100 0.254 
Note: Table A.13 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional regressions of DCOT trading measures on the price discovery measure. ***, **, * denote 




Table A.14: Yearly cross-sectional results of trading measures (DCOT) on inverse of convergence 
PMPU   t-stat Adj. R² MM   t-stat Adj. R² SW   t-stat Adj. R² OR   t-stat Adj. R² NR   t-stat Adj. R² 
Panel A: Share Variable 
2007 1.363 * 2.027 0.172 -3.472 *** -3.300 0.397 -0.883 -0.606 -0.044 -2.981 -0.847 -0.019 0.983 0.669 -0.038 
2008 0.852 1.344 0.051 -2.905 *** -3.692 0.457 0.858 0.656 -0.039 -2.898 -1.021 0.003 0.739 0.504 -0.052 
2009 0.211 0.299 -0.065 -1.776 -1.700 0.112 0.495 0.430 -0.057 -2.309 -0.757 -0.029 0.527 0.369 -0.061 
2010 0.794 1.033 0.071 -2.981 ** -2.698 0.295 -0.652 -0.514 -0.052 -1.702 -0.437 -0.057 1.206 0.677 -0.037 
2011 0.560 0.758 -0.029 -1.412 -1.074 0.010 -0.912 -0.695 -0.036 -5.218 -1.504 0.078 0.392 0.215 -0.068 
2012 0.896 1.327 0.048 -1.722 -1.387 0.058 -1.130 -0.652 -0.040 -5.045 * -2.116 0.188 0.989 0.536 -0.050 
2013 1.487 * 1.828 0.135 -2.566 * -2.096 0.184 -3.149 * -1.963 0.016 -3.266 -0.914 -0.011 2.281 1.348 0.052 
2014 1.293 * 1.787 0.128 -1.621   -1.461 0.070 -3.186 *** -3.522 0.432 1.735   0.637 -0.041 1.330   0.748 -0.030 
Panel B: Trading Pressure Variable  
2007 0.078 0.144 -0.070 -1.121 * -2.105 0.186 1.364 *** 5.037 0.619 -2.846 * -1.790 0.128 -2.968 *** -3.859 0.481 
2008 0.108 0.190 -0.069 -1.222 ** -2.213 0.206 1.212 *** 3.551 0.436 -2.674 -1.605 0.095 -2.065 * -1.875 0.144 
2009 -0.667 -1.421 0.064 -1.357 *** -3.911 0.488 1.384 *** 4.321 0.541 -3.260 * -2.010 0.169 -2.690 *** -3.050 0.356 
2010 -0.560 -0.865 -0.017 -1.201 *** -3.158 0.374 1.551 *** 6.155 0.711 -3.278 * -2.080 0.182 -3.146 *** -3.386 0.411 
2011 -1.076 -1.593 0.093 -1.212 ** -2.457 0.251 1.075 * 1.974 0.162 -1.250 -0.675 -0.038 -2.614 * -1.791 0.128 
2012 -0.859 -1.383 0.057 -1.778 ** -2.681 0.292 1.491 ** 2.530 0.265 -3.251 * -2.048 0.176 -3.936 ** -2.738 0.302 
2013 -0.395 -0.677 -0.037 -1.125 * -2.074 0.180 1.416 ** 2.424 0.245 -2.258 -1.128 0.018 -4.017 -1.711 0.114 
2014 -0.305   -0.452 -0.056 -1.464 ** -2.804 0.314 1.526 *** 3.976 0.497 -2.034 * -1.837 0.137 -2.091   -1.327 0.048 
Panel C: Propensity to Trade 
2007 -12.413 ** -2.862 0.324 -4.900 -1.586 0.092 -0.910 -0.680 -0.037 0.756 0.406 -0.059 -3.090 -0.944 -0.007 
2008 -10.030 * -2.007 0.168 2.756 0.844 -0.020 -9.015 -3.089 0.363 0.517 0.237 -0.067 -0.892 -0.445 -0.057 
2009 10.508 1.491 0.075 2.709 1.343 0.051 -0.226 -0.501 -0.053 0.041 0.030 -0.071 -3.140 -1.299 0.044 
2010 4.168 0.382 -0.060 2.317 1.015 0.002 -3.567 -1.095 0.013 -1.289 -0.485 -0.054 -6.765 ** -2.396 0.240 
2011 -5.392 -0.682 -0.037 -1.652 -0.423 -0.058 -1.478 -0.744 -0.031 0.001 0.001 -0.071 -4.326 -0.955 -0.006 
2012 0.930 0.119 -0.070 1.821 0.793 -0.025 -6.757 ** -2.855 0.323 1.872 0.890 -0.014 -2.177 -0.609 -0.044 
2013 7.845 0.995 -0.001 2.325 1.038 0.005 -10.287 *** -3.252 0.390 1.184 0.517 -0.051 -5.281 -1.220 0.032 
2014 -8.249   -1.176 0.025 -0.302   -0.073 -0.071 -5.426   -1.678 0.108 -0.334   -0.072 -0.071 -8.772   -1.691 0.110 
Note: Table A.14 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional regressions of DCOT trading measures on the inverse of convergence. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table A.15: Yearly cross-sectional results of trading measures (Index 
Invesment) on price discovery 
IT   t-stat Adj. R² IT pre t-stat Adj. R² IT PY t-stat Adj. R² 
2008 -0.084 -0.30 -0.11 -0.302 -0.52 -0.09 1.248 0.80 -0.04 
2009 0.645 1.74 0.20 1.451 1.59 0.16 -1.858 -1.57 0.15 
2010 -0.476 -1.65 0.18 -1.580 ** -2.98 0.50 0.946 0.38 -0.12 
2011 -0.171 -0.74 -0.07 -0.185 -0.27 -0.15 4.815 0.86 -0.04 
2012 -0.259 -0.70 -0.07 -0.659 -0.53 -0.10 8.356 0.98 0.00 
2013 -1.023 ** -2.57 0.45 -1.930 -1.33 0.10 7.549 3.08 0.55 
2014 -1.023 *** -4.88 0.77 -1.893 ** -2.46 0.42 7.894 *** 3.73 0.65 
Note: Table A.15 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional 
regressions of Index Trader’s trading measures on the price discovery measure. ***, ** denote 
significance at 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
Table A.16: Yearly cross-sectional results of trading measures (Index 
Invesment) on inverse of convergence 
IT   t-stat Adj. R² IT pre   t-stat Adj. R² IT PY t-stat Adj. R² 
2008 1.028 ** 3.13 0.44 2.060 ** 3.09 0.44 3.167 * 2.04 0.22 
2009 0.680 ** 2.31 0.28 1.642 ** 2.42 0.31 -1.290 -1.22 0.04 
2010 0.988 ** 2.99 0.42 2.067 ** 2.62 0.35 -3.077 -0.91 -0.02 
2011 0.729 1.80 0.17 1.585 1.47 0.10 -18.735 * -2.01 0.22
2012 0.656 * 1.97 0.28 1.752 1.56 0.20 -5.314 -0.83 -0.03 
2013 0.696 1.25 0.04 0.766 0.54 -0.06 -4.700 -1.37 0.07
2014 0.369 0.65 -0.05 -0.071 -0.06 -0.09 -15.890 *** -5.06 0.67 
Note: Table A.16 reports the coefficients, t-statistics, and adjusted R²’s of the yearly cross-sectional 
regressions of Index Trader’s trading measures on the inverse of convergence. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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The Impact of Market Participants’ Interaction on Futures 






The extreme price movements in the three U.S. wheat futures markets in 2008 and 
2011 can be largely explained by fundamental developments in the world wheat 
market. But different price reactions in those wheat futures markets raise doubt 
whether only supply and demand moved wheat futures prices. The question arises 
whether the different behavior of market participants is also essential for price 
discovery. This study examines the influence of different market structures on 
prices of the three most important U.S. wheat futures markets. For this purpose 
trader’s positions of the Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (DCOT) Report 
from June 2006 to December 2013 are analyzed. Results reveal that during the 
price peak, the behavior of hedgers and other market participants on the Min-
neapolis Grain Exchange contributed to a decoupling of wheat futures prices from 
the fundamental development. This demonstrates that market structure is of great 
importance for price development in futures markets. 
Keywords: Agricultural Commodity Markets, Wheat, Disaggregated Commitments of 
Traders, Supply and Demand. 





Several studies (e.g. Gilbert, 2010; Irwin et al., 2009; Robles et al., 2009; Stoll and 
Whaley, 2010) that examine the extreme rise of agricultural prices in the last decade 
analyze the impact of speculative activity on futures prices. Especially index trader play 
a key role in these studies after Masters (2008) accused this trader group to impact 
agricultural futures prices. While the focus of these studies is about the impact of 
positions changes of index traders and speculators on futures prices, returns, and 
volatility, this study examines the impact of the interaction between all market partici-
pants (for the following text defined as market structure) on wheat futures prices in the 
wheat futures exchanges in Chicago, Kansas, and Minneapolis. 
Before examining the influence of market structures on wheat futures prices, the 
fundamental development is analyzed. The U.S. wheat market serves perfectly for this 
purpose because three futures markets for different wheat species exist. The most 
important determinant that caused prices to rise in the wheat market remains its funda-
mental development. Wheat futures prices peaked 2008 as a result of poor harvests, 
drought and export limitations by major wheat producing countries. Inventory levels 
were at a historical low and the demand for wheat increased slightly or remained nearly 
constant. This, in large part, explains rising prices. While at the end of 2002 funda-
mental developments also led to rising prices, the extreme increase that occurred during 
the crisis 2007/08 cannot be explained only by fundamental changes. 
The extent to which a different market structure contributed to rising prices is 
analyzed by using the Disaggregated Commitment of Trader (DCOT) reports. The 
DCOT report differentiates between five trader categories. By this differentiated classi-
fication, the behavior of the trader categories and the resulting price pressure can be 
well analyzed. The results show that instead of a speculative pressure on wheat futures 
prices, commercials seem to contribute to a decoupling of futures prices from their 
fundamental development in the Minneapolis Grain Exchange. 
This study proceeds as follows. First, the existing literature about pricing and 
speculation in agricultural commodity futures markets is discussed. Section 3 gives a 
market overview of the U.S. wheat market. In section 4 data, descriptive analysis, 
methodology, and results are presented. Section 5 summarizes the findings. 
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2 Literature Review 
The U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2009) criticizes the 
increased trading activities of index traders in the wheat futures markets and other agri-
cultural commodities. They claim that index traders contributed to price distortions in 
the wheat futures market, and that they caused increased volatility and poor conver-
gence of spot and futures prices. While Robles et al. (2009) also find a relationship bet-
ween increased index trader activity and rising grain prices, Heath (2009) and Adjemian 
et al. (2013) negate a relationship between index trading activity and non-convergence 
of wheat futures prices and their corresponding spot prices. They show that too low 
storage rates for the delivery instruments set by the futures exchanges caused non-
convergence. 
UNCTAD (2010) confirms that increased trading activity by index traders led to a 
decoupling of prices from their fundamental value. In a survey among physical traders 
and speculators, both categories agree that speculation can decouple the futures price 
from its fundamental value in the short-term, but in the medium- and long-term the 
fundamentals determine the price. One weakness of studies that find a relationship 
between speculative activity and commodity prices is that their argumentation is mostly 
based on analyzing commodity price charts and its relationship with the positions of 
index traders or speculators, and correlations or Granger Causality tests between these 
variables. The lack of methodological quality is often criticized (Stoll and Whaley, 
2010; Sanders and Irwin, 2010; Aulerich et al., 2012). Nevertheless, other studies using 
advanced methods confirm an impact of increased speculative activity on commodity 
prices (Tang and Xiong, 2012; Gilbert, 2010; Singleton, 2011). 
By contrast, most studies on speculation in commodity markets refute an 
influence on commodity prices caused by speculators. Irwin et al. (2009) show that 
speculative activity in recent years cannot be seen as excessive, since the level of specu-
lative activity was not above historical averages. Sanders and Irwin (2010) find a weak 
positive influence of index traders on twelve agricultural commodity prices in a cross-
sectional regression using weekly data. For monthly and quarterly data, increasing posi-
tions held by index traders are followed by decreasing futures prices. This confirms the 
results of the UNCTAD survey among practitioners that speculation can only distort 
commodity prices in the short-term. Sanders et al. (2010) see a positive effect from 
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increased participation of index traders: they have a stabilizing impact on futures mar-
kets where hedgers’ demand on short positions dominates. For the wheat futures mar-
kets in Kansas and Chicago, Sanders and Irwin (2011) do not find a relationship 
between index trader positions and futures prices. Additionally, Stoll and Whaley 
(2010) argue against an influence of index trading on the wheat futures market and other 
commodity futures markets. Brunetti et al. (2011) use highly disaggregated data on a 
daily base.1 They find that hedge funds and swap dealers even stabilize the volatility of 
commodity futures prices in the futures market for corn. The same database is used by 
Aulerich et al. (2013) to analyze twelve agricultural markets at the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT). Only a few commodities are slightly influenced by the position changes 
of index traders in both directions, positive and negative. For the case of the three U.S. 
wheat species traded in futures exchanges, Janzen et al. (2014) show that index trading 
contributes on a diminishingly small extent to the extreme price spikes. Thus, empirical 
evidence speaks against influence of index traders on wheat futures prices. 
Another possibility to examine whether the sharp price increase of commodity 
prices during the crisis 2007/08 was caused by speculation is to test for speculative bub-
bles. In this case the direct influence of positions is not analyzed, but rather the relation-
ship between futures prices and the fundamental value. Adämmer et al. (2015) and Liu 
et al. (2013) use the convenience yield as a proxy for the fundamental value of a com-
modity. While Adämmer et al. (2015) find time-dependant speculative bubbles for 
wheat within the last decade, Liu et al. (2013) only detect a speculative bubble for 
soybeans out of six agricultural commodities. 
These different results can be largely explained by the usage of different methods, 
data and time periods. A general statement on the influence of speculation in commo-
dity markets is hardly possible. Thus, it is of special interest to analyze one commodity 
in detail instead of an aggregated analysis across all commodities. Parameters as the 
production and inventory levels differ on a large scale between different commodities. 
The results of many studies show that index trading alone or speculation in general 
cannot be the only reason for price distortions. Another important difference between 
futures markets is the varying participation of different trader categories. The central 
question is, whether this has different effects on prices. 
                                                            
1 Large Traders Reporting System = internal data of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
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Other factors impacting wheat futures prices include a U.S. Dollar Index, oil 
prices and equity markets. Gilbert (2010) finds an increasing influence of the oil price 
on grain markets after 1990. Natanelov et al. (2011) come to similar results for wheat 
and other agricultural commodities. Tang and Xiong (2012) show that a Dollar Index 
negatively impacts commodity prices, this relationship has become more pronounced 
since 2004. They also find an increasing importance of the S&P 500 after 2008. Giraldi 
(2012) demonstrates that the U.S. Dollar and the S&P 500 have an increased importance 
for hard red winter wheat during the period from 2007 to 2011. This is partly due to 
increased participation of index traders. An impact of the oil price and the U.S. Dollar 
on agricultural commodity prices is also detected by Abott et al. (2009). Nazlioglu 
(2011) finds only a non-linear relationship between oil price and the spot prices of corn 
and soybeans, but not for wheat. Nazlioglou and Soytas (2012) examine 24 agricultural 
commodities in a panel data analysis from 1980 to 2010. Their analysis show that oil 
prices, the U.S. Dollar and agricultural commodity prices influence each other in the 
short-term, whereas agricultural commodity prices are influenced by the oil price and 
the U.S. Dollar in the long-term. 
3 Market Overview 
3.1 Wheat Species 
In this study, three wheat species for which futures contracts exist are examined: soft 
red winter (SRW), hard red winter (HRW), and hard red spring (HRS). The 
corresponding wheat futures contracts are the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat 
futures contract for No. 2 soft red winter wheat, the Kansas City Board of Trade 
(KCBT) wheat futures contract for No. 2 hard red winter wheat, and the Minneapolis 
Grain Exchange wheat futures contract for No. 2 hard red spring. The three contracts are 
standardized to 5,000 bushels wheat per contract. The U.S. Senate’s Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations (2009) illustrates differences among wheat species by 
their protein content. The higher the protein content the higher is the quality of the 
wheat species.2 Hard red spring has the highest protein content of 13-14 percent. Hard 
red winter has a protein content of 11-12 percent and soft red winter of 9-10.5 percent. 
Additionally, the time of harvests differs between the three wheat species: soft red 
                                                            




winter and hard red winter are harvested in summer around July, while hard red spring 
is harvested in fall around September. 
While the CBOT contract also accepts the other two wheat species for delivery, 
the KCBT and MGEX wheat contracts only accept hard red winter and hard red spring 
wheat, respectively.3 The CBOT wheat futures contract is the most frequently traded 
futures contract of the three species, as shown in Table 1. The average open interest of 
the CBOT contract is two times higher than the open interest of the KCBT and the 
MGEX contract combined. In contrast to that, the average production during the mar-
keting years 2000/01 to 2012/13 of hard red winter is the highest with 883 million 
bushels. During the same time period, hard red spring production is on average 480 
million bushels and soft red winter 395 million bushels. 
3.2 Market Fundamentals 
As summarized by Trostle (2008) and Trostle et al. (2011), many events led to serious 
pressure on the global wheat market. The adverse weather conditions in nearly all 
important wheat producing countries had extreme effects on harvests in 2007 and 
2010/11. Russian, Ukrainian, European, Argentinean, and Australian wheat production 
suffered from drought in 2007. This led to policy responses at the end of 2007 in most 
of the wheat exporting countries. China eliminated export subsidies and even introduced 
an export tax on grain products. Argentina, Russia, and Kazakhstan raised export taxes 
on wheat, while Ukraine restricted the amount of wheat for export. In 2010 and 2011 
the sequence of events repeated. Poor harvests in several large exporting countries were 
followed by export restrictions. These reasons increased the demand for wheat from the 
U.S., where no restrictions on exports were made, but it does not completely explain the 
extreme increase of wheat prices. Nowadays, the global wheat demand is less dependent 
on U.S. wheat exports. Figure 1 shows the relative importance of U.S. exports on the 
global wheat market from 1960 to 2013. In 1973 the U.S. share of the world wheat 
exports amounted to 50.3 percent and never reached that level again with an average 
share of 23.3 percent from 2000-2013. An increase of demand on U.S. exports is not 
                                                            
3 Contract specifications of each wheat species: CBOT wheat: http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/ 
agricultural/grain-and-oilseed/wheat_contract_specifications.html; KCBT wheat: http://www. 




expected to have extreme effects on prices, given that historically much higher levels 
were usual and world exports relatively increased. 
Abott et al. (2009) document that the May 2008 estimate forecasted extremely low 
expected values between world stocks and world total use of wheat during the market-
ing year 2007/08 when prices reached a historical high. In the U.S. wheat market the 
relationship was even lower. This partly explains the extreme surge in prices in the U.S. 
wheat futures market. Wescott and Hoffman (1999) show that a large part of wheat 
price variability can be explained by the stocks-to-use ratio. For the estimation of the 
wheat price they use a model that linearly relates the wheat price to the stocks-to-use 
ratio. According to Marone (2008), announcements of the stocks-to-use ratio by the 
USDA influence both wheat spot and futures prices. Several other studies confirm a 
significant impact of fundamental news from the USDA on grain prices (e.g. Isengilda-
Massa et al., 2008; Sumner and Mueller, 1989; Garcia et al., 1997). Therefore, at least a 
long-term relationship between the stocks-to-use ratio and grain prices should be ap-
parent. 
To link the fundamental development to wheat futures prices, a variation of the 
stocks-to-use ratio is calculated. This key figure is calculated on a yearly basis after the 
harvest. Instead of using the common stocks-to-use ratio, the reciprocal value is ana-
lyzed and compared to the development of wheat futures prices. A use-to-stocks ratio 
has the beneficial property that it is easier to compare with prices in a graph. Figure 2 
shows the wheat futures price indices from the three wheat futures exchanges and the 
use-to-stock ratios of the corresponding wheat species. Although small deviations occur, 
the futures prices and use-to-stock ratios at CBOT and KCBT move similarly. The 
MGEX futures price completely decouples from its long-term fundamental value. Even 
after the fundamental situation settles down, futures prices at MGEX constantly remain 
above the use-to-stocks ratio. Futures prices at CBOT and KCBT recover after the situ-
ation of low inventory levels and poor harvests in 2007/08 cooled down. In Figure 3 it 
can be seen that the hard red spring wheat, which is the wheat species the MGEX 
futures contract is based on, was more exposed to increasing exports in 2008/09. But the 
share of exported wheat of hard red spring was already on a higher level in the four 
previous years and fell to a lower level than the hard red winter share of exported wheat 
one year after 2008/09. 
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So the extreme decoupling of the MGEX futures price cannot only be explained 
by fundamental developments, since very good harvests and lower exports in the fol-
lowing years should lead to a similar price decline as for CBOT and KCBT futures 
prices. The part of the price reaction that cannot be explained by the fundamental dev-
elopment, namely the possible impact of different market structures, will be examined 
in the following sections. 
3.3 Trader Positions 
If fundamental development does not explain the extreme price increase of the MGEX 
futures compared to the two other wheat futures contracts, it might be due to pecu-
liarities of the futures market. As the MGEX wheat futures contract is not included in 
one of the two popular commodity indices, the Standard & Poor’s-Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index (S&P-GSCI) and the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index (DJ-
UBSCI), the decoupling from its fundamentals cannot result from index trading. Figures 
4a-c show the developments of hedgers’ and all other market participants’ positions on 
the three wheat futures markets. For a detailed analysis of the traders’ actions, the long, 
short, and net long positions are presented separately. Additionally, in order to concen-
trate on the price peaks between the three wheat futures, a vertical line for the price 
peak is included in February 2008 and February 2011. The following differences in the 
behavior of hedgers and other traders on the three wheat futures markets are observed: 
during the year before the two price peaks, the hedgers’ long positions at MGEX rise 
significantly. As a consequence, hedgers at MGEX are sometimes even net long. By 
contrast, hedgers at CBOT and KCBT only modestly increase or even decrease their 
long positions until the price peaks are reached. After the price peak, other market parti-
cipants at CBOT and KCBT extremely decrease their long positions, especially after the 
second price peak. The other market participants’ long positions at MGEX increase 
shortly after the price peak again instead. Other differences are noticed when looking at 
the short positions of other market participants. The short positions of other market 
participants at CBOT and KCBT keep stable after the first price peak and increase after 
the second price peak. Instead, the other market participants at MGEX decrease their 
short positions after both price peaks. Therefore, two incidents have surely contributed 
to decouple the MGEX futures price from its fundamental value: (1) the long pressure 
coming from the hedgers, and (2) the “failure” of other market participants at MGEX to 
 63 
 
trade the price peak away by building up short positions and reducing long positions. 
The next section analyzes the interaction of different market participants in more detail. 
4 Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data 
The data of the traders’ positions from the DCOT report are publicly available on the 
website of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). They are available 
from June 13, 2006 on a weekly basis and differentiate the total open positions of a 
futures contract into producers/merchants/processors/users (PMPU), swap dealers 
(SW), money managers (MM), other reportables (OR), and non-reportables (NR). In 
this study the data until December 31, 2013 are used. In contrast to the often analyzed 
Commitments of Traders (COT) data which only differs between commercials (physical 
traders) and non-commercials (speculators), the DCOT data better serves for accurately 
assigning the motives of different trader categories. 
According to the CTFC description of trader categories, the producers/merchants/ 
processors/users hedge their exposure to the physical commodity. Swap dealers hedge 
their swap transactions towards physical traders or speculators. Money managers are 
considered as traditional speculators. They can be divided into registered commodity 
trading advisors (CTA), registered commodity pool advisors (CPO) or unregistered 
funds as hedge funds. The category other reportables consists of all traders who are 
obliged to report their positions because of the amount they hold, but cannot be put into 
one of the other groups. Additionally the DCOT reports the positions of the group 
spreading. These are the positions of swap dealers, money managers and other repor-
tables which follow a calendar spread strategy. A calendar spread in this case means to 
be long and short in contracts on the same commodity but of different maturities. The 
group spreading will not be analyzed in this study, because it is not possible to accu-
rately identify which contracts they hold and the motives to follow this strategy. All 
other traders who are not required to report because of their small amount of positions 
belong to non-reportables. Apart from Tokic (2012), this group is usually ignored. 
Because of the results from Tokic (2012), where non-reportables play an important role 
and the high participation as seen in Table 3, they are also considered later on. 
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For the empirical analysis weekly price data of wheat future contracts from the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT - Soft Red Winter), the Kansas City Board of Trade 
(KCBT - Hard Red Winter), and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGEX - Hard Red 
Spring) from June 1, 2006 to December 31, 2013 are taken from Datastream. To get a 
continous time series, a similar procedure to the one of Brunetti and Büyüksahin (2009) 
and Adämmer et al. (2011) is applied. They also base their roll-over on the liquidity of 
futures contracts. The returns are calculated by taking the contract in which the majority 
of traders are invested in, the contract with the highest open interest. If the open interest 
of the second-nearby contract exceeds the open interest of the first-nearby contract, the 
relevant contract for the return series is the second nearby contract. Although Carchano 
and Pardo (2009) show that different procedures to create a continuous return series 
lead to very similar results, the best approach is to relate the most liquid futures contract 
to the positions of the traders. The reported positions of the CFTC are based on all 
traded contracts. So it is reasonable to use the returns of the most liquid contract for 
analyzing the relationship between returns and positions. 
Further, a Dollar Index, which represents the relation of the dollar to the seven 
most important currencies (Weights of the currencies in 2010: Euro: 37 percent, Yen: 30 
percent, Brit. Pound: 17 percent, etc.), and the S&P 500 Composite Index as a Perfor-
mance Index from June 13, 2006 to December 31, 2013 are both taken from Data-
stream. The WTI oil spot price for the same period is from the Energy Information 
Administration. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Futures Prices 
Figure 5 shows the price development of the continuous price series based on open 
interest on the three U.S. wheat exchanges in the time period relevant for empirical 
analysis. CBOT and KCBT wheat futures prices move very similar in this time period 
while the MGEX futures price moves away from a common trend at the end of 2007. 
The price peak in February 2008 is more pronounced for the MGEX futures price and 
does not recover to pre-crisis levels as at CBOT and KCBT. The rolling correlations 
between the three wheat futures prices in Figure 6 support the finding that the MGEX 
wheat futures price behaves very differently compared to CBOT and KCBT. The dyna-
mic correlation between CBOT and KCBT futures returns stays constantly on a high 
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level. Only in 2002 and 2005 did the close relationship between these two futures fall 
below this level. The relationship between MGEX futures returns and the futures returns 
on the two other exchanges is not as close. During 2008 and at the end of 2011 the 
correlation between MGEX futures returns and CBOT/KCBT futures returns falls below 
0.4 and 0.6, respectively. Descriptive statistics in Table 2 underpin the different 
development of futures returns. CBOT and KCBT futures returns show negative means 
and are both normally distributed. MGEX futures returns are positive on average and 
not normally distributed. The deviation from the co-movement could be explained by a 
very different fundamental development of the MGEX futures contracts’ underlying 
wheat species. But as seen in Figures 2 and 3, nothing can justify that the MGEX wheat 
futures price decoupled extremely from its fundamentals. 
DCOT Positions 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 show a very different behavior for the growth of 
traders’ positions between the three wheat futures exchanges. The growth of positions 
moves in a quite stable way at the CBOT wheat futures market. The short positions of 
money managers, swap dealers, and other reportables move in a far larger range than the 
long positions of those traders, the long and short positions of commercials and non-
reportables at KCBT. In the MGEX wheat futures market, apart from the positions of 
commercials and non-reportables, all traders’ positions move in a very unstable way as 
is indicated by the standard deviation, maximum, and minimum. 
For further analysis it is important to consider each trader’s share of open interest, 
since it is examined whether a relationship with futures prices exist. Table 3 shows the 
mean of trader’s share of open interest over the whole time period. The swap dealers in 
the CBOT wheat futures market are highly represented in the long positions. This group 
is also active in the KCBT wheat futures market, albeit to a smaller extent. The long 
positions of the swap dealers at MGEX are playing a minor role with a total share of 3.5 
percent of the total open interest for the whole period. This can be explained by index 
traders who are indirectly, by swap transactions, included in the category swap dealers. 
Minneapolis wheat is not listed on the two popular commodity indices, the Standard & 
Poor’s-Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P-GSCI) and the Dow Jones-UBS 
Commodity Index (DJ-UBSCI). While the commercial long positions have a small 
share at CBOT, the participation is significantly higher in Minneapolis with 41.9 
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percent. At the KCBT, the long positions are equally dispersed over the different trader 
categories. The share of the reporting traders is the smallest at MGEX, thus it has the 
largest group of non-reportables. 
Summarizing, the swap dealers at CBOT dominate the long positions, but do not 
have large position changes. In the KCBT wheat futures market, no traders’ category 
dominates and just the short positions of speculators and other reportables move their 
positions in a large range. The commercials at MGEX dominate on the long and short 
side, and nearly all trader categories have large position changes during the examined 
period on the long and the short side. 
Long and Short Positions 
In most studies (e.g. Robles et al., 2009; Sanders and Irwin, 2010; Brunetti et al., 2011) 
the net positions of the trader categories, long minus short positions, are used to analyze 
the influence of speculative activity. Instead, this study applies a separate analysis of 
long and short positions for all trader categories in the same way as Borin and Di Nino 
(2012) do for money managers and swap dealers. Brunetti and Büyükşahin (2009) have 
similar results for net positions and long and short positions separated. Gilbert (2010) 
criticizes studies that do not take into account long and short positions separately. 
The reason for an individualized analysis is to examine each trader category’s 
motives and expectations on both position directions instead of just focusing on the 
price pressure coming from the aggregated positions of speculators. Many studies 
analyze the net positions of index traders (e.g. Sanders and Irwin, 2011; Aulerich et al., 
2013). Since index trader’s short positions play a minor role, the difference between 
aggregated and separated analysis is marginal. In Table 4 it is obvious that this is not the 
case for DCOT data. An aggregated analysis of these positions would eliminate any 
identification of price pressure coming from one trader category. The different traders 
do not act as a homogeneous unit with their long and short positions which would be the 
case if correlations would have negative values. This shows that within each group the 
different directions of positions are driven by heterogeneous behavior, different motives 
and expectations. Especially for commercial traders, building up long or short contracts 
is driven by completely different motives: A producer wants to hedge his harvest by 
building up short positions while a bulk purchaser builds up long positions to hedge 
against increasing prices. Other trader categories show similar patterns to commercials 
 67 
 
when building up contracts. Even the managed money category does not act completely 
homogeneous, having on average a low negative correlation. Only an analysis of money 
manager’s net position changes at CBOT can be taken into consideration with a cor-
relation of -0.34. For this group to proceed consistently, it is assumed that building up 
long or short positions is driven by different motives and expectations. 
4.3 Methodology 
Former studies on the influence of speculation in commodity markets usually analyze a 
relationship between positions and futures prices graphically, by correlations or Granger 
Causality tests. A relationship can be detected with these procedures, but a direct cau-
sality is not necessarily involved. Positions can be adjusted by new information based 
on supply and demand of a commodity. The position changes would be merely a 
reaction to the scarcity of a commodity and thereby a channel of fundamental develop-
ment rather than a sole speculative impact. At the same time, a traders’ category mainly 
consisting of daily trend-followers would exhibit a contemporaneous correlation with 
prices in weekly data. Thus all methods using contemporaneous data for positions and 
prices have little expressive power for causality between positions and prices. 
The Granger Causality test does not examine contemporaneous changes of a time 
series, but the influence of position changes from previous periods and its influence on 
prices today. On a weekly basis a lot of important information is lost, since speculators 
tend to trade short-term oriented. Therefore, it is unlikely that building up positions 
results in price pressure with one week delay. Hence, in many studies (e.g. Sanders and 
Irwin, 2011; Aulerich et al., 2013; Irwin et al., 2009) a relationship between positions, 
mostly of index traders, and prices was not detected. Grosche (2014) mentions several 
weaknesses coming from analyzing lead-lag relationships between positions and prices 
by Granger Causality tests. Thus, in this study the impact of different behavior of 
market participants and its indirect influence on prices is analyzed instead of a possible 
direct influence on prices. 
To avoid omitting important factors in the analysis, the three variables Dollar 
Index, oil price and S&P 500 are included in the regression. Figure 7 shows the dyna-
mic correlation between CBOT, KCBT, and MGEX wheat futures returns with the 
returns of a Dollar Index, oil price, and S&P 500. Evidence of increased relation bet-
ween wheat prices and changes in the three factors is supported by the rolling cor-
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relations. At the beginning of the examined time period, the correlations between 
futures returns and factor changes are low, but at the end of 2008 the correlations bet-
ween returns and factor changes begin to increase. 
Oil price and S&P 500 returns are positively and Dollar Index returns negatively 
correlated with futures returns. The trend of the correlations with the factors and the 
returns on the three wheat futures exchanges is very similar. For these reasons, the 
futures returns are first regressed on factor changes. The part which cannot be explained 
by the model, the error term of this regression, is then analyzed on its relationship with 
position changes. The intuition behind this procedure is to filter out the logical and 
observed relationships with wheat futures prices, before analyzing the relationship with 
position changes.4 The following VAR-model on residuals is applied to analyze the 
influence of position changes on futures returns: 
 
݈݊ܨܴ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ ∗ ∆݈݊ܦܫ௧ ൅ ߛ௜ ∗ ∆݈ܱ݊ܫܮ௧ ൅ ߜ௜ ∗ ∆݈݊ܵ ௧ܲ ൅ ݑ௜,௧ (1). 
 
ݑ௜,௧ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߠ௜ݑ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜,௞௟௢௡௚∆݈݋݊ ௜݃,௧ି௞ସ௞ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜,௞௦௛௢௥௧∆ݏ݄݋ݎݐ௜,௧ି௞ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (2), 
 
for the ݅ grains’ futures returns FR of CBOT wheat, KCBOT wheat, and MGEX wheat. 
ܦܫ is the Dollar Index, ܱܫܮ is the oil spot price, ܵܲ is the S&P 500. ݑ௧ is the error term 
of regression (1), ߝ௧ the error term of regression (2) and ݈݋݊݃௧ି௞ stands for logarithmic 
position changes of long positions, ݏ݄݋ݎݐ௧ି௞ for the logarithmic short position changes. 
All returns, changes in financial factors and position changes are logarithmic differ-
ences. The variable position change is calculated as long or short position of a trader 
category divided by total open interest. Each trader’s category long and short positions 
are tested separately to avoid collinearity between the position changes of different 
traders. The ݇ lags for the position changes long and short span from one to four weeks 
in order to focus on short-term dynamics of position changes. The ideal lag number is 
selected by the Schwartz Criteria. 
                                                            
4  Logical, because decreasing dollar elevates demand on U.S. wheat, since it is denominated in U.S. 
dollar. Increasing oil prices increases production costs for wheat by higher costs for fertilizer and fuel 
and is additionally related by biofuel demand with wheat prices. Increased prices for oil has the same 
effects on biofuel price and therefore incentifies farmers to cultivate other crops than wheat, which then 
has an effect on the wheat price because of lower cultivation. The increased relationship of equity 
markets and wheat price can be seen in Figure 7. 
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The following regressions are an extension of regression (1) and (2):  
݈݊ܨܴ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ ∗ ∆݈݊ܦܫ௧ ൅ ߛ௜ ∗ ∆݈ܱ݊ܫܮ௧ ൅ ߜ௜ ∗ ∆݈݊ܵ ௧ܲ ൅ ௜߮௟௢௡௚ ∗ ∆ܿ݋݉. ݈݋݊ ௜݃,௧			 
																			൅߮௜௦௛௢௥௧ ∗ ∆ܿ݋݉. ݏ݄݋ݎݐ௜,௧ ൅ ݑ௜,௧ (3). 
 
ݑ௜,௧ ൌ ߠ௜ݑ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ௜௟௢௡௚∆݈݋݊ ௜݃,௧ ൅ ߚ௜௦௛௢௥௧∆ݏ݄݋ݎݐ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (4), 
 
where ܿ݋݉. ݈݋݊݃௧ are logarithmic commercial long position changes and ܿ݋݉. ݏ݄݋ݎݐ௧ 
the logarithmic commercial short position changes. The commercials are included, 
because they represent the part of open interest with the best information about the 
fundamental development of wheat. As producers, merchants, processors, and users of 
wheat, they have the best access to information to forecast in which direction future 
price development might go. Although this might not hold for small farmers, who do 
not have an overview over global supply and demand, the large part of the global wheat 
trading and processing is carried out by a small number of large merchants with re-
search departments.5 Regressions (2) and (4) are almost the same, while in (4) only 
contemporaneous position changes of all market participants except commercials are 
included. This clearly produces an endogeneity bias. Traders may adjust their positions 
on price changes instead of having an impact on prices. In this case it does not matter, 
because it is analyzed whether other traders than commercials also move with the price 
and participate in price discovery rather than having a direct impact on futures prices. If 
this is the case, the interaction of all participants determines the price. If no significant 
value for the coefficients in (4) can be observed, the price discovery is just determined 
by (3), which leaves the whole price determination to the factors and the commercials. 
Stationarity of variables is tested according to the augmented Dickey Fuller test. 
Since all time series used in the regression are integrated by one, the test rejects the 
hypothesis of a unit root for all variables used in the regressions. As some variables are 
correlated, collinearity is checked by the variance inflation factor for all regressions. 
The highest value for the uncentered variance inflation factor is for the variance of the 
S&P 500 in Minneapolis in regression type (1) is 1.7, indicating that collinearity is not 





the results, the residuals are tested for serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange 
multiplier test), and heteroskedascity (White’s test for heteroskedasticity). If serial 
correlation is a problem, additional lags of the regressor are included. If residuals are 
heteroskedastic, robust standard errors and t-statistics are calculated. 
4.4 Results 
Table 5 shows the results of regression (1) and (2). There is no short-term predictability 
for futures returns by position changes in Chicago (CBOT). For non-reportables in 
Kansas (KCBT), building up short positions is followed by decreasing prices. While all 
the other position changes in the KCBT wheat futures market exhibit no short-term 
predictability, in Minneapolis (MGEX) several trading activities are significantly fol-
lowed by futures returns. Building up money managers’ long positions is followed by 
negative returns on a two week basis at MGEX. The same applies for other reportables’ 
long positions on a weekly basis. So both trader groups, if assumed that both are trading 
for financial gain, are trading unsuccessfully in the short term. The biggest coefficient is 
for commercials’ long positions. An increase of long positions is significantly followed 
by positive returns after one week. Whereas at CBOT and KCBT the lead-lag relation-
ship between positions changes and returns does not show any positive coefficient, the 
dominance of commercials in the long positions seem to have a direct effect on price 
determination at MGEX. 
The results of Table 6, where contemporaneous relations of position changes to 
the residual of regression (3) are tested, support the dominance of commercials in price 
discovery at MGEX. In the CBOT and KCBT wheat futures markets, money managers’ 
and non-reportables’ short positions, and swap dealers’ long positions move in the 
opposite direction of the residual of regression (3). Additionally, non-reportables’ long 
positions on both exchanges have significant positive coefficients. At MGEX, only the 
short positions of swap dealers move significantly negatively with returns. Swap 
dealers’ short positions play a minor role, because of its small coefficient, as can be 
seen in Table 3. The significance can only be explained by extreme movements of the 
relatively small share of swap dealers’ short at MGEX. After the contemporaneous posi-
tion changes of the commercials are taken into account, no other trader group really 
takes part in the price discovery at MGEX. The large share of commercials long and no 
evenly matched counterpart on the short side, apart from commercial short, surely 
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contributed to the decoupling of wheat futures prices at MGEX from its fundamental 
development. 
5 Summary 
According to current research, price formation on the wheat market has changed. The 
price is no longer influenced solely by the fundamental development of the commodity. 
Other factors like the value of the U.S. Dollar, oil prices, and the development of equity 
markets are of increased importance. This study provides new insights into the influence 
of different market structures on pricing in wheat futures markets. 
Until now, there is no clear evidence of an influence on wheat prices caused by 
speculators or index traders. A trend-intensifying influence of speculators on prices 
certainly exists, but the complete influence of speculation cannot be captured by analy-
zing the positions of the DCOT report or any other reports provided by the CFTC. To 
get the accurate share of speculative influences on prices, data on each transaction and 
its corresponding motives would be necessary. Nevertheless, strong increases or decr-
eases of positions, which are not justified by fundamental developments, indicate price 
exaggerations on the wheat futures markets. The results of this study show that the 
interaction of market participants can contribute to a decoupling of futures prices from 
the fundamental value of a commodity. The MGEX, which is mostly used by physical 
traders and which is not listed in the popular commodity indices, shows the highest peak 
of the wheat futures price and does not recover after the fundamental situation calms 
down. The fundamental development does not justify the large extent to which the fut-
ures price at MGEX deviates from CBOT and KCBT wheat futures prices after the 
peak. Whereas numerous studies concentrate on the impact of speculators and index 
traders, the results show that during price peaks, the behavior of hedgers at MGEX 
combined with the lack of other market participants trading price peaks away contri-
buted to a decoupling of prices from the fundamental development. 
Further, the results show that the increased dependency on the U.S Dollar, oil 
prices and equity markets contributed to changes in the price formation. During the 
period from the end of 2008 to end of 2012 an increased influence by these factors was 
observed, but it decreased again after this period. This shows that during the turbulent 
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period of financial crisis and soaring commodity prices, the three factors were important 
determinants for wheat futures prices. 
This study provides new findings for the U.S. wheat futures market by taking the 
market structure on the futures market into account. The often aggregated analyses of 
many commodities fail to consider these aspects. Future research focusing on the mar-
ket structure and fundamental development of single commodities in detail would be of 
great interest. These aspects should be also considered when examining regulatory 
issues. The price discovery can be improved if position limits on each single future are 
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Figure 1: U.S. and World wheat exports from 1960 – 2013 (in million bushels) 
 
Note: Figure 1 shows the amount of wheat exported from the U.S. and the World from 1960-2013. Data are collected 

























































Figure 2: Use-to-stocks ratio indices and futures price indices of the corresponding 
wheat species from 2000/01 to 2012/13 
 
Note: The continuous future price series is a continuous index (Datastream code: CS04) provided by 
Datastream. Rolling yields are avoided for this continuous series by multiplying the daily returns of 
the near month contract with previous values of the index: ௧ܲ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ܴ௧ሻ ∗ ௧ܲିଵ. The data for 
disappearance and the ending stocks of the three wheat species are from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA). The indices for yearly futures prices and the yearly use-to-stocks ratios are 
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Figure 3: Share of exported wheat for Soft Red Winter (SRW), Hard 
Red Winter (HRW), and Hard Red Spring (HRS) wheat from 
marketing year 2000/01 to 2012/13 
 















Figure 4a: Open Interest of CBOT wheat futures: Long, Short, and Net Long 
trader positions of Producer/Merchants/Processors/User (PMPU) and all other 
market participants aggregated from June 13, 2006 to December 31, 2013 
 
Note: The vertical lines show two price peaks in the futures price series; the first one in end of February 2008 and the 
second one in the beginning of February 2011. The data on positions is from the Disaggregated Commitments of 
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Figure 4b: Open interest of KCBT wheat futures; Long, Short, and Net Long 
trader positions of Producer/Merchants/Processors/User (PMPU) and all other 
market participants aggregated from June 13, 2006 to December 31, 2013 
 
Note: The vertical lines show two price peaks in the futures price series; the first one in end of February 2008 and the 
second one in the beginning of February 2011. The data on positions is from the Disaggregated Commitments of 










Jun‐06 Jun‐07 Jun‐08 Jun‐09 Jun‐10 Jun‐11 Jun‐12 Jun‐13











Jun‐06 Jun‐07 Jun‐08 Jun‐09 Jun‐10 Jun‐11 Jun‐12 Jun‐13
all other long all other short all other net long
 82 
 
Figure 4c: Open interest of MGEX wheat futures; Long, Short, and Net Long 
Trader positions of Producer/Merchants/Processors/User (PMPU) and all other 
market participants aggregated from June 13, 2006 to December 31, 2013 
 
Note: The vertical lines show two price peaks in the futures price series; the first one in end of February 2008 and the 
second one in the beginning of February 2011. The data on positions is from the Disaggregated Commitments of 
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CBOT & KCBT CBOT & MGEX KCBT & MGEX
Figure 5: Wheat futures return indices of CBOT, KCBT, and MGEX from       
June 13, 2006 to December 31, 2013 
 
Note: The continuous price series is constructed by multiplying weekly returns of the continuous return series with 
previous values of the index: ௧ܲ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ܴ௧ሻ ∗ ௧ܲିଵ. Base date with the value of 100 for the index is June 13, 2006. 
 
Figure 6: Rolling Correlations between CBOT, KCBT, and MGEX wheat futures 
returns from May 19, 2000 to December 31, 2013 
Note: Figure 6 shows rolling correlations on a 200-day window between CBOT, KCBT, and MGEX wheat futures 
prices beginning with the first correlation value on May 19, 2000 (with returns from January 3, 2000 to May 18, 2000 

























MGEX & SP 500
MGEX & Dollar Index
Figure 7: Rolling Correlations between weekly wheat futures returns and returns 
on Dollar Index, Oil Price, and S&P 500 
Note: Figure 7 shows rolling correlations on a 50-week window between the wheat futures returns at CBOT, KCBT, 
and MGEX with Dollar Index, Oil Price, and S&P 500 beginning with the first correlation value on June 5, 2007 












CBOT & SP 500












KCBT & SP 500




Table 1: Average production (in million bushels) of the three wheat species 
from 2000/01 to 2012/13 and average open interest of the corresponding 
wheat futures contracts (in thousands) from June 13, 2006 to December 31, 
2013 
  
Soft Red Winter/ 
CBOT wheat 
Hard Red Winter/ 
KCBT wheat 
Hard Red Spring/ 
MGEX wheat 
Average Production 395 883 480 
Average Open Interest 411 142 47 
Note: Table 1 shows the average yearly production (in million bushels) of soft red winter wheat, hard red 
winter wheat, and hard red spring wheat from marketing year 2000/01 to 2012/13. Data are collected from 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The average open interest of the corresponding wheat futures 
contracts is from the Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (DCOT) Report, which is published by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) weekly. It represents the average of the weekly open 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics for futures returns and position changes  
from June 13, 2006 to December 31, 2013 








Panel A: Chicago - CBOT  
Futures 
returns 
394 -0.0018 0.0490 0.1479 -0.1763 4.25 
MM long 394 0.0011 0.0617 0.2454 -0.2062   39.98*** 
MM short 394 0.0042 0.1047 0.3407 -0.5036   52.67*** 
SW long 394 -0.0014 0.0344 0.1293 -0.1809 115.92*** 
SW short 394 0.0032 0.1416 0.5483 -0.9115 592.32*** 
COM long 394 0.0010 0.0997 0.3745 -0.3687   12.46*** 
COM short 394 -0.0022 0.0568 0.3655 -0.1759 578.05*** 
OR long 394 0.0029 0.1275 0.6870 -0.4993 174.20*** 
OR short 394 -0.0004 0.0863 0.2950 -0.3519   77.95*** 
NR long 394 -0.0001 0.0713 0.3252 -0.2707 124.62*** 
NR short 394 -0.0005 0.0486 0.1653 -0.2656 107.63*** 
Panel B: Kansas - KCBT  
Futures 
returns 
394 -0.0010 0.0447 0.1533 -0.1417 3.33 
MM long 394 0.0000 0.0614 0.2139 -0.2371     26.70*** 
MM short 394 0.0055 0.5726 6.9206 -4.4881 78801.06*** 
SW long 394 0.0008 0.0553 0.2333 -0.2282     76.88*** 
SW short 394 0.0159 1.3775 7.6921 -7.2149 3172.04*** 
COM long 394 0.0010 0.0737 0.3157 -0.2102     19.26*** 
COM short 394 -0.0012 0.0402 0.2152 -0.1025   189.66*** 
OR long 394 -0.0017 0.1013 0.3685 -0.6401   519.11*** 
OR short 394 0.0031 0.2360 1.4118 -1.4171 1673.27*** 
NR long 394 -0.0020 0.0833 0.2833 -0.3479     41.23*** 
NR short 394 -0.0008 0.0601 0.2025 -0.3058   111.66*** 
Panel C: Minneapolis - MGEX  
Futures 
returns 
394 0.0012 0.0425 0.1749 -0.2062 64.42*** 
MM long 394 -0.0012 0.1489 1.1351 -1.2128 7485.70*** 
MM short 394 0.0217 1.6337 6.7740 -7.0746 1216.29*** 
SW long 394 0.0212 0.9474 6.8778 -6.1603 16129.97*** 
SW short 394 -0.0002 1.2575 6.2289 -5.9860 3140.88*** 
COM long 394 -0.0002 0.0623 0.1891 -0.2442 31.96*** 
COM short 394 -0.0003 0.0406 0.2094 -0.1741 251.81*** 
OR long 394 0.0088 0.2229 1.0338 -1.5229 1646.45*** 
OR short 394 0.0062 1.1532 6.9043 -5.7489 2680.96*** 
NR long 394 0.0002 0.0781 0.3449 -0.3449 30.01*** 
NR short 394 -0.0008 0.0669 0.1902 -0.2436 3.40 
Note: Table 2 shows mean, standard deviations, maximum and minimum sample values as well as results of Jarque-
Bera test for normality for futures returns and weekly growth of all trader categories’(COM – Commercials, MM – 
Managed Money, SW – Swap Dealer, OR – Other Reportables, NR – Non-Reportables) long and short positions 
(divided by open interest) for Chicago, Kansas and Minneapolis futures markets. The sample period encompasses 
weekly data from June 13, 2006 to December 31, 2013. 
***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 3: Traders’ shares of total open positions (in %) on the exchanges CBOT, 
KCBT, and MGEX from June 13, 2006 to December 31, 2013 
MM SW COM OR NR 
long short long short long short long short long short 
CBOT 17,87% 16,80% 39,14% 3,92% 10,11% 38,07% 5,07% 8,19% 8,25% 13,45%
KCBT 22,55% 7,85% 20,06% 1,03% 21,71% 54,96% 8,42% 3,77% 15,03% 20,17%
MGEX 17,75% 3,07% 3,45% 0,16% 41,94% 62,03% 6,19% 2,05% 23,82% 25,86%
Note: Table 3 shows the shares of the traders (COM – Commercials, MM – Managed Money, SW – Swap Dealer, OR 
– Other Reportables, NR – Non-Reportables), which are calculated as the mean of the traders’ share of open interest. 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations between weekly position changes long and short  
MM SW COM OR NR 
Chicago - CBOT 
-0.338*** 0.096* -0.273*** -0.180*** 0.451*** 
Kansas - KCBT 
-0.132*** -0.093* -0.130*** 0.081 0.706*** 
Minneapolis - MGEX 
-0.078 -0.038 0.058 -0.069 0.521*** 
Note: Table 4 shows the correlations between position changes (COM – 
Commercials, MM – Managed Money, SW – Swap Dealer, OR – Other 
Reportables, NR – Non-Reportables), which are calculated from June 20, 
2006 to December 31, 2013. 





Table 5: Results of VAR on residuals of the Factor Regression 
Lag 
Chicago - CBOT Kansas - KCBT Minneapolis - MGEX 
Long Short Long Short Long Short 
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Note: Table 5 reports coefficient estimates of long and short positions of each trader group and the corresponding t-
statistics in parentheses.  
***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The results of the factor regression (2) are the 
following (t-statistics in parentheses and adjusted R² after regression): 
CBOT:   ݈݊ܨܴ௧ ൌ െ0.003 െ 0.825 ∗ ∆݈݊ܦܫ௧ ൅ 0.193 ∗ ∆݈ܱ݊ܫܮ௧ ൅ 0.220 ∗ ∆݈݊ܵ ௧ܲ  
(-1.15)   (-3.99)                  (3.76)                        (2.15)                ܴ௔ௗ௝.ଶ ൌ 0.17 
KCBT:   ݈݊ܨܴ௧ ൌ െ0.002 െ 0.718 ∗ ∆݈݊ܦܫ௧ ൅ 0.182 ∗ ∆݈ܱ݊ܫܮ௧ ൅ 0.230 ∗ ∆݈݊ܵ ௧ܲ 
                               (-0.89)    (-3.83)                    (3.90)                       (2.47)															ܴ௔ௗ௝.ଶ ൌ 0.18 
MGEX: 	݈݊ܨܴ௧ ൌ െ0.000 െ 0.581 ∗ ∆݈݊ܦܫ௧ ൅ 0.128 ∗ ∆݈ܱ݊ܫܮ௧ ൅ 0.244 ∗ ∆݈݊ܵ ௧ܲ 




Table 6: Results of VAR on residuals of Factor and Commercial long/short 
Regression 
Chicago - CBOT Kansas - KCBT Minneapolis - MGEX 
Long Short Long Short Long Short 




















































Note: Table 6 reports coefficient estimates coefficient estimates of long and short positions of each trader group and 
the corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
The results of the factor regression (4) are the following (t-statistics in parentheses and adjusted R² after regression): 
CBOT:				݈݊ܨܴ௧ ൌ െ0.003 െ 0.532 ∗ ∆݈݊ܦܫ௧ ൅ 0.104 ∗ ∆݈ܱ݊ܫܮ௧ ൅ 0.237 ∗ ∆݈݊ܵ ௧ܲ 
  (-1.22)   (-2.23)                   (1.76)                  (1.81) 
    െ0.084 ∗ ∆݈݊ܥܱܯܮ௧ ൅ 0.350 ∗ ∆݈݊ܥܱܯܵ௧ 
      (-2.90)                          (7.15)       																																																			ܴ௔ௗ௝.ଶ ൌ 0.43 
KCBT:			݈݊ܨܴ௧ ൌ െ0.001 െ 0.523 ∗ ∆݈݊ܦܫ௧ ൅ 0.149 ∗ ∆݈ܱ݊ܫܮ௧ ൅ 0.189 ∗ ∆݈݊ܵ ௧ܲ 
(-0.58)    (-3.06)              (3.51)                    (2.22) 
			െ0.095 ∗ ∆݈݊ܥܱܯܮ௧ ൅ 0.382 ∗ ∆݈݊ܥܱܯܵ௧ 
     (-3.69)                          (8.03)      																																																				ܴ௔ௗ௝.ଶ ൌ 0.33 
MGEX:			݈݊ܨܴ௧ ൌ 					0.001 െ 0.343 ∗ ∆݈݊ܦܫ௧ ൅ 0.161 ∗ ∆݈ܱ݊ܫܮ௧ ൅ 0.187 ∗ ∆݈݊ܵ ௧ܲ 
   (-1.22)   (-1.93)                  (3.63)                    (2.14) 
			െ0.103 ∗ ∆݈݊ܥܱܯܮ௧ ൅ 0.240 ∗ ∆݈݊ܥܱܯܵ௧ 
                                 (-3.27)                          (5.00)       																																																			ܴ௔ௗ௝.ଶ ൌ 0.20 
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The Information Content of Fundamental News vs. Traders’ 
Positions on Grain Futures Markets: Evidence from 





To compare the impact of fundamental news and the publication of traders’ 
positions in an event study framework, a generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model with t-distributed error terms is applied to 
corn, soybeans, and wheat futures returns from January 1996 to June 2014. While 
fundamental news remains an important source of information for market partici-
pants in grain futures markets, results reveal that the information content of 
traders’ positions from the Commitments of Traders (COT) report has gained 
importance in the corn and wheat futures market. The impact of traders’ positions 
seems to be more pronounced in grain futures markets, where the presence of 
index traders is higher and those of professional speculators (money managers) 
lower. The impact of world fundamental news on futures prices increased after 
2006, while the impact of U.S. fundamental news decreased. Interestingly, the 
reaction on trader’s position changes is at its highest on the day of data collection, 
i.e. before it is made available to the public. Some traders seem to be able to 
anticipate large hedgers’ and speculators’ direction of trade. 
Keywords: Event Study, Fundamental Information, Hedging, Speculation, Index 
Trader. 





Since the remarkable increase of index trading in commodity markets and the com-
modity boom during the financial crisis, a large body of literature deals with time series 
dependencies of index trader’s positions and commodity prices in the agricultural 
futures market (see Robles et al., 2009; Gilbert, 2010; Sanders and Irwin, 2010; Stoll 
and Whaley, 2010; Sanders and Irwin, 2011; Capelle-Blancard and Coulibaly, 2011; 
Tang and Xiong, 2012). While it seems plausible to examine this relationship with a 
time series model, several problems arise, as illustrated by Grosche (2014). The findings 
of these studies elucidate the difficulty of getting unambiguous results about the rel-
ationship between index trading and commodity prices with standard time series 
models. Several studies (see Robles et al., 2009; Gilbert, 2010; Tang and Xiong, 2012) 
demonstrate that there is a relationship between index trader’s positions and commodity 
prices that brings unwanted distortions to the pricing mechanism on agricultural futures 
markets. Contrary to these results, Sanders and Irwin (2010), Stoll and Whaley (2010), 
Sanders and Irwin (2011), and Capelle-Blancard and Coulibaly (2011) show that index 
traders do not have a significant influence on commodity futures prices. Furthermore, 
Sanders and Irwin (2011) point out that position limits for index traders could have 
destabilizing effects on the pricing mechanism in commodity markets. 
When analyzing the impact of index traders on commodity futures prices, an ad-
ditional problem is the lack of exact and high frequency data on fundamentals. Those 
data would be necessary to exclude that index traders behave rationally according to 
recent fundamental developments. However, fundamental data for most agricultural 
markets is available on a monthly base. This makes it impossible to analyze the real 
impact of index trading in the short-term, which might lead to price distortions from the 
fundamentals. This article overcomes this problem as it analyzes the price reactions on 
grain futures markets by comparing the impact of fundamental information with the 
impact of the publication of trader’s positions. 
Although the direct impact of index trading is not the focus of this study, it 
provides several new insights into pricing in grain futures markets as to the trader’s 
positions of the Commitments of Traders (COT) reports from the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC). Furthermore, it is to my knowledge the first attempt to 
compare this relationship directly with fundamental information of the grains corn, 
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soybeans, and wheat. The following questions are addressed: (1) Do USDA announce-
ments provide new information to market participants in futures markets? (2) Do CFTC 
reports provide information that is relevant for pricing? (3) Has a shift in importance 
from fundamental information to trader’s reports occurred after 2006? The former is 
especially important and is linked to the frequently uttered opinion that fundamentals 
are of less importance since index trading increased (see UNCTAD, 2011; Tang and 
Xiong, 2012), after Masters (2008) accused “index speculators” to distort agricultural 
futures prices from their fundamental value. 
A shift from fundamentals to traders’ positions is observed in corn and wheat 
futures markets, while fundamentals remain important for all grains. Additionally, I find 
that the information of traders’ position changes is already priced in the futures market 
before it is made available to the public. 
The study is structured as followed: After reviewing literature, data and metho-
dology are presented. Finally, the results are described and conclusions are drawn. 
2 Literature Review 
According to Masters’ (2008) claims, the increase of index investment decouples 
commodity futures prices from their fundamental value. This motivated many resear-
chers to check whether this relationship can be verified empirically. Robles et al. (2009) 
show that the net positions of index traders influenced corn spot prices during the 
financial crisis 2006-2008 using Granger Causality tests. Gilbert (2010) finds that index 
investment influenced grain prices because of their additional demand for long positions 
in futures markets during the food price spike 2006-2008. He assumes that index traders 
were driven by U.S. dollar depreciation and expected growth of demand for grains from 
China. While Tang and Xiong (2012) do not directly test whether index traders’ activity 
influenced commodity prices, they find that due to index trading the correlation between 
commodity prices increased. Treating commodities as one asset class, they emphasize 
that index traders caused commodity prices to decouple from their fundamental value. 
By contrast, Sanders and Irwin (2010) show that index traders did not impact 
commodity futures prices from January 2006 to December 2008. Using cross-sectional 
regressions, they reject a relationship between positions, changes in net positions of 
index traders and returns of 12 agricultural futures prices. Similarly, Stoll and Whaley 
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(2010) argue against an influence of index traders on agricultural markets by Granger 
causality tests for data ranging from January 2006 until July 2009. In addition to stan-
dard Granger causality tests, Sanders and Irwin (2011) confirm former results of no 
influence of index traders on grain futures prices using long-horizon regressions. 
Capelle-Blancard and Coulibaly (2011) arrive at the same conclusion for 12 agricultural 
commodities by applying a Granger causality test with a Seemingly Unrelated Regr-
ession system. According to them, index traders did not cause a decoupling from the 
fundamental value during the period 2006 to 2010 or in any subperiod. 
As the CFTC publishes data on traders’ positions on a weekly base, studies 
examining dependencies between traders’ positions and commodity prices lack accu-
racy to find out the real impact traders potentially have on the price. Some internal 
studies of the CFTC overcome this problem having access to highly disaggregated data 
on a daily basis (Brunetti et al., 2011; Aulerich et al., 2013). Nonetheless, these internal 
studies suffer from the same methodological weaknesses mentioned by Grosche (2012): 
Firstly, bivariate Granger causality tests do not prove that there is no relationship bet-
ween index trader activity, commodity futures prices and volatility. Secondly, if funda-
mentals are not taken into account in the test, this leads to an omitted variable bias. 
Thus, all the above mentioned studies lack methodological precision and ignore the 
most important determinant of commodities, namely supply and demand. 
Another possibility to examine whether commodity prices decoupled from their 
fundamental value is to test for speculative bubbles, as done by Liu et al. (2013), 
Etienne et al. (2014), Adämmer and Bohl (2015). Liu et al. (2013) use the net conve-
nience yield as a proxy for the fundamental value. It is derived from two futures 
contracts with different maturities. For six agricultural commodities including corn, 
soybeans, and wheat, they solely find evidence for speculative bubbles in the case of 
soybeans. Etienne et al. (2014) relate the occurrence of bubbles to several factors, inclu-
ding index trader activity, speculative activity, inventories, and exports. They demon-
strate that only speculators contribute to bubbles. Additionally, fundamentals as low 
inventories or increasing exports may lead to bubbles as well. Adämmer and Bohl 
(2015) rely on the crude oil price and the exchange rate to proxy the fundamentals of 
corn, soybeans, and wheat. For wheat, they find some evidence on the existence of 
speculative bubbles. Since exchange rates have a higher impact on wheat prices, they 
justify their findings with higher exposure of wheat to exports. Furthermore, crude oil 
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prices have a higher impact on wheat prices since production is energy intensive. While 
these studies aim to capture the fundamental value of wheat, the proxies applied are far 
from real fundamental data. On the contrary, Etienne et al. (2014) use values directly 
related to fundamental data of a commodity, such as inventories and exports. But they 
merely measure the impact of these factors during econometrically detected bubbles. 
Therefore, the long-term impact of fundamental information compared to speculative 
activity is not being regarded. 
While the impact of the publication of COT traders’ positions was not considered 
in an event study framework, the informational value of United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) announcements was analyzed in several studies applying an event 
study methodology. Milonas (1987) demonstrates that the USDA announcements on 
crop size are a very important source of information to market participants in corn, 
soybeans, and wheat spot markets. Sumner and Mueller (1989) confirm the importance 
of USDA crop production announcements for corn and soybean futures prices. 
Fortenberry and Sumner (1993) find that USDA reports had less impact on corn 
and soybean futures prices after 1985. One reason for the decreased importance from 
1985 to 1989 as compared to the period before 1985 is that corn and soybean prices 
were at or near loan rates, such that building up stocks was encouraged by the govern-
ment. Additionally, the introduction of options markets for corn and soybeans around 
1985 shows some tendency to reduce the variability in futures markets. They conclude 
that the availability of options markets give traders the possibility to hedge their futures 
positions instead of liquidating those when unwanted market conditions appear. Garcia 
et al. (1997) confirm the findings of Fortenberry and Sumner (1993) that USDA reports 
provide important information to market participants in the corn and soybean futures 
markets and that this importance declined in the mid-1980s. McNew and Espinosa 
(1994) show that the implied volatility, derived by corn and soybean futures and option 
contracts, decrease significantly after the release of the USDA crop production fore-
casts. Thereby, they confirm the informational value of USDA reports. Egelkraut et al. 
(2003) compare the accuracy of USDA forecasts with production forecasts of two pri-
vate agencies for corn and soybeans in the period from 1971 to 2000. They find that 
USDA forecasts for both grains are the most accurate with the exception of recent fore-
casts in August (1985-2000) and for soybeans in September. Good and Irwin (2006) 
confirm these findings with data up to 2005. 
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The results of Fortenberry and Sumner (1993) and Garcia et al. (1997) show that 
for more recent periods the USDA crop reports lost importance. Additionally, Egelkraut 
et al. (2003) and Good and Irwin (2006) find that private forecasts are more accurate in 
August. Assuming that these observed tendencies continued, this seems to prohibit 
using USDA grain reports for an event study on recent data. 
Yet, according to Isengildina-Massa et al. (2008), McKenzie (2008), and Marone 
(2008), the tendency of declining importance of USDA reports did not continue. 
Isengildina-Massa et al. (2008) find that the impact of the World Agricultural Supply 
and Demand Estimates (WASDE) for corn and soybeans increased during the time 
period from 1985 to 2006. Besides, McKenzie (2008) states that USDA crop reports for 
corn and soybeans are still valuable information for market participants. While Marone 
(2008) does not generally contradict these findings, he detects that market participants 
on the wheat market improved in anticipating USDA announcements from 2001 to 2008 
compared to the period from 1992 to 2000. The price reaction on USDA reports 
changed in the manner that reactions occurred on the day prior to the publication of the 
report. 
All of the mentioned studies about fundamental information on grains aim to find 
an empirical justification for the financial support by taxpayers for crop reports by the 
USDA. This is done by checking whether USDA production forecasts are news for 
market participants, whether there are differences in the forecast accuracy between 
months, or by comparing the accuracy of USDA forecasts with forecasts of private 
agencies. Instead, my study focuses on the impact of WASDE projections compared to 
CFTC publications of trader positions on grains futures prices. Thereby, it will be of 
great importance to examine how the influence of fundamental data and trading devel-
oped over time. The increase of index traders’ participation in commodity futures 
markets will be of special interest in this case. 
How pricing in grain futures markets is affected by traders’ positions is examined 
by De Roon et al. (2000). They find that hedging pressure (net short positions of 
hedgers) and changes in hedging pressure, which they define as price pressure, has a 
significant impact on futures returns. This is strongly valid for corn and wheat, and to 
some lower extent for soybeans. Contrary to their results, Sanders et al. (2009) find little 
evidence on the ability to forecast futures returns by traders’ positions. Instead, the 
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predictive power of futures returns on speculators’ positions is high across all markets. 
To a lower extent, this also holds true for hedgers’ positions. Thus, it rather appears that 
trend-following or positive feedback trading (see De Long et al., 1990) influences 
pricing in grains futures markets when compared with a direct impact of positions on 
pricing. As discussed by Mayer (2009), another effect may hinder to find a direct 
relationship between prices and positions: if position changes from informed traders, as 
large hedgers and speculators can be classified, are imitated by less  informed traders 
like small speculators (a part of non-reportable traders) and index traders. Instead of 
gathering fundamental information, the less informed traders just follow the strategy of 
informed traders assuming that the initial trading decision of the informed traders was 
based on a detailed analysis of the fundamentals. This may lead to a decoupling of the 
fundamental value of a commodity if the participation of uninformed traders is high 
enough to impact the pricing mechanism. 
3 Data 
3.1 Prices 
Daily futures prices for corn, soybeans, and wheat are from the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT). The sample for futures prices ranges from January 1, 1996 to June 30, 2014. 
All price data is collected from Datastream. To construct a continuous time series of 
futures prices, contracts are rolled over depending on the size of open interest. As the 
futures price reaction on the publication of traders’ positions is analyzed, the futures 
price in which the majority of traders are invested in serves perfectly for this purpose. 
This is usually the nearby contract. When the nearby contract comes close to maturity, 
the second nearby contract is the contract with highest open interest. To avoid roll-over 
gains or losses, returns of each contract are calculated in order to construct a return 
index of futures prices. 
Using only nearby and next-to-nearby futures contracts ignores price reactions of 
futures contracts with longer maturities. Marone (2008) analyzes several futures cont-
racts in an event study about the impact of World Agricultural Supply and Demand 
(WASDE) news. He finds that futures contracts with longer maturities react less sen-
sible to WASDE announcements than short-term futures contracts. Consequently, and 
by reason of comparability of the impact of the publication of traders’ positions and 
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WASDE announcements, solely the continuous futures price series based on open inter-
est are analyzed. 
3.2 Fundamental data 
To analyze price reactions on fundamental news, forecasts of the USDA are used. Since 
September 1973, the USDA regularly publishes the World Agricultural Supply and 
Demand Estimates Report (WASDE).1 This report provides detailed fundamental data 
on crops, which are important for grain traders and market participants in the grain 
futures markets. For U.S. crops, the WASDE report includes planted and harvested area, 
yield per harvested acre, beginning stocks, total supply and use, and ending stocks. 
Total supply is divided into production and imports, total use into domestic use and 
exports. For corn, soybeans, and wheat, these fundamental data are not only provided 
for the U.S., yet also for several other major exporting countries and additionally for the 
world. Instead of concentrating on single values like production, stocks, and total use, 
the stocks-to-use ratio ܷܴܵ௧ for U.S. and world values is calculated for the event study: 
ܷܴܵ௧ ൌ ா௡ௗ௜௡௚	ௌ௧௢௖௞௦೟்௢௧௔௟	௎௦௘೟   (1), 
with ܧ݊݀݅݊݃	ݏݐ݋ܿ݇ݏ௧ ൌ ܤ݁݃݅݊݊݅݊݃	ݏݐ݋ܿ݇ݏ௧ ൅ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܵݑ݌݌݈ݕ௧ െ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܷݏ݁௧, and 
ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܷݏ݁௧ ൌ ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ	ܷݏ݁௧ ൅ ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐݏ௧. The change of the values from WASDE 
projections are calculated by ∆ܷܴܵ௧ ൌ ܷܴܵ௧ െ ܷܴܵ௧ିଵ. Stocks-to-use ratios are calcu-
lated for U.S. and world projections on all monthly WASDE reports from January 1996 
to June 2014. This particular period was chosen for following reasons: Firstly, accurate 
data on single wheat futures contracts is not available before 1996. Secondly, this time 
period comprises two important events that caused a shift in the grains futures markets. 
These include the rise of index investment between 2004 and 20062 and the financial 
crisis 2007/08. These two events motivated numerous researchers to analyze the rel-
ationships between trading activity of index traders and speculators and commodity 
prices. By dividing the entire period into two subperiods, it is possible to shed light on 
whether a change in the market structure had an impact on pricing. The increased 
                                                            
1 Detailed information on the procedure of the USDA to gather data on grain fundamentals can be found 
in Vogel & Bange (1999). 
2  Sanders & Irwin (2011) show that for corn, soybeans, and wheat the extreme rise of index trading 




participation of index traders and the financial crisis possibly led to a shift regarding the 
absorption of fundamental news compared to information on traders’ behavior in grains 
futures markets. 
3.3 Traders’ positions 
To measure the impact of the publication of traders’ positions, the Commitments of 
Traders Report (COT) of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are 
used. The COT Report is published every Tuesday and separates all open positions of 
traders in the futures markets into positions of commercials, non-commercials and non-
reportables. Commercials use futures markets to hedge risk stemming from their 
commercial business activities. The variable for hedgers analyzed in the event study is 
hedging pressure (ܪܲሻ. It is calculated by the number of long and short positions held 
by commercials: 
ܪܲ ൌ ௡௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௦௛௢௥௧	௛௘ௗ௚௘	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦ି௡௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௟௢௡௚	௛௘ௗ௚௘	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦௧௢௧௔௟	௡௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௛௘ௗ௚௘	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦   (2), 
which is the number of short positions minus the number of long positions held by 
commercials divided by the total number of positions held by commercials. While non-
reportable trader hold too few positions to be included in the COT reports, the other part 
of reportable traders are non-commercial traders. As they do not consider futures 
markets for the purpose of hedging, they are typically associated with speculation. Simi-
larly, speculative pressure ሺܵܲሻ is calculated by the number of long and short positions 
of non-commercials: 
ܵܲ ൌ ௡௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௟௢௡௚	௦௣௘௖௨௟௔௧௜௩௘	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦ି௡௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௦௛௢௥௧	௦௣௘௖௨௟௔௧௜௩௘	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦௧௢௧௔௟	௡௨௠௕௘௥	௢௙	௦௣௘௖௨௟௔௧௜௩௘	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦   (3), 
For each market the absolute changes in hedging pressure  ∆ܪܲ ൌ ܪ ௧ܲ െ ܪ ௧ܲିଵ  and 
speculative pressure ∆ܵܲ ൌ ܵ ௧ܲ െ ܵ ௧ܲିଵ are calculated.  
4 Methodology 
4.1 Preliminary analysis 
Figures 1a-c show futures prices, hedging and speculative pressure, and stocks-to-use 
ratios. To compare the development of traders’ positions and the fundamental 
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development to futures prices, all graphs lie within the same time line. Speculative 
pressure (net long positions of non-commercials) always overtops hedging pressure (net 
short positions of commercials). Trading pressure of speculators and hedgers conti-
nuously move in the same direction. Speculators seem to provide sufficient liquidity to 
hedgers, especially in the case of corn and soybeans. Considering the case of wheat, this 
holds to a lower degree. When comparing futures prices, trading pressure, and stocks-
to-use ratios, some relationships can be observed. In the beginning of 2004 and 2008, as 
well as at the end of the examined time period, increasing prices are ac-companied by 
increasing and high levels of speculative and hedging pressure. Moreover, the stocks-to-
use ratio is reflected in the price development. During the period from 1996 until 2000, 
all stock-to-use ratio levels increase while futures prices decline. Although the stocks-
to-use ratios and prices are also related between 2000 and 2006, the most obvious 
relationship for corn appears to be in 2006, for soybean mid of 2007, and for wheat 
gradually from mid of 2007 until the end of the year. Dramatically decreasing stocks 
introduce a period of an extreme upturn in prices. As the stock-to-use ratio never really 
recovers sustainably, price pressure remains until the end of the examined period. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of futures returns. In contrast to the aver-
age soybean futures returns, average corn and wheat futures returns are negative. The 
soybean futures returns show the lowest volatility, whereas wheat futures returns have 
the highest volatility. The kurtoses of the three return samples deviate similarly from a 
normal distribution which indicates heavy tails. The stationarity of the analyzed vari-
ables is tested by the Augmented Dickey Fuller test that includes a drift term. The 
results in Table 2a and 2b show that all time series which are relevant for the empirical 
analysis are clearly stationary. 
4.2 WASDE only 
Daily commodity futures returns frequently show volatility clustering and non-nor-
mality because of a pronounced excess kurtosis. This is also the case with corn, soy-
bean, and wheat futures returns for the examined time period in this study (see Table 1). 
McKenzie et al. (2004) suggest applying a GARCH (1,1) model with t-distributed error 
terms (GARCH (1,1)-T) when using daily commodity futures returns in an event study. 
They run simulations on different sample sizes of events with constant-mean return 
models, OLS, GARCH (1,1), and a GARCH (1,1)-T model. Due to their higher excess 
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kurtosis in comparison to other agricultural commodity futures returns, the most suitable 
model with the strongest power to detect abnormal returns in the particular case of 
grains is the GARCH (1,1)-T model. Firstly, the GARCH (1,1)-T is applied for 
WASDE data only, with an event window of eleven days (±5 days from the event), and 
ݐ ൌ 6,… , ܶ െ 5: 
ܴ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௜௝ ൅ ߠ௜௝ܴ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜,௧ା௞௝ ܦ௜,௧ା௞௝ହ௞ୀିହ ൅ ߝ௜,௧௝   (4a). 
ߝ௜,௧௝ ൌ ݁௜,௧௝ ට݄௜,௧௝ ,     with      ݁௜,௧௝ 	~	ݐ݀ሺ0, ݄௜,௧௝ , ݒ௜௝ሻ	  (4b). 
݄௜,௧௝ ൌ ݓ௜௝ ൅ ߩ௜௝ሺߝ௜,௧ିଵ௝ ሻଶ ൅ ߛ௜௝݄௜,௧ିଵ௝ ,  (4c), 
for the ݅ grains corn, soybeans, and wheat, and the ݆ different events: all WASDE pro-
jections, only those WASDE projections with positive (negative) changes in the stocks-
to-use ratios from the U.S. (world) projections, and the 20th (80th) percentile of the 
stocks-to-use ratios from the U.S. (world) projections. By analyzing the 20th and 80th 
percentiles, the impact of extreme changes in the stocks-to-use ratio can be examined 
separately. The mean equation (4a) of the GARCH (1,)-T model takes into account first 
order autoregression in the return series ܴ௧ and includes an intercept ߙ. The coefficients 
ߚ௧ା௞ measure the abnormal returns of each day in the event window. The dummy vari-
ables ܦ௧ା௞ are one on the event day and the five days before and after the event, and 
zero otherwise. The conditional variance is modeled in the GARCH (1,1)-T model with 
variance ݄௧ and with ݒ degrees of freedom. McKenzie et al. (2004) suggest including 
explanatory variables in the mean equation (4a) to take non-event related variables into 
account, which influence commodity prices constantly. For analyzing equity prices in 
an event study, this would be a common stock index, as the S&P 500 for U.S. equities. 
In the case of grains, the dollar exchange rate, the oil price, and also the S&P 500 are 
three variables that could capture some variability in the commodity returns (see Tang 
and Xiong, 2012). But as it strikingly obvious in Figure A.1, the rolling correlations of 
corn, soybeans, and wheat futures returns with the dollar index, the oil price, and the 
S&P 500 returns show a nearly constant high correlation solely during the period from 
2008 to 2010. Outside this time period the correlations are very unstable and switch 
from positive to negative values and vice versa. Thus, using these three explanatory 
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variables would not improve the model in the mean equation over the whole examined 
time period. 
The restriction on the WASDE report for an event window of eleven days has the 
following reason: The COT report is published every week on Friday. As a conse-
quence, if the impact of its publication is analyzed in an event study framework and 
directly compared to the impact of the WASDE report, the event window has to be 
scaled down to a maximum of five days. Otherwise, this would result in incorrect results 
due to overlapping in the event window for the data on trader’s positions. In the case of 
the COT report, restricting the event window to five days does not constitute a problem. 
If there is any price reaction on large traders’ net position changes, it should appear on 
the day of the publication of the COT report or few days earlier if anticipated well. 
Should market participants react in a delayed way on the position changes of large 
traders, changes are expected to appear a day later. Instead, for the monthly WASDE 
report it has to be excluded that there are significant price reactions outside the event 
window of five days. Private firms usually publish their forecasts on grain fundamentals 
a few days before the WASDE report is published. Therefore, in the first stage, it is 
reviewed whether price reactions occurred outside the event window of five days. 
4.3 WADSE vs. COT trader positions 
To compare WASDE projections with the COT trader positions, the time frame in the 
mean equation of the GARCH (1,1)-T model is adjusted to the maximum number of 
days in accordance to the weekly frequency of the COT report: 
ܴ௜,௧ ൌ ߠ௜ௐ஺ௌ஽ாܴ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜,௧ା௞ௐ஺ௌ஽ாܦ௜,௧ା௞ௐ஺ௌ஽ாଵ௞ୀିଷ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ௐ஺ௌ஽ா   (5a). 
ܴ௜,௧ ൌ ߮௜஼ை்ܴ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜,௧ା௞஼ை் ܦ௜,௧ା௞஼ை்ଵ௞ୀିଷ ൅ ߝ௜,௧஼ை்  (5b). 
The events from the WASDE report are the same as in mean equation (4a). Accor-
dingly, the events of the COT report are structured in the same manner as for the 
WASDE reports: all COT reports, positive (negative) changes in hedging (speculative) 
pressure, and extremely high and low values for hedging (speculative) pressure (the 
80%- and the 20%-percentile of hedging and speculative pressure changes). Thus, nine 
different samples of events are created for both WASDE and the COT report. For both 
equations (5a) and (5b), the dummy variables take a value of one three days before to 
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one day after the event day, and zero otherwise. For the comparison of WASDE pro-
jections and trader’s positions in an event study, the intercept is removed in (5a) and 
(5b), because for the case of the COT trader reports all dummies are related to one day 
in a week. Using an intercept in the mean equation on COT trader positions would lead 
to the dummy variable trap, since every single day in the event window is captured by 
dummy variables.3  
To account for the increase of index investment and the commodity boom during 
the financial crisis 2007/08, the whole sample is divided into two subperiods. The first 
subperiod ranges from January 1996 to December 2005. Figures 1a-c show that this 
time period does not include any extreme price changes. The second subperiod from 
January 2006 to end of June 2014 comprises the period where the financialization by 
index traders reached very high levels and when the commodity boom with its extreme 
price swings occurred. This procedure aims to uncover whether a shift from the impor-
tance of fundamentals of a commodity on pricing towards an increased impact of 
changes in large trader position occurred. 
Price limits for futures prices are another important aspect. If price limits are set 
very low, detecting significant price reactions becomes difficult. However, price limits 
for the contracts are quite high.4 In addition, McKenzie et al. (2004) state that abnormal 
returns can be detected by the GARCH (1,1)-T model with low returns. Even if being 
below one percent, the issue of price limits can be ignored. 
4.4 Distributed lag model 
In order to check whether the tendencies observed in the event study continue to in-
fluence futures prices over longer time periods, the relationships between fundamental 
news and the publication of traders’ positions with futures returns are re-examined in a 
distributed lag model: 
ܴ௜,௧ ൌ ߤ௜ௐ஺ௌ஽ா ൅ ߚ௜,ଵௐ஺ௌ஽ா∆ܷܴܵ௜,௧ௐ஺ௌ஽ா ൅ ߚ௜,ଶௐ஺ௌ஽ா∆ܷܴܵ௜,௧ିଵௐ஺ௌ஽ா ൅ ߝ௜,௧ௐ஺ௌ஽ா  (6). 
                                                            
3 For the WASDE report, equation (5a) was also calculated with an intercept included. In no case the 
intercept was significant and distinct from zero. Therefore removing the intercept for the case of 
WASDE projections, in the event study framework by equation (5a), does not lead to noteworthy 
different results. 
4  http://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/ED127_Price-Limits-FBD_8.5x11.pdf; It shows that price 




ܴ௜,௧ ൌ ߱௜஼ை் ൅ ߜ௜,ଵ஼ை்∆ܶ ௜ܲ,௧஼ை் ൅ ߜ௜,ଶ஼ை்∆ܶ ௜ܲ,௧ିଵ஼ை் ൅ ݒ௜,௧஼ை் (7), 
with the change of the stocks-to-use ratio ∆ܷܴܵ for ݆ being U.S. or world WASDE pro-
jections, and ∆ܶܲ is the change in trading pressure from either COT hedgers or specu-
lators. The corresponding futures return series are adjusted to the point of time when 
WASDE reports and COT reports are published, such that monthly returns are created 
for WASDE reports and weekly returns for the COT reports. 
5 Results 
5.1 WASDE only 
To exclude important significant reactions in futures prices outside the event window 
for the comparison of WASDE and COT reports, Table A.1 shows the results of the 
event study focusing solely on the WASDE report for an event window of five days 
prior and after the event day. Highly positive changes in the world projections (world 
big) have a significant impact on all three grains outside the event window for the 
comparison of WASDE and COT reports. Negative futures price reactions occurred in 
the corn and wheat market three days after, for soybeans four days before, and for wheat 
additionally five days before the WASDE report is published. Earlier futures price 
reactions might have occurred due to publications of other providers of fundamental 
news. Subsequent price reactions might have taken place by virtue of delayed reactions 
of market participants, who do not actively monitor the WASDE reports on a daily base 
or just by provider of fundamental information that publish after the WASDE report. 
Other futures price reactions that take place outside the event window of three days 
prior up to a day after the event, the time frame for the comparison of the WASDE and 
COT report, appear to be the negative and highly negative (world small) changes in 
world projections for wheat. Positive price reactions occurred for negative and very 
negative world projection changes on wheat five days after the WASDE report is pub-
lished. Soybean futures prices show a significant negative reaction on positive world 
projections. Thus, in any case, world projections have led to significant price reactions 
outside the event window when comparing the WASDE and COT reports. Generally, 
delayed reactions and the existence of other provider of fundamental information are 
possibly responsible for the significant price reactions, which are distant in time from 
the release of the WASDE report. The results should be kept in mind for the direct 
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comparison of WASDE and COT reports directly in order to avoid wrong conclusions, 
especially when the price reaction on the WASDE report is low during the event win-
dow of three days prior the event and a day after. 
5.2 WASDE vs. COT report 
Considering all WASDE projections throughout the whole time period for corn (Table 
3a), there is a negative reaction in futures prices on the event date. When separating into 
two subperiods, a negative reaction of the corn futures price until the end of 2005 and a 
positive reaction of corn futures prices thereafter are observed on the day of the 
WASDE publication. The impact of positive news for U.S. corn projections on futures 
prices decreased in magnitude and significance after 2006, while the average change of 
the stocks-to-use ratio was remarkably greater in the second subperiod. This also holds 
true for the 80th percentile of the biggest U.S. projections (U.S. big). This suggests that 
fundamental data on U.S. corn decreased in importance for pricing in futures markets, at 
least in the case of positive values. A decreasing importance of positive news for the 
global corn market is observed after 2006; however, contrary to U.S. projections, the 
average value of the projected world stocks-to-use ratios actually decreased. Hence, the 
decreasing reaction in prices is justified by the decreased average changes in the stocks-
to-use ratio for world projections. The largest positive world projections (World big) 
which are expected to lower the futures price, lead to an increase of prices during the 
second subperiod. This paradox can be explained by the following: firstly, the world 
market has a minor importance for corn futures prices. Yet, if all other U.S. and world 
projections and their corresponding futures price reactions are compared, this conjecture 
does not hold. Secondly, a generally decreasing importance of fundamental data on 
pricing in futures markets could have led to the contradictory price reaction. While the 
intensity of the futures price reaction on positive and very positive news actually 
decreased, it does not explain why very good fundamental news lead to a positive price 
reaction. The most likely explanation for the positive price reaction is too optimistic 
expectations for the WASDE projection by market participants. While the world stocks-
to-use ratio for soybeans and wheat recovers and stays on a higher level in the second 
subperiod, the world stocks-to-use ratio of corn remains on a low level after 2006 (see 
Figures 1 a-c). Market participants on the futures market probably expected a stronger 
recovery of corn fundamentals and therefore pushed prices as expectations were not 
met. The findings of the event study on the WASDE report with the wider event 
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window show that the contradicting price reactions are reversed three days after the 
publication of the WASDE report (Table A.1). 
While the average stocks-to-use ratios for negative U.S. and world projections 
lowered in the second subperiod, the reactions in the futures market increased, when 
summing up the significant positive reactions. The reaction of futures prices on the 20th 
percentile, the worst U.S. fundamental news, changed to a similar extent as the average 
change of the stocks-to-use ratio. Yet, the case does not apply for world projections, as 
the reaction of futures prices, if the significant ones are summed up, doubled in the 
same time where the average change of stocks-to-use ratio changed marginally. Thus, 
the worst negative projections of the global fundamental data appear to have the stron-
gest influence on corn future prices after 2006. 
The WASDE world projections are less important for the price reactions in the 
soybean futures market after 2006 (Table 3b). Decreasing values for world stocks-to-use 
ratio changes do account for the marginal futures price reactions. Positive futures price 
reactions on positive world stocks-to-use changes can be explained similarly as in the 
case of “world big” projections for corn. The low increase of stocks-to-use ratios 
resulted in higher prices, since expectations of market participants appear to be too 
optimistic on a recovery of the fundamentals. Nevertheless, the case of soybeans de-
monstrates that it has to be considered that the positive price reaction is repealed four 
days before the publication of the WASDE report (Table A.1). This happens outside the 
event window of the direct comparison between WASDE and COT publication. While 
the values of the U.S. negative and very negative average stocks-to-use ratios increase 
after 2006, the futures price reactions decrease slightly. In conclusion, the importance of 
U.S. fundamental data for soybeans decreased for pricing in futures markets, except for 
very good news on the U.S. stocks-to-use ratio. 
In the second subperiod, the most important fundamental determinant for wheat 
futures prices is the recovery of the world stocks-to-use ratio (Table 3c). Although the 
average stocks-to-use ratio change is remarkably lower in the second subperiod, positive 
and highly positive WASDE world projections lead to the strongest price reaction after 
2006. This holds especially true in the case when significant negative price reactions on 
world projections outside the event window of three days and one day after the WASDE 
publication is considered additionally (Table A.1). Negative and highly negative U.S. 
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and world projections do not play an important role after 2006. For negative and highly 
negative world projections I solely notice a significant positive price reaction five days 
after the WASDE report was published. The WASDE projections for the U.S. generally 
lost importance for pricing in wheat futures markets: Summing up the price reactions on 
U.S. stocks-to-use ratio changes after 2006, no significant reaction is left. 
In order to describe and interpret the futures price reactions on the publication of 
COT position changes, it is very important to keep in mind that day 0 is a Friday when 
the trader positions of the previous Tuesday (-3) are published by the CFTC. During the 
first subperiod, the corn futures price reactions (Table 4a) are spread over the week: 
Significant futures price reactions are observed around the day of publication and 
around the day of data collection. Changes occur in the second subperiod: all futures 
price reactions, except negative net position changes of speculators, take place on the 
day of data collection. Hence, while the publication of positions prior to 2006 appears to 
be news for some market participants, after 2006 all futures price reactions take place 
on the day when the data on trader positions is collected. If it is assumed that neither 
market participants can observe the Tuesdays’ position changes nor there is a leak in the 
procedure of collecting traders’ data by the CFTC,5 only one possible explanation 
remains: traders who follow the position changes of the most influential traders, as large 
hedgers and speculators are, successfully anticipate these position changes. 
Futures price reactions change from the first subperiod to the second in a way that 
the reaction on positive and very positive changes in hedging and speculative pressure 
increases, while the magnitude of the average net position changes strongly decreases. 
In the case of positive net position changes, exaggerated reactions in the futures market 
are observed. A decrease of speculators’ net long positions are of minor importance for 
pricing after 2006, while hedgers’ net short position changes continue to influence 
futures pricing after 2006. In general, the futures price reactions are very similar for 
changes in speculative and hedging pressure, but hedging pressure is almost in any case 
of marginally higher magnitude than the reactions on speculative pressure. Figures 1a-c 
showed that speculative and hedging pressure constantly move in the same direction. 
Thus, the similar futures price reactions are logical. The stronger reaction on hedging 
                                                            
5  According to a responsible employee of the CFTC, detailed data of the COT report will not be released 
before the publication on Friday without federal court order. At the same time strict confidentiality 
cannot be guaranteed. 
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pressure can be explained by the assumption that commercial traders engaged in the 
commodity business have better access to fundamental data than speculators, and the 
finding that speculators often follow momentum strategies (Kang et al. 2014; Bosch and 
Smimou, 2014). Therefore, it seems a more common strategy for market participants 
who follow net position changes of large COT traders to follow hedgers (commercials) 
instead of speculators (non-commercials). 
Compared to the futures price reactions of COT net position changes on the corn 
market, the soybean futures market does not show any futures price reaction on the day 
of publication (0) before 2006 (Table 4b). Nearly all price reactions occur on the day of 
data collection. As all average net position changes - positive or negative - decrease 
after 2006, the absent or much lower futures price reactions are corollary. The positive 
futures price reactions on decreasing speculative and hedging pressure in the second 
subperiod appear somehow confusing. As data on position changes seem relevant for 
pricing on the soybeans futures market on the day of data collection, positive reactions 
on the day prior to publication seem to be a correction of the higher expected negative 
values for net position changes. On day -3 prior to the event day insignificantly 
negative, yet high, values are observed. When time moves closer to the release of the 
CFTC positions, the uncertainty about the value of the anticipated net position changes 
decreases so that the wrongly anticipated value is corrected on the day prior to public-
cation. The previously mentioned offers potential to explain the futures price reaction 
occurring on the day of data collection in more detail. Maybe it is not the case that some 
market participants have access the results of the data collection. Instead, it might be 
due to a very good anticipation of market participants who trade according to the net 
long (short) position changes of speculators (hedgers). 
While the COT net position changes show much lower values after 2006, most 
wheat futures price reactions increase, especially when experiencing extreme changes 
(big and small). A tendency of decreased importance of fundamental news and in-
creased impact of traders’ positions seems most evident in the wheat futures market. 
This results from the fact that in the special case of U.S. projections the importance for 
pricing of wheat futures is lost. A globally integrated grain market with extreme 
conditions in the second subperiod certainly has contributed to the finding that the rela-
 108 
 
tive importance of U.S. fundamental news on grains decreased.6 The reaction day of 
wheat futures prices tends to be the day of data collection, as it is also the case for corn 
and soybeans. 
Reasons for increased importance of trading pressure might be the high share of 
index traders (Table 5) and strikingly lower participation of professional speculators 
(money managers, Table 6) in the wheat market compared to the other grain markets. 
As index traders are rather motivated by portfolio diversification instead of a detailed 
analysis of single commodities, this motivation may have had a decoupling effect of 
wheat futures prices from the fundamental development. This conjecture is supported 
when price reactions and the corresponding participation of different trader categories in 
the corn, soybean, and wheat futures market are considered. On average, the soybean 
futures market has the highest share of professional speculators and the lowest share of 
passive traders (index traders and swap dealers). At the same time the price reactions on 
COT reports are the least in the soybeans futures market. Consequently, the information 
content of large trader’s positions does not seem to be an important influence in the 
soybean futures market. By contrast, the wheat futures market, having a large share of 
index traders and swap dealers and an average share of professional speculators’ net 
long positions near zero, is the market that shows the highest impact coming from the 
publication of large traders’ positions. On the total ranking, the corn futures market lies 
within the wheat and soybean futures markets with respect to its development of price 
reactions on COT reports and with its participation of professional speculators, index 
traders, and swap dealers. These findings indicate that more index traders and less 
professional speculators contribute to the influence from large traders’ positions on pri-
cing in agricultural futures markets. Furthermore, this has some potential to explain that 
most studies analyzing the impact of index traders on agricultural futures prices do not 
find any economically significant relationship to returns and volatility (see e.g. Sanders 
and Irwin, 2010; Stoll and Whaley, 2010; Sanders and Irwin, 2011, and Capelle-
Blancard and Coulibaly, 2011). While a direct influence coming from index trader 
positions cannot be detected, uninformed traders as index traders and swap dealers 
likely aggravated the extreme price developments by following the strategy of large 
                                                            
6 A summary of events that led to decreased supply and inventories of global crops are summarized by 
Trostle et al. (2011): Adverse weather conditions in the most important grain producing countries 
occurred from 2005 - 2007 and 2010/11. 
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hedgers and speculators. This may have contributed to a decoupling of corn and wheat 
futures prices from their fundamental value. 
5.3 Distributed Lag model 
The results from the distributed lag model (Table 5a and 5b) confirm the results from 
the event study of the impact of fundamental news on grains futures prices for the most 
part: The relative importance of world projections increased in the corn and wheat 
futures markets from the first to the second subperiod, while this only holds to a weaker 
extent in the soybean futures market. Moreover, this result is supported by a decreasing 
impact of U.S. fundamental news on the soybean and the wheat futures market. Thus, 
the tendencies observed in the event study can be verified over longer horizons in a 
distributed lag model. 
The same holds true for the relationship of futures returns with hedging and specu-
lative pressure: From the first to the second subperiod, the impact of hedging and 
speculative pressure increased most evidently in the wheat futures market. Corn shows a 
similar tendency, but slightly lower when also considering the lagged coefficients from 
hedging and speculative pressure. The results for soybeans are at variance with the 
results from the event study. In the event study, the influence of the publication of large 
traders’ position decreased, while the results from the distributed lag model show a 
slight increase of the relationship between futures returns with hedging and speculative 
pressure. However, in relative terms, all tendencies follow the same pattern as in the 
event study. 
6 Conclusions 
The results of the GARCH (1,1)-T event study reveal several new aspects that could not 
be detected by usual time series methodologies, and without taking into account the 
supply and demand of corn, soybeans, and wheat: The publication of the WASDE 
report by the USDA still provides valuable new information for market participants in 
grains futures markets. Particularly, the global development of stocks and use of grains 
has an increased impact on more recent futures prices. 
A general tendency of relatively less influence of fundamental news and an 
increased influence of traders’ positions on futures prices are observed in the case of 
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corn and wheat. The larger share of index traders and less professional speculators could 
be responsible for the shift from fundamentals to traders’ positions, while this con-
jecture is limited to the observation that price reactions on trading pressure is more pro-
nounced in grains futures markets where index traders’ and swap dealers’ participation 
in the futures market is higher and those of professional speculators (money managers) 
lower. Another interesting finding is the day of significant futures price reactions on 
COT reports, which occurs on the day when data on traders’ positions is collected. This 
happens to be three days before this data is published. 
The findings of my study might be of interest to the CFTC in order to monitor 
possible cases of herd behavior and decoupling from fundamental values and its relation 
to the market structure. With access on internal data with higher frequencies of trader’s 
positions compared to the publicly available weekly reports, the significant price rea-
ctions on COT reports could be assigned to traders that apply strategies as following 
large traders’ position changes. Additionally, the price reactions on the day of data col-
lection for the COT report should motivate those responsible for confidentiality of the 
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Figure 1a: Corn futures price, speculative pressure, hedging pressure and stocks-
to-use ratio for U.S. and world from January 1, 1996 until June 30, 2014 
 
Note: The first part of Figure 1a shows the continuous futures price series for corn (continuous series by Datastream with 
code CS02; the rollover is based on a volume weighted procedure) from January 1, 1996 until June 30, 2014. The second 
part of the figure illustrates the hedging and the speculative pressure calculated as in formula (2) and (3). Part three and 






























Figure 1b: Soybean futures price, speculative pressure, hedging pressure and 
stocks-to-use ratio for U.S. and world from January 1, 1996 until June 30, 2014 
 
Note: The first part of Figure 1b shows the continuous futures price series for soybeans (continuous series by Datastream 
with code CS02; the rollover is based on a volume weighted procedure) from January 1, 1996 until June 30, 2014. The 
second part of the figure illustrates the hedging and the speculative pressure calculated as in formula (2) and (3). Part 






























Figure 1c: Wheat futures price, speculative pressure, hedging pressure and stocks-
to-use ratio for U.S. and world from January 1, 1996 until June 30, 2014 
 
Note: The first part of Figure 1c shows the continuous futures price series for wheat (continuous series by Datastream 
with code CS02; the rollover is based on a volume weighted procedure) from January 1, 1996 until June 30, 2014. The 
second part of the figure illustrates the hedging and the speculative pressure calculated as in formula (2) and (3). Part 





























Figure A.1: Rolling Correlations (200-day window) between Grains Returns and 

























































































































































































Table 1: Descriptive statistics on daily futures returns for corn, soybeans, and 
wheat 
 Corn  Soybeans  Wheat  
Mean -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0005 
SD 0.0167 0.0148 0.0184 
Skewness 0.0751 -0.1838 0.0740 
Kurtosis 5.2529 5.2219 5.1625 
Jarque-Bera 1025*** 1020*** 945*** 
Note: 4826 observations for all price series, *** denote significance at 1% level. 
 
Table 2a: Unit Root Tests (Augmented Dickey Fuller test) on daily futures returns, 


















Panel A: Corn 
t-statistic -66.99*** -23.55*** -22.55*** -13.91*** -13.76*** 
observations 4826 966 966 222 222 
Panel B: Soybeans 
t-statistic -69.81*** -19.39*** -24.95*** -14.03*** -14.93*** 
observations 4826 966 966 222 222 
Panel C: Wheat 
t-statistic -69.48*** -25.16*** -24.35*** -13.07*** -14.72*** 
observations 4826 966 966 222 222 
Note: *** denote significance at 1% level. 
 
Table 2b: Unit Root Tests (Augmented Dickey Fuller test) on weekly and monthly 
returns 
 Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Panel A: weekly returns 
t-statistic -31.62*** -30.70*** -31.07*** 
observations 966 966 966 
Panel B: monthly returns 
t-statistic -13.30*** -14.89*** -14.47*** 
observations 222 222 222 





Table 3a: Corn, futures prices reaction on WASDE projections (changes in stocks-to-use ratio) 
Day to 
event 
Total USDA U.S. positive World 
positive 
U.S. negative World 
negative 
U.S. big World big U.S. small World small 
Panel A: total sample (01/01/1996 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0027** 0.0009 0.0023* 0.0007 0.0004 0.0002 0.0012 
-2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0015 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0048** 0.0053** 
-1 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0008 0.0023 0.0017 -0.0019 0.0003 0.0010 0.0020 
0 -0.0013* -0.0063*** -0.0063*** 0.0069*** 0.0049*** -0.0117*** -0.0069*** 0.0223*** 0.0133*** 
1 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0010 0.0007 0.0030 0.0042** 0.0047** 0.0028 
Panel B: 1st subperiod (01/01/1996 – 12/30/2005) 
-3 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0029** 0.0011 0.0032** 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0013 
-2 0.0007 0.0008 0.0012 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002 0.0062*** 0.0037 
-1 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0029 -0.0012 -0.0016 0.0009 
0 -0.0034*** -0.0076*** -0.0069*** 0.0062*** 0.0016 -0.0128*** -0.0093*** 0.0183*** 0.0098*** 
1 0.0005 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0041 0.0036 0.0052** 0.0043* 
Panel C: 2nd subperiod (01/02/2006 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 -0.0007 -0.0021 -0.0020 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0012 -0.0004 
-2 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0024 0.0008 -0.0011 0.0024 0.0008 0.0022 0.0106** 
-1 0.0022 -0.0034 -0.0003 0.0056** 0.0044* 0.0021 0.0052 0.0063* 0.0081** 
0 0.0033** -0.0024 -0.0050** 0.0072*** 0.0107*** -0.0062* -0.0014 0.0295*** 0.0255*** 
1 -0.0002 -0.0045* -0.0027 0.0027 0.0021 -0.0012 0.0066* 0.0041 -0.0022 
Panel D: Average change of stocks-to-use ratio 
total 
sample  0.1217 0.0476 -0.1020 -0.0403 0.2833 0.0942 -0.1839 -0.0790 
1st sub  0.1006 0.0521 -0.1032 -0.0442 0.2292 0.0999 -0.1677 -0.0776 
2nd sub  0.1545 0.0420 -0.1009 -0.0359 0.3572 0.0863 -0.2008 -0.0814 
Note: -3 to 1 means coefficients of dummy variables from the third day prior the event on day 0 until the day after its occurrence. Total USDA: all WASDE projections, U.S. 
(World) positive: only WASDE U.S. (World) projections with change of stocks-to-use ratio > 0, U.S. (World) negative: only WASDE U.S. (World) projections with change of 
stocks-to-use ratio < 0, U.S. (World) big: only 80th percentile of the stocks-to-use ratio changes calculated with WASDE U.S. (World) projections, U.S. (World) small: only 20th 
percentile of the stocks-to-use ratio changes calculated with WASDE U.S. (World) projections. Coefficients of lagged returns are not reported. ***, **, * denote significance at 




Table 3b: Soybeans, futures prices reaction on WASDE projections (changes in stocks-to-use ratio) 
Day to 
event 
Total USDA U.S. positive World 
positive 
U.S. negative World 
negative 
U.S. big World big U.S. small World small 
Panel A: total sample (01/01/1996 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0019* 0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0019 0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0011 
-2 0.0016* -0.0001 0.0016 0.0031*** 0.0017 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0035* 0.0030* 
-1 0.0023** -0.0004 0.0024** 0.0041*** 0.0021 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0039* 0.0030 
0 -0.0001 -0.0030*** -0.0031*** 0.0023** 0.0034*** -0.0028* -0.0054*** 0.0104*** 0.0017 
1 0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0017 0.0015 0.0012 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0029 
Panel B: 1st subperiod (01/01/1996 – 12/30/2005) 
-3 0.0003 0.0004 0.0027** 0.0003 -0.0021 0.0013 0.0032 0.0010 -0.0024 
-2 0.0018* 0.0009 0.0021 0.0025* 0.0015 -0.0001 0.0022 0.0019 0.0024 
-1 0.0019* -0.0030* 0.0011 0.0053*** 0.0029* -0.0025 -0.0006 0.0060* 0.0035 
0 -0.0015* -0.0042*** -0.0046*** 0.0006 0.0023* -0.0019 -0.0102*** 0.0127*** 0.0021 
1 0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0015 0.0021 0.0027* 0.0006 -0.0025 0.0024 0.0035 
Panel C: 2nd subperiod (01/02/2006 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 0.0004 -0.0012 0.0007 0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0071*** -0.0018 -0.0010 0.0019 
-2 0.0013 -0.0012 0.0008 0.0037** 0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0016 0.0053* 0.0042 
-1 0.0027* 0.0031 0.0043** 0.0023 0.0009 0.0034 -0.0002 0.0011 0.0021 
0 0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0012 0.0044** 0.0045*** -0.0041 -0.0010 0.0080*** 0.0009 
1 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0013 0.0010 -0.0002 0.0020 0.0020 -0.0017 0.0016 




0.1642 0.0473 -0.0914 -0.0367 0.3374 0.0968 -0.1742 -0.0700 
1st sub  0.1637 0.0563 -0.0865 -0.0434 0.3352 0.1147 -0.1610 -0.0676 
2nd sub  0.1648 0.0366 -0.0974 -0.0289 0.3401 0.0745 -0.1868 -0.0757 
Note: -3 to 1 means coefficients of dummy variables from third day prior the event on day 0 until the day after its occurrence. Total USDA: all WASDE projections, U.S. (World) 
positive: only WASDE U.S. (World) projections with change of stocks-to-use ratio > 0, U.S. (World) negative: only WASDE U.S. (World) projections with change of stocks-to-
use ratio < 0, U.S. (World) big: only 80th percentile of the stocks-to-use ratio changes calculated with WASDE U.S. (World) projections, U.S. (World) small: only 20th percentile 
of the stocks-to-use ratio changes calculated with WASDE U.S. (World) projections. Coefficients of lagged returns are not reported. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 




Table 3c: Wheat, futures prices reaction on WASDE projections (changes in stocks-to-use ratio) 
Day to 
event 
Total USDA U.S. positive World 
positive 
U.S. negative World 
negative 
U.S. big World big U.S. small World small 
Panel A: total sample (01/01/1996 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0031** -0.0004 0.0026 0.0013 -0.0020 0.0022 0.0029 
-2 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0016 0.0018 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0029 
-1 0.0014 0.0008 -0.0010 0.0024 0.0040*** -0.0007 -0.0024 0.0036 0.0065*** 
0 -0.0043*** -0.0062*** -0.0081*** -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0078*** -0.0067*** 0.0040* 0.0019 
1 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0023 -0.0012 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0024 
Panel B: 1st subperiod (01/01/1996 – 12/30/2005) 
-3 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0019 0.0028 0.0027 0.0008 -0.0015 0.0044 0.0039 
-2 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0006 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0025 0.0025 
-1 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0021 0.0032 0.0035* -0.0060** -0.0039 0.0037 0.0064*** 
0 -0.0036** -0.0056*** -0.0072*** 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0069** -0.0048** 0.0057** 0.0030 
1 0.0001 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0023 
Panel C: 2nd subperiod (01/02/2006 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 -0.0020 0.0004 -0.0054** -0.0045 0.0025 0.0023 -0.0039 -0.0006 0.0006 
-2 -0.0002 -0.0025 -0.0032 0.0024 0.0038 0.0015 0.0025 0.0036 0.0033 
-1 0.0026 0.0038 0.0006 0.0013 0.0052* 0.0086** 0.0033 0.0033 0.0064 
0 -0.0057*** -0.0083*** -0.0098*** -0.0032 -0.0002 -0.0101*** -0.0127** 0.0018 -0.0007 
1 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0048** -0.0033 -0.0007 0.0014 -0.0055 -0.0018 -0.0021 




0.1099 0.0272 -0.1210 -0.0243 0.3152 0.0548 -0.1850 -0.0443 
1st sub  0.0982 0.0353 -0.1290 -0.0257 0.3175 0.0649 -0.1867 -0.0483 
2nd sub  0.1265 0.0192 -0.1141 -0.0223 0.3128 0.0397 -0.1834 -0.0388 
Note: -3 to 1 means coefficients of dummy variables from third day prior the event on day 0 until the day after its occurrence. Total USDA: all WASDE projections, U.S. (World) 
positive: only WASDE U.S. (World) projections with change of stocks-to-use ratio > 0, U.S. (World) negative: only WASDE U.S. (World) projections with change of stocks-to-
use ratio < 0, U.S. (World) big: only 80th percentile of the stocks-to-use ratio changes calculated with WASDE U.S. (World) projections, U.S. (World) small: only 20th percentile 
of the stocks-to-use ratio changes calculated with WASDE U.S. (World) projections. Coefficients of lagged returns are not reported. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 





Table 4a: Corn, futures prices reaction on CFTC publication of COT position changes (of hedgers and speculators) 
Day to 
event 






Spec big Hedge big Spec small Hedge small 
Panel A: total sample (01/01/1996 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 0.0003 0.0022*** 0.0021*** -0.0013** -0.0014** 0.0031*** 0.0029*** -0.0022** -0.0024*** 
-2 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0003 
-1 -0.0008* -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0010* -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0002 
0 -0.0010** -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0011* -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0016* -0.0012 -0.0017* 
1 -0.0007* -0.0008 -0.0015*** -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0019** -0.0024*** -0.0005 -0.0010 
Panel B: 1st subperiod (01/01/1996 – 12/30/2005) 
-3 0.0002 0.0020*** 0.0016** -0.0012* -0.0011 0.0026*** 0.0023** -0.0022** -0.0021** 
-2 -0.0006 -0.0018** -0.0012* 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0022** -0.0013 -0.0002 0.0004 
-1 -0.0011** -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0008 0.0005 
0 -0.0019*** -0.0016** -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0018** -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0018* -0.0020** 
1 0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0018*** -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0016* -0.0034*** -0.0004 -0.0009 
Panel C: 2nd subperiod (01/02/2006 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 0.0005 0.0024** 0.0030*** -0.0015 -0.0024*** 0.0043** 0.0044** -0.0024 -0.0037* 
-2 0.0006 0.0009 0.0009 0.0003 0.0003 0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 
-1 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0011 0.0031 -0.0011 
0 0.0010 0.0006 0.0011 0.0014 0.0009 0.0003 -0.0013 0.0007 -0.0010 
1 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0017* -0.0011 -0.0028 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0014 




0.0649 0.0232 -0.0582 -0.0231 0.1249 0.0447 -0.1151 -0.0430 
1st sub  0.0878 0.0304 -0.0745 -0.0285 0.1430 0.0501 -0.1255 -0.0468 
2nd sub  0.0404 0.0154 -0.0381 -0.0164 0.0894 0.0338 -0.0887 -0.0347 
Note: -3 to 1 means coefficients of dummy variables from third day prior the event on day 0 until the day after its occurrence. Total CFTC: all CFTC publications, Spec (Hegde) 
positive: only those CFTC publications with a change of speculative (hedging) pressure > 0, Spec (Hegde) negative: only those CFTC publications with a change of speculative 
(hedging) pressure < 0, Spec (Hegde) big: only those CFTC publications with a change of speculative (hedging) pressure above the 80th percentile, Spec (Hegde) small: only those 
CFTC publications with a change of speculative (hedging) pressure lower than the 20th percentile. Coefficients of lagged returns are not reported. ***, **, * denote significance at 





Table 4b: Soybeans, futures prices reaction on CFTC publication of COT position changes (of hedgers and speculators) 
Day to 
event 






Spec big Hedge big Spec small Hedge small 
Panel A: total sample (01/01/1996 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 0.0008** 0.0031*** 0.0035*** -0.0014*** -0.0018*** 0.0037*** 0.0041*** -0.0025*** -0.0030*** 
-2 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 0.0009 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0009 
-1 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0003 
0 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0005 
1 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 < -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0009 0.0009 
Panel B: 1st subperiod (01/01/1996 – 12/30/2005) 
-3 0.0008* 0.0037*** 0.00042*** -0.0019*** -0.0022*** 0.0050*** 0.0045*** -0.0035*** -0.0039*** 
-2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0005 
-1 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0015** -0.0012 0.0009 0.0003 -0.0023** -0.0005 
0 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0009 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0010 
1 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0007 0.0004 
Panel C: 2nd subperiod (01/02/2006 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 0.0008 0.0022*** 0.0026*** -0.0007 -0.0012 0.0010 0.0033** -0.0002 -0.0014 
-2 0.0008 0.0013 0.0009 0.0003 0.0008 0.0004 0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0018 
-1 0.0011* 0.0002 0.0002 0.0021** 0.0022** 0.0004 0.0006 0.0015 -0.0001 
0 0.0007 0.0014 0.0015* 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0018 0.0013 0.0002 0.0004 
1 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0012 0.0017 




0.0627 0.0274 -0.0611 -0.0274 0.1196 0.0504 -0.1164 -0.0513 
1st sub  0.0785 0.0329 -0.0777 -0.0330 0.1294 0.0530 -0.1297 -0.0561 
2nd sub  0.0443 0.0211 -0.0421 -0.0209 0.0989 0.0451 -0.0897 -0.0430 
Note: -3 to 1 means coefficients of dummy variables from third day prior the event on day 0 until the day after its occurrence. Total CFTC: all CFTC publications, Spec (Hegde) 
positive: only those CFTC publications with a change of speculative (hedging) pressure > 0, Spec (Hegde) negative: only those CFTC publications with a change of speculative 
(hedging) pressure < 0, Spec (Hegde) big: only those CFTC publications with a change of speculative (hedging) pressure above the 80th percentile, Spec (Hegde) small: only those 
CFTC publications with a change of speculative (hedging) pressure lower than the 20th percentile. Coefficients of lagged returns are not reported. ***, **, * denote significance at 




Table 4c: Wheat, futures prices reaction on CFTC publication of COT position changes (of hedgers and speculators) 
Day to 
event 






Spec big Hedge big Spec small Hedge small 
Panel A: total sample (01/01/1996 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 -0.0007 0.0020*** 0.0025*** -0.0032*** -0.0038*** 0.0033*** 0.0037*** -0.0046*** -0.0051*** 
-2 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0004 
-1 -0.0014*** -0.0012* -0.0012* -0.0015** -0.0015** -0.0011 -0.0018* -0.0010 -0.0024** 
0 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0021** 0.0006 0.0010 
1 -0.0010** -0.0019*** -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0008 
Panel B: 1st subperiod (01/01/1996 – 12/30/2005) 
-3 -0.0008 0.0016* 0.0021** -0.0030*** -0.0035*** 0.0028*** 0.0028** -0.0043*** -0.0046*** 
-2 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0003 
-1 -0.0016** -0.0017* -0.0017* -0.0015* -0.0016* -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0024** 
0 -0.0007 -0.0016* -0.0021** 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0027** 0.0006 0.0011 
1 -0.0005 -0.0015* -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 
Panel C: 2nd subperiod (01/02/2006 – 6/30/2014) 
-3 -0.0007 0.0025** 0.0032*** -0.0037*** -0.0047*** 0.0051*** 0.0066*** -0.0059** -0.0074*** 
-2 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 0.0021 0.0009 0.0019 
-1 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0016 0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0028 
0 <0.0001 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0005 0.0009 <0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002 
1 -0.0017** -0.0025** -0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0020 0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0034 -0.0058** 




0.0551 0.0307 -0.0543 -0.0312 0.1069 0.0596 -0.1051 -0.0592 
1st sub  0.0761 0.0422 -0.0730 -0.0412 0.1205 0.0661 -0.1168 -0.0637 
2nd sub  0.0319 0.0181 -0.0317 -0.0191 0.0724 0.0431 -0.0705 -0.0446 
Note: -3 to 1 means coefficients of dummy variables from third day prior the event on day 0 until the day after its occurrence. Total CFTC: all CFTC publications, Spec (Hegde) 
positive: only those CFTC publications with a change of speculative (hedging) pressure > 0, Spec (Hegde) negative: only those CFTC publications with a change of speculative 
(hedging) pressure < 0, Spec (Hegde) big: only those CFTC publications with a change of speculative (hedging) pressure above the 80th percentile, Spec (Hegde) small: only those 
CFTC publications with a change of speculative (hedging) pressure lower than the 20th percentile. Coefficients of lagged returns are not reported. ***, **, * denote significance at 




Table 5: Index Investment report, means of Index Trader Positions 
from December 31, 2007 to April 1, 2014 
Corn Soybeans Wheat 
0.311 0.307 0.462 
Note: Means of Index Trader are calculated as the number of net long positions 




Table 6: DCOT report, means of each traders’ categories from June 6, 2006 
to June 24, 2014 







Corn 0.315 0.121 0.234 0.041 -0.081 
Soybeans 0.352 0.164 0.218 0.027 -0.057 
Wheat 0.274 0.010 0.344 -0.030 -0.051 
Note: PMPU = producers/merchants/processors/users. For PMPU, the mean is computed 
by net short positions divided by open interest. For all other trader categories, the mean is 




Table 7a: Distributed Lag Model, monthly futures returns regressed on 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in stocks-to-use ratios from U.S. and world 
projections 
 Corn Soybeans Wheat 
 coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat 
Panel A: Futures returns on changes in stocks-to-use ratio from US projections 
 total sample (January 1996 – December 2014) 
U.S. -0.161*** -6.30 -0.084*** -4.23 -0.081*** -2.63 
U.S.(-1) -0.004 -0.15 -0.008 -0.39 -0.005 -0.16 
Adj. R² 0.15 0.07 0.02 
 1st  subperiod (January 1996 – December 2005) 
U.S. -0.120*** -3.28 -0.102*** -3.99 -0.082** -2.30 
U.S.(-1) -0.009 -0.24 -0.034 -1.25 0.025 0.69 
Adj. R² 0.09 0.11 0.04 
 2nd subperiod (January 2006 – December 2014) 
U.S. -0.182*** -4.98 -0.066** -2.11 -0.081*** -2.63 
U.S.(-1) -0.005 -0.13 0.017 0.52 -0.005 -0.16 
Adj. R² 0.18 0.02 0.02 
Panel B: Futures returns on changes in stocks-to-use ratio from world projections 
 total sample  (January 1996 – December 2014) 
World -0.456*** -6.12 -0.361*** -5.43 -0.339** -2.53 
World(-1) 0.015 0.189 -0.032 -0.46 -0.172 -1.27 
Adj. R² 0.15 0.11 0.02 
 1st  subperiod (January 1996 – December 2005) 
World -0.348*** -4.49 -0.331*** -4.49 -0.240* -1.92 
World(-1) 0.026 0.32 -0.006 -0.08 -0.136 -1.08 
Adj. R² 0.15 0.13 0.04 
 2nd subperiod (January 2006 – June 2014) 
World -0.618*** -4.32 -0.424*** -3.09 -0.681* -1.97 
World(-1) -0.003 -0.02 -0.091 -0.63 -0.264 -0.75 
Adj. R² 0.14 0.07 0.03 
Note: U.S.: coefficients of contemporaneous changes in the stocks-to-use ratio from U.S. projections, U.S.(-1): 
coefficients of lagged changes in the stocks-to-use ratio from U.S. projections, World: coefficients of contem-
poraneous changes in the stocks-to-use ratio from world projections, World(-1): coefficients of lagged changes in the 
stocks-to-use ratio from world projections. Coefficients of lagged returns are not reported. OLS with Newey-West 




Table 7b: Distributed Lag Model, weekly futures returns regressed on changes in 
trading pressure from hedgers and speculators 
 Corn Soybeans Wheat 
 coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat 
Panel A: Futures returns on change in hedging pressure 
 total sample (01/01/1996 – 6/30/2014) 
Hedge 0.709*** 15.83 0.547*** 20.09 0.510*** 16.86 
Hedge(-1) -0.119*** -3.32 -0.031 -0.99 -0.070** -2.54 
Adj. R² 0.35 0.36 0.28 
 1st  subperiod (01/01/1996 – 12/30/2005) 
Hedge 0.563*** 15.96 0.474*** 17.21 0.420*** 17.05 
Hedge(-1) -0.092** -2.35 0.004 0.10 -0.066** -2.29 
Adj. R² 0.50 0.43 0.43 
 2nd subperiod (01/02/2006 – 6/30/2014) 
Hedge 1.340*** 12.86 0.761*** 12.93 0.997*** 9.83 
Hedge(-1) -0.233*** -2.97 -0.115** -2.08 0.020 0.22 
Adj. R² 0.36 0.34 0.28 
Panel B: Futures returns on change in speculative pressure 
 total sample (01/01/1996 – 6/30/2014) 
Spec 0.214*** 12.64 0.183*** 14.80 0.263*** 15.38 
Spec(-1) -0.043*** -3.79 0.005 0.35 -0.045*** -3.02 
Adj. R² 0.25 0.23 0.25 
 1st  subperiod (01/01/1996 – 12/30/2005) 
Spec 0.173*** 12.40 0.165*** 12.56 0.217*** 15.71 
Spec(-1) -0.027 -2.28 0.008 0.49 -0.042*** -2.59 
Adj. R² 0.38 0.31 0.40 
 2nd subperiod (01/02/2006 – 6/30/2014) 
Spec 0.442*** 9.79 0.256*** 10.29 0.610*** 11.64 
Spec(-1) -0.076** -2.53 0.009 0.34 0.047 0.86 
Adj. R² 0.26 0.17 0.28 
Note: Hedge: coefficients of contemporaneous changes in hedging pressure, Hedge(-1): coefficients from lagged 
changes in hedging pressure, Spec: coefficients of contemporaneous changes in speculative pressure, Spec(-1): 
coefficients from lagged changes in speculative pressure. Coefficients of lagged returns are not reported. OLS with 




Table A.1: WASDE-Data (±5 days around event day) on futures returns 
  Corn Soybeans Wheat 
All 
All - 2D*(+), 1D**(+) 1D**(+) D0***(-) 
Pre2006 D0***(-) 2D*(+), 1D*(+) D0*(-) 
Post2006 D0**(+) D0*(+) D0***(-) D3**(-) 
U.S. positive 
All D0***(-) D0***(-) D0***(-) 
Pre2006 D0***(-) 2D**(-), 1D***(-) D0***(-) 

























All 1D**(+) D0***(+) 
2D***(+), 1D***(+) 
D0**(+) 1D*(+) 
Pre2006 D0***(+) 2D**(+), 1D***(+) D4*(-) 








D0***(+) 3D**(+), 2D**(+), 1D***(+) 







D0**(+) 2D*(+), 1D**(+) D5***(+) 
U.S. big 





Pre2006 D0***(-) D1*(+) - 
1D*(-) 
D0**(-) 







All D0***(-) D1**(+) 
4D*(-) 
D0***(-) D0***(-) 
Pre2006 D0***(-) D1*(+) D0***(-) D0*(-) 





























Pre2006 D0***(+) D1*(+) - 
4D**(+), 3D*(+) 
1D***(+) 




Note: XD = X days before the event; D0 = event day; DX = X days after the event. For significant coefficients: sign of 
significance in parentheses; bold if significant and coefficient > 0,01; bold and italics, if significant and coefficient > 




Traders’ Motivation and Hedging Pressure in Commodity 
Futures Markets 




This study seeks to elucidate major drivers behind participants’ trading position 
changes and subsequently addresses the effect of interactions among traders on 
prices of commodity markets. We find that influential traders (managed money 
funds) not only are poised to follow price momentum in grains, softs, and meat 
commodities, they concurrently learn from hedgers’ positions. We additionally 
find that some noticeable divergence among selected commodities in terms of 
trading directions results from changes of major fundamentals in the U.S. 
equity and bond markets and the behavior of the U.S. dollar. Results support 
our conjecture that there is a subtle contemporaneous feedback exerted by 
hedgers’ positions on the positions of swap dealers and non-reportable traders. 
Furthermore, evidence per commodity reveals that on average commodity re-
turns are profoundly influenced by positions of two groups of traders—hedgers 
and managed money funds, given the latter’s larger size and informational 
advantage. Our evidence suggests that net traders’ positions constitute the most 
important information channel via which market fundamentals influence com-
modity prices.	
Keywords: Hedgers; Speculators; Market Participants; Motivation; Interaction; 
Trading Positions; Flight to Quality; Futures Prices; Commodity Markets. 





While the economics of commodity markets have received a considerable amount of 
recent research attention, some important unanswered questions remain, notably those 
related to the theoretical and empirical examination of drivers and motivators of various 
market participants. The behavior of many of these participants is the subject of conti-
nuing debate on the effects of trading, especially by speculators, and the recent Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulatory initiatives to possibly restrain 
such trades. 
In this empirical study, we contribute to a debate prompted by concerns about the 
focus of speculators and their informational advantage over other market participants. 
We are motivated by some past studies that examined the determinants of hedging in 
futures markets (Hirshleifer, 1989; Rouwenhorst and Tang, 2012). Moskowitz et al. 
(2012) show that speculators follow time-series momentum strategies in many markets 
and profit from momentum returns at the expense of hedgers. Other work that highlights 
the role of speculators given the recent interest in commodities includes Büyükşahin and 
Harris (2011), Tang and Xiong (2012), Fattouh et al. (2012), Cheng et al. (2014), and 
Sockin and Xiong (2015). 
Our objective is in line with and encouraged by the publication of a number of 
recent studies that attempt to examine financial issues within specific markets or a 
group of industries to gain insights that would not be possible once we amalgamate all 
the assets and ignore those specific factors. Studies with industry specifics are able to 
capture additional intuitions, as we intend to do in this study (see e.g. Hu and Xiong, 
2013; Acharya et al., 2013). The present study examines two research questions: What 
is the impact of the financial fundamentals (equity, bond, and the US dollar) including 
momentum on trading position changes? Subsequently, what is the additional contri-
bution and impact of changes in trading positions including hedging pressure on 
commodity prices? Ultimately, the answers to the proposed research questions are com-
plementary and vital to our collective understanding about the economics of commodity 
markets, since drivers and forces behind the changes of trading positions subsequently 
impact commodity prices in futures markets via the trading activity channel. In our 
effort to understand these main drivers, our empirical examination tries to highlight the 
role of various types of traders given the predicament that each group of traders differs 
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in their strategies, expectations, and motivation (Fuertes et al., 2015; Miffre and Rallis, 
2007; Alexander et al., 2007). 
Trading activities offer valuable insights regarding the commodity prices. Thus, 
we use various trading position measures computed based on the weekly Disaggregated 
Commitments of Traders (DCOT) of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) reports to test proposed hypotheses and examine the drivers behind the change 
of hedging pressure (hedgers’ net short positions) and other traders’ net long positions, 
and to successively examine impacts of trading activities of all CFTC participants 
(comprising the most influential traders, as they hold equal or above positions at the 
CFTC reporting level) on the price dynamic of a selected commodity. As empirical 
evidence speaks against an influence of index traders on commodity prices (Stoll and 
Whaley, 2010; Sanders and Irwin, 2010; Irwin and Sanders, 2012), we concentrate on 
the categories from the DCOT report. We analyze which market participants channeled 
financial factors in their trading strategies that led to an intensified co-movement with 
financial markets as observed in several studies (Tang and Xiong, 2012; Silvennoinen 
and Thorp, 2013; Delatte and Lopez, 2013; Büyükşahin and Robe, 2014). We then show 
results that differ across 22 commodities selected from five groups (energies, metals, 
grains, food and fiber (softs), and livestock and meats). 
To our knowledge, no past studies have examined comprehensively the moti-
vation behind trading activities of the CFTC traders per commodity or provided an 
empirical procedure to capture interactive effects among participants’ positions and 
their influence on commodity returns. Our paper thus indirectly connects two strands of 
the literature. The first focuses on the trading activity and its impacts on asset pricing, as 
we intend to show the relevance of the trading behavior of participants in the prediction 
of the commodity returns and how it is linked to fundamental understandings (e.g. Fama 
and French, 1987; Erb and Harvey, 2006; Alexander et al., 2007; Miffre and Rallis, 
2007; Büyükşahin and Harris, 2011; Gorton et al., 2012), in line with the substantial 
evidence that fundamentals can forecast stock market returns (see, for example, Chen et 
al., 1986; Keim and Stambaugh, 1986; Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Fama and French, 
1988). The second strand of research addresses investment strategies of various 
participants in the commodity markets, notably trading strategies of sophisticated 
traders such as hedgers and speculators (e.g. De Roon et al., 2000; Fung and Hsieh, 
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2001; Sanders et al., 2004; Kaniel et al., 2008; Moskowitz et al., 2012; Rouwenhorst 
and Tang, 2012; Cheng and Xiong, 2014; Fuertes et al., 2015). 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The next (second) section discusses 
key related studies to show the basis of our exploratory research questions. The third 
section looks at the data-collection methods, outlines the variables we use, and puts 
forth the preliminary analysis. The fourth section details the econometric methodology 
and models. The fifth section presents empirical evidence by looking more closely at 
determinants and motivation behind various trading positions in commodity markets 
and how interactions among participants influence the movement of commodity prices. 
Finally, the sixth section presents the conclusion and implications. 
2 Related studies and hypotheses 
The work of Singleton (2014) and Sockin and Xiong (2015) has raised some relevant 
questions about the existence of informational frictions in commodity markets. If the 
boom and bust of commodity of 2007–2008 is not isolated from the economic 
fundamentals, then we argue that traders’ positions and trading activities of some 
participants should reveal valuable insights—notably in relation to the drivers behind 
their trading activities. Furthermore, we are interested in the interactions and learning 
effects induced by informational frictions among these participants and how such 
effects determine the movement of the commodity prices while controlling for the 
dynamic of equity markets (domestic and global), bond markets (domestic and global), 
and the U.S. dollar behavior. To understand major drivers behind the movement of the 
trading positions of five types of traders (hedgers, money managers, swap dealers, other 
reportables, and non-reportables) and in line with the work of Kang et al. (2014), we use 
a broad sample of selected commodities to include three energies contracts (crude oil, 
gasoline, and heating oil), three meats (lean hogs, live cattle, and feeder cattle), five 
metals (platinum, silver, gold, high-grade copper, and palladium), six grains (CBOT 
wheat, KCBT wheat, Spring wheat (MGEX), corn, soybeans, and oats), and five softs 
(cocoa, coffee, orange juice, sugar, and cotton). 
Under market-linkage theory (e.g. Büyükşahin and Robe, 2014), we propose that 
the main drivers (motivators) behind the changes of position of all participants are 1) 
changes originating in the equity market or bond market for traders as they search for 
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diversification benefits, or 2) the motivator is simply flight-to-quality during a crisis 
period that may manifest in trading position changes. Yet, we deem that other 
participants can revise their trading positions as a result of change of the U.S. dollar 
versus other major currencies; thus we suggest that the direction of the dollar does have 
a legitimate impact on the overall longer-term direction of commodities in general, as 
some past studies have shown in the case of energy or metals commodities (see, e.g., 
Sherman, 1982; Gisser and Goodwin, 1986; Jaffe, 1989; Johnson and Soenen, 1997; 
Draper and Faff, 2006; Nandha and Faff, 2008; Batten et al., 2010; Souček, 2013). In 
the present work we seek to examine to what extent the behavior of the U.S. dollar can 
be qualified as one of the factors that trigger some participants to buy or sell on any 
given day.1 
For instance, Batten et al. (2010) find that monetary variables impact return 
volatilities of spot prices of gold, palladium, and platinum metals while also showing 
that equity market movements of both the U.S. and World have a sizeable effect on 
volatilities of platinum and palladium. In the same vein other studies have explored 
additional aspects of the behavior of stock market and commodity prices. Aruga and 
Managi (2011) show the causality between the U.S. and Japanese platinum and 
palladium futures markets such that the U.S. market leads the price to transmit 
information between both markets (see also Wang, 2001; Xu and Fung, 2005). De Long 
et al. (1990) show that rational speculators have a role in destabilizing market prices by 
triggering trend followers to trade when the prices move up. In addition, Mayer (2009) 
discloses that positions of experienced speculators tend to be replicated by other traders 
who are less informed—that is, small traders may have profit incentive to learn from 
sophisticated traders and thus to add to the intensity of speculators’ positions. 
We aim to extend understanding of the nature of the dynamic relationships among 
commodity participants. Building on past studies (e.g. Mork, 1994; Huang et al., 1996; 
Hamilton and Herrera, 2004; Rzepczynski et al., 2004), we advance the following 
hypotheses and then examine the impact of various financial fundamentals/variables 
including equity, bond, and past returns on the position of commodity traders. 
Hypothesis 1A (H1A): There is significant impact of financial fundamentals on trading 
activities of various participants in selected commodity futures. 
                                                            
1 Recently Olson, Vivian, & Wohar (2014) argued that past studies tend to ignore the importance of 
currency movements and their impact on the energy-equity relationship. 
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In our effort to explore what motivates different traders to change their positions, we 
seek to determine whether the dynamics in the big three markets—equity, bond, and the 
U.S. dollar (currency) markets—affect those positions. In other words, we hope to 
elucidate the contributions of some financial fundamentals to movements in trading 
activity of commodity participants. The fact that we are using a set of different com-
modities from various groups (from energies to metals, grains and meats) allows us to 
surmise the commonalities and distinctions among all types of traders across these 
groups—hedgers (HP), managed money (MM), Swap Dealers (SW), Other Reportables 
(OR), and Non-Reportables (NR). Yet contrary to some past studies that utilized an 
aggregate approach by amalgamating and pooling all commodity groups (all grains and 
metals, etc.) in order to test their propositions, we are purposely testing our hypotheses 
using individual commodities since not all commodities have the same level of 
participation (low to high liquidity). Furthermore, differences do exist within each 
commodity group and across all commodities, from those that are well-traded (e.g. 
crude oil) to those that are less frequently traded (such as oats). Therefore, we did not 
want to mask our results by providing an erroneous conclusion that might result from 
the aggregation approach or ignore the value of exploring some valuable insights into 
the dynamics of various traders that may exist within or across commodity groups. 
Additionally, since we examine the effect of financial fundamentals, as outlined in 
H1A, on positions of participants in selected individual commodities, the following 
hypothesis—complementary in nature—focuses on differences among various com-
modity groups (e.g. energy vs. softs) and whether the effect of various financial vari-
ables is homogenous across all commodities. For instance, we anticipate divulging 
whether money managers tend to be momentum traders on every commodity or whether 
they have additional informational advantage in trading some commodities over others, 
and how they position their trading activities vis-à-vis the movement of the financial 
fundamentals (e.g. equity, bond, currency markets). Thus, we advance the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1B (H1B): There is a significant difference in positions among individual 
commodity futures; that is, the participants in various individual commodity futures 
position their trades differently as a result of changes in financial fundamentals. 
Our second research question concerning how changes of positions of traders and 
interactions among them impact commodity prices is based in part on the market 
microstructure literature and on the recent theoretical model of Sockin and Xiong 
 135 
 
(2015), which proposes an extension of their basic equilibrium model while taking into 
account the informational frictions and incorporating a futures market. The authors 
suggest a realistic setting to highlight the role of informational noise by futures market 
trading, which affects commodity demand and spot prices. They propose in the timeline 
of the extended model that the three main traders (producers-long future, suppliers-short 
futures, and financial traders-long/short futures) in futures markets build their positions 
at time t=0 and choose to revise and unwind their positions before delivery at time t=1. 
In our empirical framework, to align with those authors’ notations, the producers and 
suppliers are presented as hedgers, while the financial traders in this study are 
represented by four other types of investor (MM, SW, OR, and NR). Sockin and Xiong 
(2015) assume that the learning effect takes place with one-period time lag and under-
line interactive phenomena between suppliers and producers such that producers 
observe the private signals about global productivity at time zero, yet commodity 
suppliers observe that signal at time t=1. The proposed trading structure leads to two 
rounds of information aggregation, the first in the futures markets with informational 
noise originating from the activity of financial traders, and the second round of trading 
in the spot market when the financial traders unwind their futures positions and 
commodity suppliers (hedgers) observe a supply shock. In this context, the interaction 
among major influential traders is established; thus we forestall highlighting the nature, 
direction, and type of interactions among all agents (e.g. hedgers and managed money 
traders). 
Sockin and Xiong (2015) suggest using a multiplicative term that represents the 
contribution of financial traders in the aggregate position of producers such that the two 
components of this term capture (1) knowledge of financial traders about the global 
fundamentals and (2) trading activities not related to the fundamental(s) but instead 
manifested by diversification motives that are unobserved by other market participants. 
In that sense, we argue that changes of positions of main traders beyond global 
fundamental determinants assist in revealing the nature of direct impact on commodity 
prices, and at a minimum this new interactive channel among traders should increase 
questions about the relevance of informational advantage and contemporaneous learning 
among participants. 
In their theoretical models, Sockin and Xiong (2015) show that activity of finan-
cial traders does not have a direct impact on commodity supply and demand, yet it does 
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affect the futures price, which can indirectly impact commodity demand and the spot 
price. Through the projected influence of financial traders, Sockin and Xiong (2015) 
show that traders in commodity markets (financial traders) can exert an impact on those 
markets via the informational feedback channel—originating from the unobservability 
of the positions of different participants—of commodity futures prices. While Sockin 
and Xiong (2015) reiterate and call for more complete empirical models that consider 
informational frictions in trading activities of participants, the present study seeks to 
examine the interactions between various participants and to investigate how relevant 
positions of some participants influence the positions of other traders. Thus we 
indirectly respond to concerns about how commodity prices impact agents’ expec-
tations. In our study, we try to tackle the contemporaneous feedback and interaction 
among traders given the high correlation between positions of hedgers and speculators 
by following a two-step statistical procedure as presented in Bosch and Pradkhan 
(2015). 
In line with the study of De Roon et al. (2000) that examines the cross-hedging 
properties of the commodity markets, we anticipate evidence of this cross-market 
linkage in relation to the interaction between trader types. Thus the following 
hypothesis examines how the position changes of different trader groups impact the 
pricing of the commodity. As is documented based on the informational arguments, 
some traders will follow the strategy of the most influential participants, while in other 
instances traders may adopt a contrarian strategy, which may depend on the nature of 
the commodity. 
Hypothesis 2: The dynamic interaction among influential commodity participants 
exerts a significant impact on commodity prices. 
While hypotheses H1A and H1B anticipate the main drivers behind the positions of 
commodity participants, in hypothesis 2 we are subsequently more concerned with how 
the changes of these positions of different traders impact the pricing of the commodity. 
3  Data 
For the empirical analysis we use weekly data from June 13, 2006 to December 30, 
2014 of the positions from the Disaggregated Commitments of Trader (DCOT) report 
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and 22 selected commodity futures contracts. Futures contracts are included only when 
the DCOT data are available from the beginning date of June 13, 2006: 
Energy: WTI Crude Oil (NYMEX), Heating Oil (NYMEX), RBOB Gasoline 
(NYMEX) 
Metals: Gold (COMEX), Silver (COMEX), Platinum (NYMEX), Palladium 
(NYMEX), Copper (COMEX) 
Grains: Soft Red Winter Wheat (CBOT), Hard Red Winter Wheat (since end of 2013 
CBOT, formerly KCBOT), Hard Red Spring Wheat (MGEX), Corn (CBOT), 
Soybeans (CBOT), Oats (CBOT) 
Softs: Cotton (since September 2007 ICE, formerly NYBOT), Orange Juice (ICE), 
Cocoa (since September 2007 ICE, formerly NYBOT), Sugar (since September 2007 
ICE, formerly NYBOT), Coffee (since September 2007 ICE, formerly NYBOT) 
Livestock: Lean Hogs (CME), Live Cattle (CME), Feeder Cattle (CME) 
Data on futures prices are from Datastream. To construct a continuous return series, 
contracts are rolled over based on the open interest. As long as the first-nearby contract 
shows the highest open interest, returns are calculated from the first-nearby contract. 
When the open interest of the second-nearby contract exceeds the open interest of the 
first-nearby contract, the rollover takes place and returns are calculated by the second-
nearby contract. This methodology is also applied by Brunetti and Büyüksahin (2009). 
It is the best approach when analyzing trader positions and the relation to futures 
returns, since data on trader positions are based on all open positions. Thus, the impact 
of traders’ positions will be best reflected in the contract where the largest part of all 
traders is invested. For instance, Carchano and Pardo (2009) note that traders prefer 
open interest as an indicator of liquidity, instead of volume, in order to switch contracts 
in liquidity peaks. 
Positions data of the DCOT report are collected by the CFTC every Tuesday and 
provided to the public the following Friday. Next we present the description of the five 
trader categories of the DCOT report as listed in the CFTC’s explanatory notes and 
include some literature on findings about trader behavior: 
Producers/merchants/processors/users (HP) are physical traders that trade on 
futures markets to manage or hedge risks arising from their activity in the physical com-
modity business. Kang et al. (2014) show that hedgers trade as contrarians and that they 
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provide liquidity to speculators; and Mutafoglu et al. (2012) find that hedgers are nega-
tive feedback traders in precious metals markets—they sell when prices rise. 
Managed money traders (MM) are non-commercial traders which include regi-
stered commodity trading advisors (CTA), registered commodity pool operators (CPO), 
and unregistered funds like hedge funds, floor brokers, and traders. They trade in 
commodity markets on behalf of their clients. The MM traders are another group that is 
often examined in the literature, and they are usually regarded as traditional or pro-
fessional speculators, often associated with trend-following behavior (e.g. Borin and Di 
Nino, 2012; Baltas and Kosowski, 2013; Hutchinson and O’Brian, 2014) and a short-
term orientation (e.g. UNCTAD, 2011; Tokic, 2012). 
Swap dealers (SW) trade on futures markets solely to hedge and manage risks 
arising from their swap transactions. The clients of SW can be traders who trade for 
speculative or hedging purposes, thus it is difficult to identify the initial motivation of 
the clients to enter into a swap contract with SW. Brunetti and Büyüksahin (2009) use 
the SW category to proxy index traders for the energy and the corn futures markets. 
While data on the positions of index traders are directly available by Index Investment 
Data (IID), the limitations of IID prevent usage in many studies. IID is available on a 
monthly basis, and before June 30, 2010, only on a quarterly basis. Irwin and Sanders 
(2012) show that for energy and metals futures markets, the SW category is a poor 
proxy for index traders’ activity, while for agricultural markets high correlations 
between SW and index traders indicate a close match of the two trader categories. 
Other reportable traders (OR) are obliged to report their positions but do not fit in 
any of the three mentioned trader categories. Tokic (2012) finds for the crude oil market 
that OR trading activity is determined by fundamental analysis. 
Non-reportable traders (NR) are not described in detail in the explanatory notes of 
the CFTC; they are the part of all open positions not covered by the four reporting trader 
categories due to the number of positions they hold. Only when a trader exceeds a 
specified level of positions held by one trader is he or she obliged to report positions to 
the CFTC. Because NR traders are not defined in detail by the CFTC, the motivation of 
a single NR trader to trade in a commodity futures market might be speculation, 
hedging, or portfolio diversification. 
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The CFTC emphasizes that the trader categories cannot be interpreted as a 
detailed description of the corresponding trading activities. Thus, the description in the 
explanatory notes of the CFTC leaves a lot of latitude for how the different categories 
actually behave in futures markets. Several attempts were made to analyze the behavior 
or the impact of different trader categories on commodity prices and/or volatility, with 
most weight on index traders (either IID or proxied by SW) and the speculative traders 
(MM or non-commercials).2 But very few studies analyze all trader categories’ behavior 
and the impact of their interaction on all of those commodity markets for which the 
DCOT report is available.3 
4 Econometric Methodology 
Preliminary analysis 
Table 1a presents the summary statistics of futures returns and traders’ position changes 
based on the selected commodities over the sample period (weekly data from June 13, 
2006 to December 30, 2014). For hedgers, we calculate the net short positions similarly 
to De Roon et al. (2000), where it is defined as hedging pressure (HP). While those 
authors divide the net short positions of hedgers by hedgers’ total positions, we are 
interested in the relative importance of hedging pressure and therefore divide by total 
open interest: 
ܪ ௧ܲ ൌ ௌ௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௅௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ை௣௘௡	௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧೟  (1). 
To ensure stationarity net short position changes of hedgers are calculated as absolute 
changes: 
∆ܪ ௧ܲ ൌ ܪ ௧ܲ െ ܪ ௧ܲିଵ. (2). 
For all other traders’ net long positions are calculated as: 
݌݋ݏ௧,௜ ൌ ௅௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟,೔ିௌ௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟,೔ை௣௘௡	௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧೟ ,		 (3). 
ݓ݅ݐ݄	݅ ൌ ܯܯ, ܹܵ,ܱܴ, ܽ݊݀	ܴܰ 
                                                            
2 Before the introduction of the DCOT Report on October 20, 2009, data of the Commitments of Trader 
Report (COT) were used in studies analyzing the behavior or impact of traders in futures markets. The 
COT divided all traders into commercials and non-commercials. Commercials trade for hedging 
purposes, and non-commercials are typically associated with speculative behavior. 
3 Tokic (2012) takes all trader categories into account. However, his findings are solely based on a 
graphical analysis of the positions on the crude oil futures market. 
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To ensure stationarity net long position changes of all other traders are calculated as 
absolute changes: 
∆݌݋ݏ௧,௜ ൌ ݌݋ݏ௧,௜ െ ݌݋ݏ௧ିଵ,௜ (4). 
We note that the mean returns of energy commodities are negative with varying signs in 
the case of other commodities (metals, grains, soft, and meats), highlighting the obser-
vation that not all selected commodities behave in the same fashion. Instead there is a 
great mixture of returns within the commodity market. In addition, we note that on 
average hedgers have slightly decreased their net short positions in 12 out of 22 com-
modities during the sample period, while the other reportable (OR) traders have shown 
an increase of their net long positions on a weekly basis by 1.8% in silver. The standard 
deviation of net positions of all five types of traders shows diversity of trading positions 
such that a high standard deviation implies higher tendency of a group of traders to 
change their net positions frequently, and this group may be considered a market mover 
due to its size and informational advantage. Results in Table 1a show that among 
traders, managed money funds (MM) tend to showcase at, or near, the high end of the 
possible standard deviation range with respect to energy, metals, livestock, and meats 
futures markets (1.18% to 4.76%); thus they have a tendency to trade and change their 
net long positions frequently in search of profitable opportunities or to reposition their 
investment strategies in light of anticipated pertinent market estimates and announce-
ments. In grains, and in food and fiber markets, hedgers are the most active traders. 
Because swap dealers (SW) are often associated with index trading and therefore 
rather passive long trading, the standard deviations of their net position changes are 
expected to be low. The replication of a commodity index does not require high fre-
quent rebalancing. For all commodity markets, apart from metals markets, low standard 
deviations can actually be observed. The higher standard deviations of swap dealers’ 
position changes in metals markets are near to those of hedgers. Therefore using swap 
dealers as a proxy for index traders with passive trading behavior would not be adequate 
for metals markets. OR and NR traders are the least active traders in almost all com-
modity futures markets. 
In Table 1b, we calculate participants’ propensity to trade (PT) per commodity 
based on the weekly data as a fraction of gross net positions: 
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ܲ ௧ܶ ൌ ௔௕௦ሺ௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభሻା௔௕௦ሺ௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభሻ௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభା௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభ   (5). 
Results show that the propensity to trade of MM and OR is higher in energies and 
grains. We note cases in our results where the PT of managed money funds is higher 
than that of the OR or SW traders in soybeans, gold, heating oil, and crude oil, which 
possibly supports the conjecture that OR traders adopt or follow similar trading 
strategies in some commodities as those of MM. Hedgers trade less actively by the PT 
measure. This was also expected, since hedgers use futures markets to manage risks, 
which can be achieved at lower frequencies. MM as professional speculators are 
expected to adjust their positions frequently in order to profit from any market move-
ment. Compared to the standard deviations from the net positions, the values of the PT 
measure are quite high for OR and NR traders on most commodities. So while they do 
not seem to trade very actively by the values of their net long positions, the propensity 
to trade shows that they adjust their long and short positions, considered separately, 
quite frequently. 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that other types of traders (SW, OR, and NR) 
exhibit various mean net positions across all selected commodities, a fact that grants 
support to the idea that trading strategies differ across various types of traders, and 
across all commodities; thus we cannot claim that all participants adopt the same 
positions even within the same group of commodities such as metals, grains, or live-
stock and meats (Table 1b). Hedgers are by far the most important player in the net 
short positions in all markets, apart from crude oil and feeder cattle. In the crude oil 
market some hedgers seem to manage their risks via swap dealers, since swap dealers 
are net short on average in crude oil. In feeder cattle markets the majority of hedging 
seems to be done by traders who are too small to be obliged to report, considering the 
high value of net short positions of NR traders and the very low share in net short posi-
tions of hedgers. MM share of net long position lies between 5 and 26 percent in most 
commodities. 
SW mean net position shares of open interest on crude oil and precious metals ex-
cept copper are negative; while on all other commodities their net positions’ share is 
positive. SW have quite high participation in the net long positions for nearly all soft 
commodities, but these participants do not adjust their long and short positions as fre-
quently as the PT measure indicates, except in Minneapolis wheat and feeder cattle. 
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However, it must be taken into account that SW in the Minneapolis wheat futures 
market have for several periods no open positions at all; therefore the PT measure is dis-
torted by the large jumps from zero to a non-zero value.4 The finding of Irwin and 
Sanders (2012) that for agricultural futures markets SW are an appropriate proxy for 
index traders thus is indirectly supported by our data, as the SW are on average long in 
their positions and trade passively on agricultural commodities. 
To enhance our collective understanding about the relationship among various 
types of traders in the commodity markets based on our selected sample, we rely on the 
reflection gathered from correlation matrices of the four types of traders’ positions per 
commodity. Table A.1 in the appendix shows correlation among traders’ positions: we 
notice a high positive correlation between HP and MM traders’ positions across all 
listed commodities, which echoes our prior observation that HP and MM are the main 
traders in the commodity markets, and both add to the liquidity of the commodity 
market since they accommodate and tend to trade against each other. However, 
evidence reveals that SW, OR, and NR positions do not exhibit a consistent correlation 
across all commodities. For instance, OR positions have a negative correlation with MM 
traders in orange juice, which implies that OR traders take a net long position in orange 
juice during the time period when MM are net short. Due to this high correlation 
coefficient between HP and MM, we decided to test our Hypothesis 2 and run the 
regression using a step-wise statistical procedure, as described in the next section. 
Econometric methodology 
Parallel with our hypotheses, our analysis concentrates on two primary questions. First, 
what drives the different traders in commodity futures markets? More specifically, is 
their trading determined by momentum or contrarian behavior, and do they show herd-
ing behavior? In addition to these drivers, we take into account the fact that traders’ 
behavior might be determined by financial fundamentals. The data set of 22 com-
modities and five trader categories is broad enough to shed light on similarities in trad-
ing behavior in commodity groups and/or trader categories. The drivers of the trading 
behavior of hedgers are analyzed by the following regression: 
                                                            
4 From June 13, 2006 to January 16, 2007, swap dealers (SW) have no open positions on the Minneapolis 
Grain Exchange (MGEX) at all. Plus, SW on MGEX rarely hold short positions during the full selected 
period. The specific dates when SW hold no long and short positions are: August 7-28, 2007; December 
24, 2007, to January 21, 2008; February 12 to October 14, 2008; and February 3 to April 7, 2009. 
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∆ܪ ௧ܲ,௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߜ∆ܪ ௧ܲିଵ,௜ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߚ′ܺ ൅ ߱௜ܦி௘௕஻௥௘௔௞ ൅ ߝ௧   (6). 
with ݅ for the 22 individual commodities. ∆ܪ ௧ܲ is the change of hedgers’ net short posi-
tions. A positive sign of the coefficient δ can be interpreted as persistence in the trading 
behavior. To account for the reaction of hedgers to past returns, the lagged returns ݎ௧ିଵ 
are included. A positive sign of ߛ indicates contrarian trading, and positive past returns 
are followed by hedgers building up net short positions. A negative sign would 
demonstrate that hedgers behave as momentum traders, reducing their net short posi-



















for the possibility that trading behavior is determined by macroeconomic and financial 
factors. ∆ܦܫ is the change of a U.S. dollar trade-weighted spot index. A weaker dollar is 
expected to increase the demand on commodities from non-U.S. countries, as all com-
modities are denominated in U.S. dollars. ∆ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕܲݎ݋ݔݕ is the return of the S&P 500 
index, and ∆ܤ݋݊݀ܲݎ݋ݔݕ the return of the World Government Bond Index (WGBI) for 
United States  and all maturities. These two factors account for the possibility that 
traders’ behavior is also driven by developments in financial markets. 
As a robustness check, we alternate the equity and the bond proxy to account for 
developments in global financial markets. In the robustness check, we use the MSCI 
world index as the equity proxy and the WGBI world index “all maturities” as the bond 
market proxy instead of the U.S. equity and bond market proxies. ∆ܸܫܺ is the change of 
the volatility index, which reflects the implied volatility of options on the S&P 500. It 
measures financial sentiment regarding market conditions and market uncertainty. As 
we want to concentrate on the short-term pricing of each commodity, we deem it is rele-
vant to only include contemporaneous and one-week lagged factors in the regression. 
ܦி௘௕஻௥௘௔௞ is a dummy for the month of February. It accounts for seasonality effects 
especially for grains, where in February new fundamental information leads traders to 
revise their strategies. 
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For all other trader categories, the regression is almost identical to the specification 
for hedgers in Equation (6), with the only difference being that a hedging pressure term 
is included: 
∆݌݋ݏ௧,௜௝ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߜ௜∆݌݋ݏ௧ିଵ,௜௝ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߠ௜∆ܪ ௧ܲ,௜ ൅ ߚ′ܺ ൅	߱௜ܦி௘௕஻௥௘௔௞ ൅ ߝ௧,௜ (7). 
with ݅ for the 22 individual commodities and ݆ for the four trader categories MM, SW, 
OR, and NR. The reason for including hedging pressure here is to consider that mem-
bers of the four trader categories might incorporate the behavior of hedgers in their 
trading strategy. One reason is that hedgers’ behavior is expected to reflect some infor-
mational content about the fundamental state of the commodity, since hedgers use 
futures markets to hedge and manage risk arising from their business in the physical 
commodity (Sockin and Xiong, 2015). Another reason for market participants to follow 
hedging pressure is the finding of De Roon et al. (2000), who state that commodity 
futures returns can significantly be explained by hedging pressure. Conversely, it’s 
possible to argue that we do not expect hedgers to follow other traders’ strategies, since 
their main focus is to manage risk, which should not depend on the behavior of other 
market participants. 
The second question in alignment with hypothesis 2 asks how interactions bet-
ween the different traders impact pricing in commodity futures markets. As it is im-
possible to include all traders in one regression due to the high correlation between 
hedgers and managed money (Table A.1), the impact of interaction effects of the 
different market participants is investigated with a two-step procedure: We first sep-
arately regress the return of the individual commodity futures on hedgers or managed 
money net position changes. The control variables—which show at least for several 
commodities and traders’ net position changes a significant influence in Equations (6) 
and (7)—are also included to explain the futures returns: 
ݎ௧,௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߠଵு௉∆ܪ ௧ܲ ൅ ߠଶு௉∆ܪ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚᇱܺ ൅ ߝ௧,௜ (8a). 
 
ݎ௧,௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߠଵெெ∆ܯܯ௧ ൅ ߠଶெெ∆ܯܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚᇱܺ ൅ ߝ௧,௜ (8b). 
Then, the part ߝ௧—which cannot be explained by the control variables and hedgers 
according to Eq. (8a) or MM traders’ net position changes as illustrated in Eq. (8b)—is 
tested on every other trader category’s net position changes singly: 
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ߝ௧,௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߜଵ∆݌݋ݏ௧,௜௝ ൅ ߜଶ∆݌݋ݏ௧ିଵ,௜௝ ൅ ݑ௧,௜ (9). 
with ݆ for each trader group not already included in Eq. (8a) or Eq. (8b). So, for 
example, the error terms of Eq. (8a), where hedgers are included, are tested singly by 
Equation (9) for MM, SW, OR, and NR. This is done by the contemporaneous and 
lagged relationship, in order to determine whether the part which cannot be explained 
by the control variables and hedgers or managed money is significantly related to the 
net position changes of other traders. Inclusion of the contemporaneous net position 
changes is not intended to help us find a direct impact of traders on commodity pricing 
or an influence of commodity pricing on traders’ net position changes. The aim is to see 
whether the different trader categories play a role in the interaction of all trader 
categories that influence pricing of commodity futures. The lagged position changes of 
other trader categories in Equation (9) are included to examine whether the part which is 
not explained by Eq. (8a) or Eq. (8b) can be forecasted by positions of the different 
traders. 
5  Empirical results 
5.1 Motivation and determinants of trading positions in commodity futures 
Table 2 presents HP (hedgers’ net short position) results based on Equation (6) in 
alignment with hypothesis 1. Since we are concerned with identifying the main drivers 
behind the position changes of major CFTC traders per commodity, results depict the 
impact of the big four markets (currency–the U.S. dollar, equity, bond markets, and 
overall market uncertainty) as possible main drivers behind position changes. Among 
the five groups of commodities, we note that the dollar index movement has a statis-
tically significant negative impact on HP except in the case of crude oil, cotton, live 
cattle, and lean hogs. Furthermore, hedgers in grains and softs except sugar, metals 
except gold, and meats are contrarian traders—not in all commodities, though, but in 16 
out of 22—which implies that hedgers reverse their positions on prior performance of 
commodity in question in addition to their trading persistence in the majority of com-
modities. Yet, we cannot rule out that they are not merely influenced by price 
momentum of commodity or the U.S. dollar movement but also to a lesser extent by the 
U.S. equity and bond markets as proxied by the S&P 500 index and WGBI. Evidence 
shows that the net short positions of these hedgers are positively influenced by the 
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equity market and negatively by the bond market. Weak results are observed from the 
proxy of extreme market condition; the implied volatility (VIX) has a positive effect on 
hedgers’ net positions in heating oil, corn, and cocoa, but negative on hedging positions 
of crude oil, gasoline, palladium, and sugar. 
February break is a seasonal phenomenon (weakness with commodities per se) 
specifically observed by traders and practitioners in commodity markets in grains and 
soft commodities as a time period when participants revise their trading strategies and 
prepare to be positioned in the commodity markets in light of new seasonal trends, 
inventory direction, and information. Historical daily data in grains show that in Feb-
ruary, sharp increases and equally sharp breaks are not uncommon; as practitioners have 
noted, a weakness associated with the second month of the year is well known and 
anticipated. Thus, it is critical to our understanding to include this dummy variable to 
avoid capturing incorrect changes in trading positions that may be due to this usual 
seasonal variation, as some sophisticated traders prefer to be in the sidelines of some 
commodities during this period (seasonal effect changes) (see also, e.g., Ritter, 1988; 
Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Kamstra et al., (2003); Garrett et al., 
2005; DeGennaro et al., 2008; Kamstra et al., 2014). Results in Table 2 support only 2 
out of 22 cases when we find that hedgers’ positions are positively influenced by this 
break (sugar, and crude oil). 
On average, the explanatory power of the variables to describe the position 
changes of hedgers is lowest for energy and metals futures markets. It is especially low 
for the crude oil and the silver futures markets. 
Along these lines, Table 3 addresses and tests the same hypothesis using the 
CFTC managed money (MM) net positions as the dependent variable. Given the fact 
that this group of traders do differ in their strategies, expectations, and motivation, it is 
essential to understand the main drivers behind the changes of their positions over the 
sample period. Evidence in Table 3 illustrates that as the U.S. dollar comes under down-
side pressure, the MM net positions improve in energy, gold, and spring wheat, but 
when the dollar is under upside pressure, the MM net positions increase for cocoa. 
Additionally, HP has a positive and statistically significant effect on MM net long 
positions across all selected commodities. This evidence supports the contemporaneous 
feedback between these traders in line with some past studies that examine traders’ 
reaction and that of rational investors who may prefer to ride bubbles because of pre-
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dictable investor sentiment (e.g. Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004). MM net positions are 
less driven by persistent behavior compared to hedgers. Cases of momentum traders 
were observed in MM net positions, but returns of commodity in question are only 
significant when the traders’ net positions are in crude oil, corn, CBOT wheat, spring 
wheat, oats, soft commodities, and meats. 
The U.S. equity market performance has a smaller impact (contribution) on MM 
positions. Additionally, evidence reveals that an appreciation of the bond market has a 
tendency to encourage an increase of net long positions of MM in gold but also a dec-
rease of their positions in crude oil, gasoline, platinum, and corn. Overall market 
conditions as proxied by implied volatility show that high uncertainty and sentiment 
exhibit a mixed effect on net positions of traders in few commodity futures markets. In 
contrast to hedgers’ positions, February break shows a statistically significant (but not 
economically significant) effect on positions of heating oil, gold, palladium, corn, and 
CBOT wheat. Overall, we find that explanatory powers of our estimations are higher in 
Table 3 than those given in Table 2. This can be attributed to the high and significant 
values resulting from the inclusion of hedging pressure, which is supported by the high 
correlations between money managers and hedgers as presented in Table A.1. 
In contrast to the MM traders, swap dealers (SW) reverse their positions (Table 4) 
when commodity returns of energy, copper, grains except soybeans and spring/winter 
wheat, softs except cocoa, and meats are declining. This observation shows that SW 
traders tend to trade as contrarians, and that the major driver/force behind the changes 
of position are the U.S. dollar and hedgers’ positions (that is, when HP improve then the 
SW net long positions increase in crude oil, gasoline, grains, softs except cocoa, and 
meats). For the two precious metals gold and silver, SW negatively react to HP. This 
again confirms the different behavior of SW in the gold and silver markets. SW net long 
positions are very persistent, similar to HP. Contrary to results in Tables 2 and 3, the 
dollar index upside movement harkens an increase of SW positions in energies except 
gasoline, metals, spring wheat, cotton, and orange juice. Perhaps this result could be 
explained by a large portion of non-U.S traders or participants who can benefit from an 
increasing dollar channeled by commodity prices. 
The U.S. equity market has minor negative effects on some SW positions in crude 
oil, orange juice, and sugar, with a positive impact on positions in cocoa and feeder 
cattle. The U.S. bond market movement is considered an important determinant of gold 
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SW positions such that when the bond market performs, SW have a tendency to lower 
their positions in gold, but they increase them in copper, corn, CBOT wheat, winter 
wheat, and orange juice. The implied volatility shows again a weak yet statistically 
significant impact on SW positions in heating oil, gold, copper, feeder cattle, and live 
cattle. At this stage we can deduce that increase of SW positions in gold is driven by an 
underperforming bond market and high market uncertainty, lending partial support to 
the “safe haven” argument.5 
Table 5 presents results of net positions of the CFTC Other Reportables (OR). 
Positions of this group of participants are negatively influenced by commodity returns 
prior performance. In the cotton, orange juice, and sugar futures markets, there is some 
persistent behavior of the net long positions of OR. Alternatively, in the silver and 
palladium futures markets, past position changes are negatively related to the present 
ones. Hedgers’ positions influence their trading strategies in a majority of cases (16 out 
of 22 selected commodities), yet the direction of their trading positions differs in some 
instances; they lower those positions in copper and CBOT wheat and increase them in 
crude oil, platinum, palladium, corn, soybeans, and meats. For OR, the financial 
variables play a minor role. A weaker tone in the U.S. dollar index was bearish for the 
net positions of this group of traders in copper but bullish in spring wheat, as it made 
the U.S. wheat more attractive to foreign buyers. Given such a scenario, OR traders are 
inclined to increase their positions. Both equity and bond markets have a mixed effect 
(negative or positive) on some of the selected commodities. In sum, positions of this 
group of traders are largely driven by hedgers’ positions. 
Table 6 presents results regarding the net long positions of the last group of 
traders, the non-reportables (NR). In energy markets and the palladium market, NR 
seem to be driven by momentum trading, while on the livestock and meat futures mar-
kets there is some weak evidence of contrarian trading. The big picture that emerges 
from Table 6 supports past observations that this group of traders (small traders) tends 
to follow and simultaneously learn from the hedgers’ positions. We note that the U.S. 
dollar movement drives the NR traders’ net positions in metals, soybeans, and softs 
expect orange juice. The U.S. stock market does not exert a consistent effect on their 
                                                            
5 Joy (2011) examines the relationship between gold and the U.S. dollar using a dynamic model while 
trying to determine if gold acts as a hedge against the U.S. dollar or is a safe haven, or perhaps neither 
of these. Kaul and Sapp (2006) define a financial safe haven as “an ideal venue to park money during 
periods of uncertainty.” A hedge asset is one that is on average uncorrelated or negatively correlated 
with another asset (see Baur and McDermott, 2010). 
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trade but has some effect in gasoline, gold, palladium, cocoa, and live cattle. Addi-
tionally, only 7 out of 22 commodity positions are influenced (positively or negatively) 
by movement of the U.S. bond market. 
Based on Tables 4 to 6, we note that HP coefficients which are statistically 
significant tend to be smaller in magnitude—sometimes negative—than those presented 
in Table 3 (case of the MM positions), which brings our attention to a lower 
contemporaneous feedback that HP positions exert on the positions of these groups of 
traders (SW, OR, and NR). Contrary to the HP, MM, or SW, we notice that OR and NR 
traders tend to be less persistent in their trading strategies from one period to another, 
since we find cases when they reverse their positions (reduction or surge) per 
commodity; this implies that they are reluctant to hold the same positions over a longer 
term due to their low risk tolerance vis-à-vis the MM traders. 
Furthermore, a negative coefficient of the prior commodity returns on the posi-
tions of these groups of traders shows that they tend to reverse their positions (reduce 
their positions) when commodity returns are higher because this matches their short-
term focus to sell after a high performance of commodity return—they are gain seekers. 
Overall, we find similarities and differences in trading behavior among all types of 
traders, and given the predicament that fundamentals at least partly drive their positions, 
our contention not to amalgamate all commodities in our empirical approach is clearly 
supported, in line with some past studies. For instance, Erb and Harvey (2006) point out 
that commodity futures are not correlated with one another, proposing that to consider 
them a market of individual unrelated assets is more meaningful than to accept them as 
a homogenous market of similar assets. 
The futures prices of commodities traded in the U.S. are frequently used as baro-
meters of the global economy (see also, e,g., Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006; Erb and 
Harvey, 2006; Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2014; Singleton, 2014). This depen-
dence on U.S. futures to forecast the global economy arose in part due to the global 
focus and reach of commodity markets, with various traders from multiple countries 
participating in the U.S. commodity market for diversification of their holdings (as 
documented in past studies, e.g., Hu and Xiong, 2013). 
Thus, for purposes of robustness of our results and to examine the effect of the 
world equity and bond markets, in this section we repeat the previous estimations based 
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on Equations (6) and (7), while including world equity market proxy of MSCI and the 
world bond market proxy of WGBI world (noted “the world approach”) instead of the 
U.S. equity and bond markets’ proxies. Results are given in the appendix, Tables A.2 to 
A.6, which represent the positions of hedgers, managed money, swap dealers, other 
reportables, and non-reportables, respectively. We find some noticeable additional 
statistically significant impact/contribution of the world equity—not found before when 
we used the U.S. equity—on hedgers’ net positions, an impact that is negative in crude 
oil and positive in the palladium, copper, corn, spring wheat (MW), cotton, and coffee 
futures markets. In sum, the evidence does not differ qualitatively from the data 
presented using the U.S. equity and bond markets, notably for other types of traders (see 
Tables A.2-A.6 in the appendix). 
5.2 Interaction and contemporaneous effects among commodities’ 
participants 
Main variables:  
To examine price impact of various participants since their interactions are relevant in 
price determination, we examine the relationship between trading positions and futures 
returns of each trader type per commodity in alignment with hypothesis 2 and the 
microstructure literature (e.g. De Roon et al., 2000; Haigh et al., 2007; Büyükşahin and 
Harris, 2011; Hong and Yogo, 2012; Rouwenhorst and Tang, 2012; Acharya and Naqvi, 
2012; Büyükşahin and Robe, 2014). 
Based on the results presented in Table 7a (hedging pressure version) and Table 
7b (managed money version), we notice that returns of selected commodities (energy, 
metals, grains, softs, and meats) except crude oil are all positively influenced by 
hedging pressure represented by the HP measure. Yet in Table 7b (managed money 
traders) we note that the change of MM position which proxies the speculative pressure 
has a higher and positive impact on the movement of futures returns across all selected 
commodities. In addition, the explanatory power in Table 7b is slightly higher than that 
of Table 7a, which possibly highlights the additional and important role of this group 
(MM) of traders on the behavior of commodity futures. Especially for crude oil, the 
explanatory power is nearly 30 percent higher for the regression with MM included. For 
soft commodities results are mixed. While orange juice, sugar, and meat returns are 
better described with MM, cotton is better described by hedging pressure. Grains except 
 151 
 
oats returns can be slightly better explained by the hedging pressure version of Equation 
8a. 
Furthermore, the majority of coefficients of both the lagged HP positions in Table 
7a and the lagged MM positions in Table 7b tend to be negative, an observation that 
supports the liquidity argument as price of the commodity in question makes necessary 
corrections and reversal of prices occurs after an excessive trading period. Nevertheless, 
the summation of both contemporaneous and lagged coefficients of HP in Table 7a and 
MM positions in Table 7b remains positive, lending support to the combined infor-
mational effects that both traders exhibit on commodity prices (see, e.g., Sockin and 
Xiong, 2015). Evidence shows that the lagged commodity return is negative and statis-
tically significant across some selected commodities in both Tables 7a and 7b, rein-
forcing the suggestion that the corrections are not associated with the U.S. dollar, 
equity, or bond market nor trading activities of selected participants, but are due to a 
weekly time-correction relevant to commodity specifics such as grains, softs, and meats. 
Evidence in Tables 7a and 7b shows that both types of traders (HP and MM) do 
exert a crucial role in the behavior of the commodities’ prices; thus, it is important to 
examine the price impact while taking into account the interaction among all traders. It 
is beneficial to respond to the existing cross-market linkages by examining the nature of 
interactions among some of the most influential traders and how that interaction in-
fluences the commodity prices. Given the high correlation between HP and MM posi-
tions, we advance the empirical examination in our subsequent regressions following 
two steps. In the first step we take the errors from the estimation of Table 7a (hedging 
pressure version) as a dependent variable and run the regressions using positions of 
other traders including MM. The second step consists of taking the errors from the 
estimation of Table 7b (MM version) as a dependent variable and running the 
estimation process using the positions of the other traders including HP. This procedure 
ensures that our estimation disentangles the additional impact and contribution of the 
other types of traders in addition to the dominant influence of the main traders (HP or 
MM) as depicted in the result; the process also allows us to highlight the consistency of 
our results regarding these two groups of traders (HP and MM); and finally it assists us 
in addressing the collinearity problem. 
Results in Table 8a based on Equation (9) using errors of Equation (8a), given that 
the main impact of the HP has shown a positive impact on price of selected 
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commodities, show us that the MM traders’ positions exert an additional positive 
contribution on returns of energy, metals, meats, corn, oats, and some soft commodities. 
Thus, Table 8a reveals that MM and NR have the ability to move the commodity prices 
such that higher net long positions of MM traders (and NR with few exceptions) tend to 
increase commodity returns. Evidence shows that SW tend to trade contrary to the MM 
or HP; SW net long positions have negative contributions to the commodity returns. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that NR positions, given the low number of traders in 
this category, do have an impact on the overall return but differ in sign and magnitude 
across selected commodities. This result pinpoints the fact that changes of positions of 
this group of participants are not always associated with a consistent trading strategy in 
commodity markets—they tend to differ, and thus those positions’ influence on 
commodity prices differs accordingly. 
Moreover, results in Table 8b based on Equation (9) using errors of Equation (8b), 
once the impact of MM is captured as the main influencer, show that HP contributes an 
additional positive effect on some of the selected commodities’ returns (metals except 
copper, grains except oats, soft except sugar, and lean hogs), but a negative impact is 
seen in the case of crude oil.6 In the case of the other types of traders (OR and NR), we 
notice that most of the traders’ positions have positive additional impact on the futures 
returns, but NR positions have negative impact on crude oil returns. Under this second 
step of the procedure, changes of SW do not have a stable impact, as we find a negative 
impact on crude oil, heating oil, silver, palladium, sugar, live cattle, and lean hogs, but 
positive impact on cocoa and spring wheat. It is important to note that both statistical 
procedural steps clearly highlight the interaction property among the four types of 
traders and underline contemporaneous learning taking place among them, showing that 
each group builds trading strategies that differ across selected commodities. The signi-
ficance of the interaction of hedging pressure and money managers is obvious if the 
coefficients of both traders from Table 7a and 7b are compared. The levels of the coeffi-
cients of both traders are quite similar, even for the lagged values. The only exception is 
crude oil, where HP did not play any role explaining futures returns. 
In almost every market, the lagged coefficients of either hedging or speculative 
pressure are, if significant, negative and much lower than the contemporaneous vari-
                                                            
6 We note that the explanatory power is very low for HP after taking into account the error term from 
Equation 3a “managed money” version as presented in Table 8b, since changes of MM positions show 
much higher explanatory power if the HP is initially taken into account as in Table 8a.  
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ables. So while the contemporaneous positive and significant relationship between 
futures returns, HP, and MM holds on a weekly basis, the lagged net position changes 
of hedgers and speculators are not helpful to forecast futures returns. Both trader types 
seem to adjust their positions in a short-term perspective to the new direction of the 
returns. 
Overall evidence per commodity reveals that on average commodity returns are 
profoundly influenced by two groups of traders—hedgers and managed money funds, 
given their size and informational advantage—but nonetheless interactions among all 
participants are ubiquitous. The relative importance of hedgers and managed money 
funds for pricing varies for different commodities. In many commodities we find that 
money managers still can explain a large part of futures returns if HP with all control 
variables is taken into account. Especially for the crude oil market, MM can explain an 
additional 12 percent of the variation in the error term of Equation (8a) with HP in the 
regression. This confirms that hedgers’ net positions or variations are less important for 
pricing in the crude oil commodity than for other commodities. Also on the silver, 
copper, oats, and feeder cattle futures markets, much explanatory power is left to money 
managers. Instead, the error terms of Equation (8a) with speculative pressure do not 
leave any explanatory power for HP. None of the adjusted R-square is above 2 percent, 
while some coefficients are significant. This shows that in many cases MM trading acti-
vity is more important for pricing on commodity futures markets than that of hedgers. 
We anticipate that a large proportion of the net long positions and active trading 
strategies of managed money funds are surely behind our observations. In every 
commodity market, the contemporaneous net long position changes of MM are very 
significant and positive. In crude oil, corn, and sugar futures markets, the coefficients of 
managed money net long positions based on Table 7b exceed the value of one. Interest-
ingly, the standard deviations of the net long positions (Table 1a) and the propensity to 
trade (Table 1b) of money managers on the crude oil, corn, and sugar markets are low. 
This leads to the conclusion that money managers are the most professional in these 







It was not surprising that results in Tables 7a and 7b show that the U.S. dollar index 
movement consistently maintains a negative effect on commodity returns, which is 
congruent with results of some past studies (e.g., Capie et al., 2005; Joy, 2011; and 
many more). Even the lagged values are negatively significant for crude oil and heating 
oil. Only orange juice and livestock and meat futures returns are not dependent on the 
U.S. dollar index at all. These futures markets seem to be less influenced by global 
movement of relevant variables as the other futures markets, since if that were the case, 
traders from foreign countries surely would be affected by variations of the dollar index. 
However, the overall U.S. equity performance, proxied by S&P 500 index, has a con-
current positive impact on some selected commodities, notably energy, copper, 
palladium, and meats—that is, for example, when the U.S. equity market is doing well, 
the return of crude oil is gaining momentum. So increasing equity indices is seen as an 
indicator for increasing energy and industrial metal demand and as a driver for some 
soft commodities. Nevertheless, the U.S. bond market exhibits a statistically significant 
but negative impact on returns of some commodities (energy, some grains, and 
palladium) and a positive impact on gold returns. Perhaps this result grants support to 
the diversification argument such that when the bond market is not well performing 
there is an inclination on the part of investors to reverse their trading positions from the 
U.S. bond toward U.S. commodities to lower their overall risk. In that sense the prices 
of those commodities except gold reflect that additional information revealed from the 
U.S. bond market behavior. The implied volatility, a forward-looking volatility, mea-
sures the sentiment regarding market conditions and market uncertainty, such as a high 
VIX, which implies poor market conditions; our evidence in Tables 7a and 7b shows 
that there are a few cases when there is high uncertainty—extreme conditions—and 
returns of some commodities (e.g. heating oil) are higher yet return of oats is lower. 
6 Conclusions 
Motivated by the debate over the focus of speculators and their informational advantage 
over other market participants, and by some recent past studies that examined the deter-
minants of hedging in futures markets, we were inspired to examine (1) major drivers 
behind the changes of the most influential traders in the commodity markets using the 
CFTC categorizations of the Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (DCOT), and (2) 
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subsequently how those changes in positions—five groups of traders—affect prices of 
individual commodities; we simultaneously attempted to capture interactive effects 
among participants’ positions. We show that hedgers in grains and softs except sugar, 
metals except gold, and meats are contrarian traders—not in all commodities, though 
(only 16 out of 22), which implies that hedgers reverse their positions on prior perfor-
mance of the commodity in question in addition to their trading persistence in the 
majority of cases. In addition, speculators (specifically managed money funds, MM) 
who are poised for a higher propensity to trade have a short-term focus and often sell 
after a high performance of commodity return—they are gain seekers. Evidence illustr-
ates that as the U.S. dollar comes under downside pressure, this type of trader’s net 
positions improve in energy, gold, and spring wheat, but when the U.S. dollar is under 
upside pressure, the MM net positions increase in cocoa. Additionally, hedging pressure 
(hedgers’ net short positions) apart from the actions of the commercial traders—actual 
producers or end-line users of the commodity—has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect on MM net long positions across all selected commodities. This evidence 
supports the notion of contemporaneous feedback between these traders in line with 
some past studies that examine traders’ reaction and rational investors who may prefer 
to ride bubbles because of predictable investor sentiment (e.g. Brunnermeier and Nagel, 
2004). 
The preponderance of the evidence supports the existence of important trading 
interactions among the most influential traders such that on average commodity returns 
are profoundly influenced by two groups of traders—hedgers and managed money 
funds, given their size and informational advantage. To learn the price impact of various 
participants since their interactions are relevant in price determination, we examine the 
relationship between trading positions and futures returns of each trader type per 
commodity. 
Furthermore, we find that financial fundamentals proxied by equity and bond 
markets and the U.S. dollar account for a great deal of variability of traders’ positions in 
some individual commodities, yet this observation is not consistent and stable across all 
selected commodities. Overall, the U.S. dollar movement emerges to have two effects: 
one is directly via its influence on commodity returns, and the other effect is indirect via 
its influence on the net positions of hedgers and to a lesser extent on MM net positions. 
In general, this observation supports our argument that behavior of commodity prices 
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cannot be well understood without taking into account the changes of positions of 
influential traders, which are in turn motivated by financial fundamentals and mo-
mentum. We are not suggesting that selected control fundamentals are the only vari-
ables that influence market prices of individual commodities; rather we deem that we 
have identified another channel by which fundamentals exert lagged or contem-
poraneous impacts on commodity prices by triggering traders to revise their positions. 
Additionally, the effect of the traders’ positions on commodity prices confirms 
cases when hedgers’ net positions (hedging pressure) and managed money funds’ net 
positions (speculators) both play a crucial role in price determination and direction of 
some selected commodities. Specifically, even when controlling directly for the same 
financial fundamentals which initially reveal an indirectly sizeable effect on various 
positions, we still find that changes of positions of DCOT traders exhibit a significant 
effect on individual commodities, and this is more pronounced in energies, grains, and 
metals. 
This result will prove to have some practical and policy implications. Because this 
study has put the spotlight on the underlying factors that influence positions of various 
traders including speculators, institutional investors can learn from the predictive ability 
of traders’ positions when assessing potential performance of individual commodity 
futures and more importantly the relevance of some DCOT traders in the prediction of 
commodity returns. Hedge fund and equity-based investment strategies including ro-
tation and tactical strategies will benefit from the main picture that emerges from this 
study, given its comprehensive exposure, as managers enhance their understanding 
regarding determinants and drivers behind the movement of some commodities in re-
lation to some economic and financial fundamentals. Building an active, effective, 
equity-commodity-based strategy while taking advantage of the cyclical market 
conditions should only be achievable with a better understanding of the commodity 
futures market and its various interactive ramifications and effects of various types of 
traders’ activities, suggesting that identification of those main trading factors offers a 
tremendous support to those investors who are prone to replicate trading strategies of 
sophisticated traders or engage in hedge fund strategies or multiple strategies including 
opportunistic strategies and commodity-market investing. 
As all commodity futures contracts analyzed in this study are affected by position 
limits proposed by the CFTC, and given the important role of managed money funds 
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and hedgers in price determination, it is of great relevance that the CFTC takes into 
account the role of the interaction between speculators and hedgers when determining 
the levels for position limits of speculators. The findings of this study might be helpful 
to quantify the extent to which pricing is influenced by traders’ interaction. For 
example, in the crude oil futures market, managed money funds and small traders seem 
to be the main actors in pricing, while hedgers play a relatively minor role. In co-
mbination with the fact that managed money funds and small traders are driven by 
trend-following, position limits for managed money funds are more justified for the 
crude oil market than, for example, grain markets, where the impact of pricing is more 
evenly dispersed among all market participants. In addition to such an application, the 
findings of our study suggest that it is prudent to regularly observe the motivations of 
the market participants. As just mentioned, a commodity futures price that is driven to a 
large extent by traders who carry out trend-following strategies may hinder efficient 
pricing and may lead to bubbles or other divergence from the fundamental development 
of the commodity. 
For future research it would be an interesting task to examine the effects of market 
participants’ interaction on commodity pricing with the more disaggregated internal 
data, the Large Reporting Trading System (LTRS) of the CFTC, which were already 
examined in some studies (e.g. Büyüksahin and Harris, 2011). Because the LTRS con-
sists of daily data on single large traders, an examination of their motivations and the 
impact of traders’ interactions on higher frequencies and more disaggregated data on 
traders’ positions could shed more light on the effect of the interaction on pricing in 
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 Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics of futures returns and position changes in percentage 


























CL -0.28 4.70 -0.01 0.78 0.02 1.18 -0.04 1.10 0.01 0. 87 <0.01 0.53 
HO -0.15 4.15 -0.04 2.52 -0.03 2.31 <-0.01 1.10 -0.01 0. 97 -0.01 1.10 
RB -0.07 4.63 -0.02 2.78 -0.01 2.49 -0.02 0.94 0.02 0. 81 <-0.01 0.87 
 Metals 
GC 0.14 2.75 -0.03 2.21 <0.01 2.92 <-0.01 2.08 -0.01 1.23 -0.02 0.93 
SI 0.09 4.92 <0.01 1.97 <0.01 2.82 0.02 1.80 1.80 <-0.01 -0.02 1.26 
PL -0.01 3.58 0.03 3.18 0.06 3.59 -0.03 3.15 0.02 2.07 -0.01 1.66 
PA 0.20 4.66 0.01 2.96 0.07 3.49 -0.02 2.93 -0.02 1.82 -0.03 1.22 
HG -0.03 3.90 <0.01 2.47 0.06 3.62 0.06 2.03 -0.03 1.72 -0.02 1.21 
 Grains 
C 0.03 4.59 <-0.01 2.13 0.02 1.99 -0.02 0.95 <-0.01 0.78 <-0.01 0.57 
S 0.20 3.57 -0.02 2.77 0.03 2.37 -0.03 1.13 -0.01 1.08 -0.01 0.76 
W -0.17 4.76 <0.01 2.41 <0.01 2.43 -0.02 1.33 0.01 1.04 0.01 0.66 
KW -0.09 4.37 -0.02 2.72 <0.01 2.34 0.02 0.97 -0.04 0.97 <-0.01 0.96 
MW 0.09 4.14 <-0.01 3.05 -0.02 2.11 0.02 0.65 -0.02 1.43 0.02 1.65 
O 0.07 5.12 -0.06 5.05 -0.02 4.18 -0.02 1.94 -0.02 2.36 <-0.01 2.15 
 Food and fiber 
CC 0.08 3.92 0.07 2.84 0.07 0.84 0.01 0.84 -0.01 0. 84 0.01 0.83 
CT -0.08 4.22 -0.05 3.83 0.03 3.01 -0.04 1.78 -0.03 1.43 -0.01 1.03 
KC -0.08 4.21 0.02 3.13 0.07 3.07 -0.03 1.25 -0.01 1.06 -0.01 0.73 
JO -0.10 4.90 -0.08 4.99 -0.12 4.76 <0.01 1.05 0.05 2.43 -0.02 1.60 
SB -0.19 4.81 -0.04 2.65 -0.04 1.98 <0.01 1.33 <0.01 1.33 -0.01 0.96 
 Livestock and meats 
FC 0.02 2.04 -0.02 2.36 -0.04 3.30 -0.02 1.15 <0.01 1.93 0.03 1.90 
LC -0.03 1.88 0.05 1.89 0.04 2.01 -0.01 0.93 -0.01 1.18 0.02 0.68 
LH -0.27 3.23 0.01 2.01 0.03 2.08 -0.03 1.26 <-0.01 1.27 0.02 0.82 
Note: Table 1a lists all the means and standard deviations of the futures returns (F), the position changes of hedging 
pressure (ΔHP), money managers’ net positions changes (ΔMM), swap dealers’ net position changes (ΔSW), other 
reportables’ net position changes (ΔOR), and non reportables’ net positions changes (ΔNR) on weekly data from 13 June 
2006 to 31 December 2014 (447 observations). CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating Oil, RB=RBOB Gasoline, GC=Gold, 
SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, W=CBOT Wheat, KW=Kansas City 
Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange Juice, SB=Sugar, 
FC=Feeder Cattle, LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs.   
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Table 1b: Means of net positions shares of open interest and prospensities to trade (PT) 
in percentage 






















CL 8.24 4.74 8.96 6.27 -1.66 3.47 0.46 6.09 0.48 8.40 
HO 26.53 4.83 5.76 12.04 18.37 3.82 -1.14 9.30 3.54 5.69 
RB 35.74 5.22 17.90 9.15 13.07 4.19 2.52 9.52 2.25 8.34 
 Metals 
GC 26.73 5.34 25.88 7.57 -12.44 5.80 6.58 6.71 6.71 7.54 
SI 32.37 4.66 14.94 8.78 -0.09 5.24 6.19 9.08 11.33 5.76 
PL 40.07 6.40 42.74 7.13 -20.50 8.23 8.65 13.04 9.18 9.04 
PA 53.95 5.31 42.23 6.32 -3.66 9.42 7.91 9.65 7.47 9.93 
HG 23.68 7.13 1.12 9.14 29.79 2.73 -5.17 10.15 -2.05 7.19 
 Grains 
C 30.94 3.51 11.99 6.82 23.22 2.28 3.94 5.63 -8.21 2.95 
S 33.13 4.82 15.88 8.34 21.14 2.95 2.20 7.79 -6.09 4.29 
W 26.83 5.27 0.40 6.21 34.09 2.33 -2.73 7.52 -4.94 4.46 
KW 32.46 4.39 14.64 6.90 19.56 3.62 3.59 8.23 -5.32 5.89 
MW 20.17 4.73 14.15 9.91 3.51 19.52 4.26 17.45 -1.76 6.14 
O 40.51 6.00 11.30 15.66 14.64 3.60 6.78 16.04 7.68 9.82 
 Food and fiber 
CC 26.98 3.60 16.82 7.21 5.99 4.64 1.55 12.11 2.62 11.08 
CT 44.23 6.40 11.08 8.23 30.00 3.00 0.18 8.97 2.97 8.22 
KC 35.37 4.66 6.45 8.38 23.86 2.45 3.71 9.23 1.36 12.56 
JO 46.20 6.13 20.04 11.91 12.10 3.78 7.85 11.72 6.20 10.75 
SB 29.90 4.23 9.38 6.62 15.25 2.87 3.64 7.95 1.64 7.03 
 Livestock and meats 
FC 3.32 8.29 18.79 8.68 12.41 6.11 -4.59 12.59 -23.29 4.86 
LC 35.07 3.75 17.35 5.56 30.59 1.54 -3.84 8.42 -9.03 4.29 
LH 36.62 4.73 10.09 7.18 32.17 2.06 -1.40 9.66 -4.23 4.87 
Note: Table 1b lists all the means (for HP: ௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟௢௣௘௡	௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧೟ ; for all other categories:	
௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟
௢௣௘௡	௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧೟ )  
and the prospensities to trade (ܲ ௧ܶ ൌ ௔௕௦ሺ௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభሻା௔௕௦ሺ௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟ି௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభሻ௟௢௡௚	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభା௦௛௢௥௧	௣௢௦௜௧௜௢௡௦೟షభ ) of hedging 
pressure (HP), money managers (MM), swap dealers (SW), other reportables (OR), and non reportables (NR) on weekly data 
from 13 June 2006 to 31 December 2014 (447 observations). CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating Oil, RB=RBOB Gasoline, 
GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, W=CBOT Wheat, KW=Kansas City 
Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange Juice, SB=Sugar, FC=Feeder 
Cattle, LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs.   
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Table 2: Hedging pressure as the dependent variable, the “US approach” 
HP(-1) F(-1) DI DI(-1) SP SP(-1) BIUS BIUS   
(-1) 
VIX VIX(-1) R² 
adj. 
Energies
CL -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01 0.00(-0.03) (-0.79) (-0.93) (-0.20) (-1.11) (-0.30) (0.03) (-0.05) (-2.08) (-1.04) 
HO 0.01 0.07* -0.19* -0.22** 0.23*** -0.00 0.00 -0.43** 0.03* -0.02 0.09(0.27) (1.95) (-1.80) (-2.38) (3.19) (-0.07) (0.01) (-2.00) (1.74) (-1.17) 
RB 0.12*** 0.02 -0.06 -0.23* 0.25** -0.13 -0.09 -0.33 0.03 -0.05** 0.07(2.62) (0.51) (-0.40) (-1.94) (2.28) (-1.60) (-0.26) (-1.37) (1.34) (-2.33) 
Metals
GC 0.05 0.07 -0.55*** -0.20* -0.07 -0.12* -0.06 -0.11 -0.01 -0.00 0.09(0.88) (1.46) (-5.72) (-1.86) (-1.12) (-1.89) (-0.28) (-0.57) (-0.63) (-0.26) 
SI 0.04 0.04* -0.21** 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.18 0.09 -0.00 0.00 0.01(0.82) (1.68) (-2.07) (0.03) (-0.22) (0.11) (0.92) (0.48) (-0.12) (0.07) 
PL 0.01 0.20*** -0.31** -0.02 0.14 0.01 -0.19 -0.50* 0.02 -0.01 0.08(0.31) (4.15) (-2.26) (-0.11) (1.54) (0.16) (-0.70) (-1.79) (0.75) (-0.44) 
PA 0.13*** 0.07** -0.32** -0.16 0.10 -0.10 -0.20 0.37 0.01 -0.04* 0.07(2.72) (2.08) (-2.49) (-1.18) (1.10) (-1.18) (-0.76) (1.39) (0.24) (-1.80) 
HG 0.11** 0.11*** -0.32*** -0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.38* 0.07 -0.00 -0.02 0.08(2.26) (2.98) (-2.83) (-0.11) (0.76) (-0.59) (-1.82) (0.34) (-0.28) (-1.21) 
Grains
C 0.25*** 0.03 -0.26*** 0.02 0.12 -0.05 -0.22 0.26 0.03** -0.03 0.12(4.71) (1.37) (-3.00) (0.33) (2.68) (-0.76) (-1.26) (1.19) (2.13) (-1.50) 
S 0.17*** 0.08* -0.21** 0.05 0.22*** 0.02 -0.31 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.10(2.92) (1.94) (-2.22) (0.35) (2.64) (0.25) (-1.20) (0.51) (1.18) (-0.46) 
W 0.16*** 0.06** -0.48*** -0.05 0.06 -0.08 -0.25 0.34 0.03 -0.02 0.12(2.93) (2.27) (-4.72) (-0.47) (0.92) (-1.26) (-1.18) (1.61) (1.43) (-1.10) 
KW 0.30*** 0.11*** -0.28** 0.03 0.14** -0.15** 0.03 0.27 0.00 -0.04 0.20(5.95) (3.53) (-2.54) (0.24) (1.97) (-2.14) (0.15) (1.21) (0.15) (-2.09) 
MW 0.14*** 0.16*** -0.28** -0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.10(2.97) (3.86) (-2.57) (-0.66) (0.76) (0.44) (-0.09) (0.43) (-0.24) (0.02) 
O 0.18*** 0.20*** -0.79*** 0.15 0.02 0.08 -0.90 -0.68 0.03 -0.00 0.14(2.82) (3.33) (-3.45) (0.66) (0.13) (0.73) (-1.89) (-1.69) (0.66) (-0.10) 
Food and fiber 
CC 0.24*** 0.12*** -0.40*** -0.13 0.14* 0.06 -0.21 -0.32 0.03 0.06*** 0.19(4.89) (3.22) (-3.42) (-1.06) (1.86) (0.74) (-0.87) (-1.36) (1.34) (2.83) 
CT 0.29*** 0.02 -0.10 -0.17 0.13 -0.04 -0.20 -0.36 -0.02 0.04 0.10(5.91) (0.41) (-0.63) (-1.04) (1.27) (-0.42) (-0.59) (-1.06) (-0.70) (0.16) 
KC 0.16*** 0.15*** -0.29** -0.09 0.14 -0.04 -0.27 -0.35 0.02 0.00 0.12(2.85) (3.42) (-2.13) (-0.61) (1.61) (-0.43) (-0.99) (-1.26) (0.71) (0.15) 
JO 0.13** 0.26*** -0.62*** 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.55 0.17 -0.00 -0.04 0.14(2.37) (4.58) (-2.89) (0.26) (0.17) (0.10) (-1.27) (0.40) (-0.01) (-1.05) 
SB 0.32*** -0.01 -0.20* -0.08 0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.21 -0.00 -0.04** 0.14(6.48) (-0.20) (-1.77) (-0.72) (1.14) (-1.26) (-0.25) (-0.93) (-0.06) (-2.34) 
Livestock and meats 
FC 0.22*** 0.42*** 0.08 -0.18* 0.07 -0.10 0.41** -0.23 -0.03 0.00 0.21(4.82) (8.07) (0.80) (-1.85) (1.10) (-1.57) (2.11) (-1.20) (-1.39) (0.06) 
LC 0.11** 0.26*** -0.09 -0.08 0.02 -0.02 -0.38 -0.20 0.02 0.02 0.08(2.31) (5.44) (-1.08) (-1.00) (0.36) (-0.35) (-2.29) (-1.22) (1.29) (1.15) 
LH 0.29*** 0.09*** -0.11 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.22* -0.10 0.01 -0.00 0.13(5.97) (3.37) (-1.27) (0.01) (0.19) (-0.67) (-1.65) (-0.55) (0.59) (-0.21) 
Note: Table 2 lists all the coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses of equation (6): 
∆ܪ ௧ܲ,௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߜ∆ܪ ௧ܲିଵ,௜ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߚ′ܺ ൅ ߱௜ܦி௘௕஻௥௘௔௞ ൅ ߝ௧. Regressions were calculated by OLS, and Newey-West standard
errors are calculated for regressions with serial correlated and/or heteroskedastic error terms. CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating Oil, 
RB=RBOB Gasoline, GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, W=CBOT Wheat, 
KW=Kansas City Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange Juice, SB=Sugar, 
FC=Feeder Cattle, LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs; HP(-1)=one lagged hedging pressure, F(-1)=one lagged futures return, DI=Dollar 
Index, DI(-1) one lagged Dollar Index, SP=S&P 500, SP(-1)=one lagged S&P 500, BIUS=Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, BIUS(-
1)=one lagged Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, VIX=S&P 500 Volatility Index, VIX(-1)= one lagged S&P 500 Volatility Index, 
FEB= dummy for February effect. ***, ***, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Money managers’ net long position changes as the dependent variable, the “US approach” 
 MM(-1) F(-1) HP DI DI(-1) SP SP(-1) BIUS BIUS   
(-1) 
VIX VIX(-1) R² 
adj. 
 Energies  
CL -0.03 0.03* 0.49*** -0.19*** -0.07 0.11*** -0.04 -0.19** -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.23 (-0.57) (1.90) (7.57) (-4.12) (-1.48) (3.61) (-1.39) (-2.01) (-0.23) (1.08) (-0.76) 
HO 0.04 0.02 0.73*** -0.13** 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.15 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.68 (0.99) (1.43) (20.48) (-2.33) (0.13) (-0.19) (0.03) (-1.27) (-0.02) (-0.72) (0.03) 
RB 0.04 0.01 0.76*** -0.10** -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.16* -0.25** 0.01 -0.01 0.76 (1.17) (0.74) (27.22) (-2.15) (-0.26) (0.58) (-0.72) (-1.82) (-2.31) (0.73) (-1.16) 
 Metals  
GC 0.01 0.01 0.94*** -0.16* -0.15 0.02 -0.05 0.28* -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.57 (0.16) (0.38) (13.81) (-1.94) (-1.46) (0.27) (-1.02) (1.72) (-0.10) (-0.84) (-1.57) 
SI 0.14*** 0.03 0.82*** -0.09 -0.08 0.13** -0.06 0.16 -0.20 -0.01 -0.04** 0.45 (3.30) (1.02) (15.61) (-0.94) (-0.72) (2.17) (-0.96) (0.81) (-1.04) (-0.63) (-2.56) 
PL 0.11** 0.00 0.61*** -0.19 0.00 -0.08 0.01 -0.46* 0.41 -0.03 -0.06*** 0.36 (2.36) (0.08) (9.27) (-1.39) (0.03) (-0.87) (0.08) (-1.94) (1.45) (-1.42) (-2.99) 
PA 0.10** -0.03 0.69*** -0.08 0.03 0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 0.00 -0.04* 0.39 (2.47) (-1.02) (14.67) (-0.61) (0.23) (1.31) (-1.19) (-0.49) (-0.27) (0.01) (-1.78) 
HG 0.06 -0.03 1.05*** -0.05 -0.10 -0.02 -0.01 -0.32 -0.04 -0.05*** -0.03* 0.57 (1.26) (-0.70) (15.45) (-0.51) (-1.15) (-0.29) (-0.20) (-1.51) (-0.17) (-2.64) (-1.67) 
 Grains  
C 0.06** 0.04*** 0.77*** -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.11 -0.21** 0.00 0.01 0.73 (2.17) (2.83) (30.86) (-0.65) (-0.43) (-0.23) (0.00) (1.11) (-2.14) (0.31) (1.63) 
S 0.03 0.02 0.72*** -0.05 -0.02 -0.00 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.75 (1.20) (1.06) (33.20) (-0.85) (-0.33) (-0.04) (1.64) (-0.56) (-0.19) (0.35) (0.99) 
W 0.06** 0.03** 0.83*** 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.00 -0.00 0.70 (2.09) (2.06) (29.50) (0.64) (0.30) (-0.44) (-0.53) (-0.78) (-0.89) (-0.10) (-0.31) 
KW 0.05 0.05*** 0.70*** -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.12 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.72 (1.60) (2.77) (28.45) (-1.05) (0.24) (-1.18) (0.75) (-1.06) (-0.03) (0.69) (1.23) 
MW 0.03 0.00 0.48*** -0.15** -0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.11 0.01 -0.01 0.52 (0.73) (0.15) (19.40) (-2.30) (-1.29) (1.23) (-0.45) (0.02) (0.93) (1.20) (-0.82) 
O 0.01 0.09*** 0.57*** 0.06 0.00 -0.11 0.05 -0.11 0.36 -0.03 -0.01 0.52 (0.26) (2.71) (19.28) (0.46) (0.00) (-1.28) (0.63) (-0.42) (1.34) (-1.35) (-0.30) 
 Food and fiber  
CC 0.04 0.07*** 0.79*** 0.11* -0.03 -0.05 -0.06** -0.11 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.77 (1.33) (3.77) (15.48) (1.94) (-0.47) (-1.19) (-2.12) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-1.12) (-1.41) 
CT 0.10*** 0.05** 0.60*** -0.07 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.65 (3.19) (2.07) (25.63) (-0.91) (-0.51) (0.56) (-0.40) (-0.01) (0.82) (0.91) (-0.76) 
KC 0.04 0.10*** 0.79*** 0.08 -0.05 0.09** 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.03** 0.01 0.78 (1.38) (4.65) (33.36) (1.24) (-0.68) (2.00) (1.21) (0.07) (0.64) (2.45) (0.86) 
JO 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.72*** -0.17 0.21* -0.02 0.07 -0.11 0.35 0.00 0.02 0.74 (2.97) (5.01) (28.21) (-1.46) (1.84) (-0.30) (1.02) (-0.47) (1.54) (0.11) (1.22) 
SB 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.58*** 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.06* -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.02** 0.66 (2.73) (3.91) (25.87) (0.49) (1.43) (-0.31) (1.73) (-0.73) (-0.20) (0.35) (2.13) 
 Livestock and meats  
FC 0.10** 0.19*** 0.83*** 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.22 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 0.47 (2.31) (2.66) (11.00) (0.24) (0.36) (0.17) (-1.11) (0.87) (-0.47) (0.12) (-0.45) 
LC 0.06* 0.17*** 0.76*** -0.02 0.11 -0.05 -0.08** -0.11 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.60 (1.93) (4.76) (22.09) (-0.33) (1.95) (-1.38) (-2.04) (-0.93) (0.37) (-1.44) (-1.29) 
LH 0.04 0.12*** 0.67*** 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.52 (0.88) (4.82) (17.22) (0.36) (0.09) (0.68) (-0.37) (-0.10) (0.19) (-0.04) (0.02) 
Note: Table 3 lists all the coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses of equation (7): 
∆݌݋ݏ௧,௜௝ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߜ௜∆݌݋ݏ௧ିଵ,௜௝ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߠ௜∆ܪ ௧ܲ,௜ ൅ ߚ′ܺ ൅	߱௜ܦி௘௕஻௥௘௔௞ ൅ ߝ௧,௜. Regressions were calculated by OLS, and Newey-West 
standard errors are calculated for regressions with serial correlated and/or heteroskedastic error terms. CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating 
Oil, RB=RBOB Gasoline, GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, W=CBOT Wheat, 
KW=Kansas City Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange Juice, SB=Sugar, 
FC=Feeder Cattle, LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs; MM(-1)=one lagged money managers’ net long position changes, F(-1)=one lagged 
futures return, HP=hedging pressure, DI=Dollar Index, DI(-1) one lagged Dollar Index, SP=S&P 500, SP(-1)=one lagged S&P 500, 
BIUS=Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, BIUS(-1)=one lagged Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, VIX=S&P 500 Volatility Index, 
VIX(-1)= one lagged S&P 500 Volatility Index, FEB= dummy for February effect. ***, ***, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively.  
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Table 4: Swap dealers’ net long position changes as the dependent variable, the “US approach” 
 SW(-1) F(-1) HP DI DI(-1) SP SP(-1) BIUS BIUS   
(-1) 
VIX VIX(-1) R² 
adj. 
Energies
CL 0.18*** -0.04** 0.28*** 0.16*** -0.01 -0.08*** 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.17(3.92) (-2.28) (3.57) (3.07) (-0.15) (-2.81) (0.19) (0.75) (-0.08) (-0.76) (0.04) 
HO -0.01 -0.05*** -0.00 0.14*** -0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.12 0.01 0.01* -0.01 0.05(-0.18) (-3.18) (-0.01) (3.14) (-1.55) (0.81) (-0.73) (1.27) (0.05) (1.82) (-1.59) 
RB 0.15*** -0.03** 0.09*** 0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.12 -0.00 -0.00 0.10(3.37) (-2.02) (3.93) (1.20) (0.14) (-1.10) (0.07) (0.50) (1.31) (-0.05) (-0.55) 
Metals
GC 0.05 -0.01 -0.20*** 0.21** 0.10 -0.08 0.01 -0.37** 0.09 0.00 0.03* 0.11(1.09) (-0.13) (-4.53) (2.31) (1.05) (-1.37) (0.30) (-2.01) (0.48) (0.30) (1.74) 
SI 0.11 -0.03 -0.16** 0.15* 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.11(1.59) (-1.42) (-2.17) (1.87) (0.07) (-0.95) (0.52) (0.72) (1.32) (1.61) (1.63) 
PL 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.51*** -0.03 0.11 -0.06 0.30 -0.18 0.00 0.03 0.02(0.78) (-1.04) (0.84) (3.59) (-0.26) (1.19) (-0.66) (1.03) (-0.61) (0.19) (1.30) 
PA 0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.29** -0.05 -0.12 -0.01 0.25 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.03(1.27) (0.17) (-0.55) (2.20) (-0.40) (-1.46) (-0.16) (0.94) (0.99) (0.27) (0.62) 
HG 0.14*** -0.05** 0.06 0.29*** -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.40** 0.36** 0.04** 0.01 0.09(2.84) (-1.79) (1.51) (3.25) (-0.46) (0.77) (0.24) (2.23) (1.97) (2.27) (0.68) 
Grains
C 0.25*** -0.03** 0.14*** 0.01 -0.06* -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.15** -0.00 -0.01 0.17(6.24) (-2.44) (4.89) (0.22) (-1.78) (-0.62) (-0.73) (0.62) (2.13) (-0.22) (-1.11) 
S 0.23*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.07 -0.00 -0.03*** 0.10(4.86) (0.38) (4.57) (1.18) (0.07) (0.29) (-1.53) (0.16) (0.66) (-0.48) (-3.19) 
W 0.20*** -0.03* 0.19*** 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.16 0.23** 0.00 -0.01 0.17(4.52) (-1.87) (7.61) (0.77) (-1.51) (-0.33) (0.09) (1.40) (2.01) (0.10) (-1.17) 
KW 0.12*** -0.02 0.13*** 0.08* -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.21** 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.13(2.60) (-1.60) (6.78) (1.80) (-0.37) (1.22) (-1.06) (2.27) (0.72) (-1.40) (-1.11) 
MW 0.12*** -0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.04(2.64) (-1.51) (4.42) (0.21) (0.22) (0.92) (0.53) (-0.08) (0.11) (0.53) (-0.70) 
O -0.03 -0.05*** 0.15*** 0.02 0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.13 -0.38 0.01 0.00 0.15(-0.25) (-3.16) (3.04) (0.16) (0.70) (0.38) (-0.14) (-0.40) (-1.53) (0.50) (0.01) 
Food and fiber 
CC 0.09* -0.02 0.06 -0.00 0.06 0.06** 0.02 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.06(1.94) (-1.45) (4.09) (-0.04) (1.53) (2.38) (0.65) (1.57) (1.25) (1.42) (1.31) 
CT 0.26*** -0.04** 0.18*** 0.11* 0.00 -0.08 0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.24(5.41) (-2.20) (6.35) (1.79) (0.04) (-1.50) (1.18) (-0.47) (-0.32) (-0.81) (1.45) 
KC 0.20*** -0.06*** 0.13*** -0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.00 0.15(4.62) (-4.38) (6.93) (-0.03) (0.58) (-1.11) (-0.46) (0.27) (-0.91) (-1.43) (-0.21) 
JO 0.15*** -0.02* 0.04*** 0.12** -0.05 0.03 -0.06** 0.21** -0.12 0.00 -0.01 0.06(3.19) (-1.74) (3.99) (2.52) (-1.06) (1.04) (-2.04) (2.22) (-1.27) (0.05) (-0.87) 
SB 0.14*** -0.04*** 0.19*** 0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.07** 0.10 0.14 -0.02** -0.02** 0.21(3.14) (-3.67) (8.17) (1.10) (-1.63) (-0.61) (-2.05) (0.96) (1.24) (-2.45) (-2.04) 
Livestock and meats 
FC 0.24*** -0.07** 0.11*** 0.04 0.01 -0.00 0.07** 0.07 0.07 -0.00 0.02* 0.09(3.94) (-2.26) (5.28) (0.60) (0.28) (-0.01) (2.00) (0.56) (0.51) (-0.08) (1.90) 
LC 0.10** -0.06** 0.16*** 0.02 -0.05 -0.00 0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01** 0.11(2.21) (-2.32) (6.74) (0.48) (-1.30) (-0.15) (1.25) (-0.76) (0.22) (0.59) (2.03) 
LH 0.06 -0.03* 0.11*** 0.08 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 -0.00 0.01 0.02(1.25) (-1.71) (3.64) (1.39) (-0.13) (1.42) (-0.50) (0.90) (-0.57) (-0.24) (0.50) 
Note: Table 4 lists all the coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses of equation (7): 
∆݌݋ݏ௧,௜௝ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߜ௜∆݌݋ݏ௧ିଵ,௜௝ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߠ௜∆ܪ ௧ܲ,௜ ൅ ߚ′ܺ ൅	߱௜ܦி௘௕஻௥௘௔௞ ൅ ߝ௧,௜. Regressions were calculated by OLS, and Newey-West 
standard errors are calculated for regressions with serial correlated and/or heteroskedastic error terms. CL= WTI Crude Oil, 
HO=Heating Oil, RB=RBOB Gasoline, GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, 
W=CBOT Wheat, KW=Kansas City Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange 
Juice, SB=Sugar, FC=Feeder Cattle, LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs; SW(-1)=one lagged swap dealers’ net long position changes, F(-
1)=one lagged futures return, HP= hedging pressure, DI=Dollar Index, DI(-1) one lagged Dollar Index, SP=S&P 500, SP(-1)=one 
lagged S&P 500, BIUS=Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, BIUS(-1)=one lagged Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, VIX=S&P 500 
Volatility Index, VIX(-1)= one lagged S&P 500 Volatility Index, FEB= dummy for February effect. ***, ***, * denote significance at 
1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5: Other reportables’ net long position changes as the dependent variable, the “US approach” 
 OR(-1) F(-1) HP DI DI(-1) SP SP(-1) BIUS BIUS  
(-1) 
VIX VIX(-1) R² 
adj. 
 Energies  
CL -0.10* -0.01 0.17** 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.05* 0.11 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.03 (-1.73) (-1.10) (2.54) (0.26) (1.06) (-0.38) (1.84) (1.33) (0.23) (-0.25) (1.56) 
HO 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.06* -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.54) (-1.44) (-0.69) (0.12) (1.73) (-0.76) (0.33) (0.82) (-0.26) (-0.83) (0.99) 
RB 0.13* -0.02** -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.03* 0.01 0.13** -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 (1.87) (-2.19) (-0.55) (1.09) (-0.72) (-1.71) (0.59) (2.36) (-0.42) (-1.40) (1.26) 
 Metals  
GC -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.07* 0.02 0.10 0.01 -0.00 0.00 (-0.47) (-0.37) (1.37) (0.06) (0.26) (-0.40) (1.90) (0.20) (0.86) (0.61) (-0.11) 
SI -0.14*** -0.03** 0.05 0.09* -0.05 -0.06* -0.02 -0.18* -0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.03 (-2.79) (-2.46) (1.60) (1.69) (-0.87) (-1.89) (-0.52) (-1.71) (-0.73) (-0.80) (0.20) 
PL 0.05 -0.02 0.19*** -0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.11* -0.16 -0.14 0.02 0.04** 0.08 (0.80) (-0.76) (4.02) (-0.34) (0.69) (-0.65) (1.66) (-0.89) (-0.69) (1.19) (2.39) 
PA -0.18** 0.00 0.16*** -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.10 -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.10 (-2.11) (0.04) (4.25) (-0.48) (-0.45) (0.31) (0.88) (-0.66) (-0.48) (0.97) (0.86) 
HG -0.03 0.03 -0.26*** -0.19*** 0.08 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.02 0.15 (-0.68) (1.12) (-8.13) (-2.61) (1.13) (-1.01) (0.32) (-0.31) (-0.61) (1.63) (1.28) 
 Grains  
C 0.01 -0.01 0.06** -0.01 0.06* 0.00 0.03 -0.11 0.06 -0.00 -0.00 0.03 (0.21) (-1.42) (3.22) (-0.18) (1.80) (0.21) (1.29) (-1.53) (0.89) (-0.28) (-0.49) 
S 0.03 -0.02 0.05*** 0.05 0.03 -0.00 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 0.01 (0.70) (-1.10) (2.67) (1.00) (0.69) (-0.05) (-0.92) (0.83) (-0.32) (-0.13) (0.29) 
W -0.04 -0.02** -0.11*** -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.17* -0.00 0.01 0.08 (-0.78) (-2.19) (-5.22) (-1.04) (0.41) (0.37) (0.05) (0.51) (-1.89) (-0.34) (1.00) 
KW -0.05 -0.03** 0.06*** 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.00 -0.01* 0.02 (-0.95) (-2.37) (3.28) (0.86) (0.99) (0.16) (-1.03) (0.92) (0.32) (-0.23) (-1.76) 
MW -0.05 -0.01 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.27** -0.01 -0.00 0.13 (-1.03) (-0.58) (7.78) (2.87) (0.44) (-0.42) (-1.15) (-0.07) (-2.22) (-1.10) (-0.22) 
O 0.16 -0.04 0.07* -0.10 -0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.16 -0.23 0.03* -0.00 0.05 (1.53) (-1.53) (1.79) (-1.06) (-0.02) (0.80) (-0.68) (1.02) (-0.98) (1.91) (-0.20) 
 Food and fiber  
CC -0.07 -0.03*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.11 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.02 (-0.78) (-2.76) (-0.25) (-0.49) (-0.39) (-1.31) (-0.38) (1.63) (-1.19) (-1.17) (0.58) 
CT 0.13*** -0.03 0.04** 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.21 0.01 0.00 0.02 (2.80) (-1.56) (2.26) (0.43) (0.58) (1.10) (-0.83) (0.09) (-1.59) (0.56) (0.00) 
KC -0.00 -0.04*** -0.03* -0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 (-0.01) (-3.10) (-1.89) (-0.84) (1.11) (-1.09) (-1.01) (-0.60) (0.51) (-1.13) (-0.76) 
JO 0.16*** -0.12*** 0.06** 0.17 -0.11 -0.00 -0.07 -0.14 -0.18 0.00 -0.02 0.08 (3.43) (-4.79) (2.50) (1.58) (-1.06) (-0.04) (-0.95) (-0.66) (-0.83) (0.11) (-1.11) 
SB 0.14** -0.02** 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.19** 0.01** 0.00 0.04 (2.54) (-2.30) (0.95) (-0.34) (-0.97) (-0.16) (-0.11) (-0.03) (-2.49) (2.52) (0.46) 
 Livestock and meats  
FC 0.01 -0.07 0.15*** -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.17 -0.21 0.01 -0.01 0.01 (0.23) (-1.28) (2.72) (-0.13) (0.39) (0.72) (-0.85) (-0.80) (-1.08) (0.99) (-0.50) 
LC 0.07 -0.11*** 0.17*** -0.05 -0.00 0.02 0.06* 0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 (1.41) (-3.38) (5.41) (-0.89) (-0.09) (0.52) (1.89) (0.28) (-0.00) (1.03) (0.62) 
LH 0.05 -0.03 0.12*** -0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.05 (0.74) (-1.64) (3.93) (-0.85) (0.17) (-2.04) (0.29) (0.48) (0.11) (1.06) (-0.24) 
Note: Table 5 lists all the coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses of equation (7):  
∆݌݋ݏ௧,௜௝ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߜ௜∆݌݋ݏ௧ିଵ,௜௝ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߠ௜∆ܪ ௧ܲ,௜ ൅ ߚ′ܺ ൅	߱௜ܦி௘௕஻௥௘௔௞ ൅ ߝ௧,௜. Regressions were calculated by OLS, and Newey-West 
standard errors are calculated for regressions with serial correlated and/or heteroskedastic error terms. CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating 
Oil, RB=RBOB Gasoline, GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, W=CBOT Wheat, 
KW=Kansas City Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange Juice, SB=Sugar, 
FC=Feeder Cattle, LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs; OR(-1)=one lagged other reportables’ net long position changes, F(-1)=one lagged 
futures return, HP=hedging pressure, DI=Dollar Index, DI(-1) one lagged Dollar Index, SP=S&P 500, SP(-1)=one lagged S&P 500, 
BIUS=Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, BIUS(-1)=one lagged Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, VIX=S&P 500 Volatility Index, VIX(-
1)= one lagged S&P 500 Volatility Index, FEB= dummy for February effect. ***, ***, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  
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Table 6: Non reportables’ net long position changes as the dependent variable, the “US approach” 
 NR(-1) F(-1) HP DI DI(-1) SP SP(-1) BIUS BIUS  
(-1) 
VIX VIX(-1) R² 
adj. 
Energies
CL -0.25*** 0.03*** 0.06* 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 0.18(-4.83) (5.61) (1.85) (0.43) (0.49) (-1.51) (-0.83) (1.22) (0.71) (-0.88) (-1.22) 
HO -0.04 0.03*** 0.28*** -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.45(-1.15) (3.04) (13.75) (-0.60) (0.66) (0.12) (0.60) (-0.34) (0.14) (0.12) (0.72) 
RB -0.09 0.04*** 0.16*** 0.00 0.03 0.05** 0.02 -0.02 0.14** 0.00 0.01 0.34(-1.22) (3.79) (10.84) (0.09) (1.24) (2.14) (0.77) (-0.26) (2.04) (0.15) (1.37) 
Metals
GC -0.13*** 0.03 0.23*** -0.06* 0.02 0.07*** -0.03 0.02 -0.16** 0.00 0.00 0.39(-3.29) (1.53) (11.70) (-1.77) (0.54) (3.22) (-1.37) (0.43) (-2.50) (0.45) (0.03) 
SI -0.20*** 0.01 0.25*** -0.17*** 0.07 -0.02 0.04 -0.16 0.02 -0.00 0.02* 0.23(-4.40) (1.05) (5.65) (-3.58) (1.21) (-0.50) (1.25) (-1.56) (0.18) (-0.42) (1.73) 
PL -0.10* 0.05 0.14*** -0.27*** -0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.27** -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.15(-1.71) (1.61) (5.18) (-3.33) (-0.78) (0.98) (-0.88) (2.01) (-0.14) (0.97) (-0.60) 
PA -0.12** 0.04*** 0.16*** -0.16*** 0.05 0.01 0.07** 0.01 -0.07 -0.02*** 0.01 0.24(-2.31) (2.77) (6.56) (-3.37) (0.85) (0.20) (2.21) (0.12) (-0.61) (-2.75) (1.43) 
HG -0.10 0.04 0.14*** -0.08* 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.27*** -0.01 0.00 0.15(-1.57) (1.51) (4.86) (-1.66) (0.27) (0.57) (-0.40) (-0.86) (-2.65) (-1.06) (0.14) 
Grains
C -0.06 -0.00 0.02* -0.00 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.09* -0.02 -0.00 -0.01* 0.02(-1.23) (-0.41) (1.77) (-0.06) (0.98) (-0.21) (-1.30) (-1.66) (-0.43) (-0.61) (-1.73) 
S -0.02 -0.01 0.13*** -0.08*** -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.00 0.01** 0.23(-0.31) (-1.19) (10.66) (-2.75) (-0.91) (-1.51) (0.18) (-1.17) (-0.16) (-0.51) (2.47) 
W -0.27*** 0.01 0.08*** -0.05 0.05* -0.01 0.01 -0.13** 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.17(-4.08) (1.20) (4.85) (-1.63) (1.81) (-0.40) (0.35) (-2.54) (0.21) (-0.53) (0.41) 
KW -0.02 -0.00 0.09*** -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.19** -0.13 0.00 0.01 0.07(-0.34) (-0.35) (4.84) (-1.65) (-1.14) (-0.28) (0.83) (-2.03) (-1.49) (0.56) (1.35) 
MW -0.07* 0.02 0.30*** -0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.05 0.01 0.16 -0.00 0.01 0.31(-1.79) (1.19) (13.19) (-0.58) (0.95) (-1.34) (1.18) (0.05) (1.24) (-0.35) (1.28) 
O -0.02 0.01 0.20*** 0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.00 0.13 0.26 -0.01 0.01 0.21(-0.41) (0.40) (10.38) (0.23) (-0.45) (1.09) (-0.05) (0.72) (1.49) (-0.60) (0.37) 
Food and fiber 
CC -0.20*** -0.01 0.14*** -0.10*** -0.04 0.04* 0.05** -0.11 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.31(-4.31) (-1.10) (6.54) (-3.27) (-1.16) (1.93) (2.31) (-1.55) (1.47) (1.64) (0.44) 
CT -0.15*** 0.02* 0.17*** -0.06** -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.00 0.00 0.38(-3.20) (1.70) (14.25) (-2.06) (-1.00) (1.14) (0.68) (-0.63) (1.42) (-0.01) (0.38) 
KC -0.33*** 0.01 0.10*** -0.07** -0.05 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.00 -0.00 0.27(-4.75) (0.98) (6.07) (-2.11) (-1.48) (-0.07) (-0.67) (-0.70) (-1.35) (-0.24) (-0.19) 
JO -0.19*** -0.01 0.18*** -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.31(-3.69) (-0.36) (10.18) (-1.39) (-1.39) (-0.17) (1.09) (0.39) (0.12) (-0.91) (-0.34) 
SB -0.14** 0.02* 0.20*** -0.07** 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.01 -0.00 0.33(-2.33) (1.85) (9.96) (-2.12) (0.88) (1.61) (0.65) (-0.78) (0.88) (1.08) (-0.58) 
Livestock and meats 
FC 0.01 -0.09* -0.13*** -0.03 -0.11 -0.04 0.07 -0.00 0.20 -0.02 0.00 0.04(0.18) (-1.81) (-3.17) (-0.32) (-1.31) (-0.64) (1.19) (-0.00) (1.19) (-1.09) (0.10) 
LC -0.02 -0.02 -0.08*** 0.05 -0.05 0.04* -0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.06(-0.42) (-0.85) (-4.71) (1.60) (-1.63) (1.95) (-0.81) (2.30) (-0.38) (0.11) (-1.51) 
LH -0.07 -0.04*** 0.09*** -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.13 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.08(-1.22) (-3.74) (3.65) (-1.55) (-0.29) (-0.27) (0.64) (-1.59) (0.25) (-1.27) (-0.74) 
Note: Table 6 lists all the coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses of equation (7): 
∆݌݋ݏ௧,௜௝ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߜ௜∆݌݋ݏ௧ିଵ,௜௝ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߠ௜∆ܪ ௧ܲ,௜ ൅ ߚ′ܺ ൅	߱௜ܦி௘௕஻௥௘௔௞ ൅ ߝ௧,௜. Regressions were calculated by OLS, and Newey-West 
standard errors are calculated for regressions with serial correlated and/or heteroskedastic error terms. CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating 
Oil, RB=RBOB Gasoline, GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, W=CBOT Wheat, 
KW=Kansas City Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange Juice, SB=Sugar, 
FC=Feeder Cattle, LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs; NR(-1)=one lagged non reportables’ net long position changes, F(-1)=one lagged 
futures return, HP=hedging pressure, DI=Dollar Index, DI(-1) one lagged Dollar Index, SP=S&P 500, SP(-1)=one lagged S&P 500, 
BIUS=Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, BIUS(-1)=one lagged Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, VIX=S&P 500 Volatility Index, VIX(-




Table 7a: Futures returns as the dependent variable, the “hedging pressure version” 
 F(-1) HP HP(-1) DI DI(-1) SP SP(-1) BIUS BIUS(-1) R² 
adj. 
 Energies  
CL -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -1.30*** -0.29* 0.58*** 0.02 -1.92*** -0.97** 0.33 (-0.69) (-0.10) (-0.29) (-4.96) (-1.69) (3.33) (0.10) (-3.76) (-2.03) 
HO 0.00 0.58*** -0.23*** -0.99*** -0.28* 0.39*** 0.20** -1.45*** -0.67** 0.43 (0.03) (9.23) (-3.38) (-7.02) (-1.93) (4.17) (2.14) (-5.00) (-2.27) 
RB -0.01 0.47*** -0.16** -0.95*** -0.16 0.37*** 0.24** -1.94*** -0.76** 0.33 (-0.24) (6.86) (-2.24) (-5.54) (-0.93) (3.31) (2.11) (-5.53) (-2.12) 
 Metals  
GC -0.08 0.51*** 0.00 -0.85*** 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.56** 0.29 0.39 (-1.63) (9.62) (0.04) -6.70) (0.39) (0.40) (-0.14) (2.45) (1.44) 
SI -0.05 0.68*** 0.08 -1.75*** -0.20 0.19 -0.04 -0.22 -0.28 0.32 (-0.96) (6.87) (0.79) (-9.48) (-1.01) (1.61) (-0.31) (-0.58) (-0.76) 
PL -0.10 0.25*** 0.11** -1.11*** -0.01 0.13 0.04 -0.65 0.24 0.26 (-1.48) (3.60) (2.52) (-4.17) (-0.03) (1.14) (0.39) (-1.54) (0.60) 
PA -0.06 0.44*** -0.06 -0.99*** 0.16 0.36*** 0.16 -1.38*** -0.13 0.32 (-0.93) (6.15) (-0.82) (-3.80) (0.60) (2.78) (1.36) (-3.15) (-0.28) 
HG 0.01 0.50*** -0.06 -0.74*** -0.01 0.38*** -0.04 -0.88 -0.14 0.34 (0.20) (7.60) (-0.98) (-3.28) (-0.09) (2.88) (-0.35) (-2.24) (-0.31) 
 Grains  
C -0.08* 1.19*** -0.26*** -0.69*** 0.03 0.07 0.14 -0.74** -0.19 0.37 (-1.76) (13.46) (-2.60) (-4.15) (0.20) (0.65) (1.32) (-2.18) (-0.57) 
S -0.12** 0.67*** -0.05 -0.54*** -0.17 0.08 0.13 -0.73*** -0.09 0.37 (-2.15) (11.86) (-0.91) (-4.26) (-1.25) (0.75) (1.61) (-2.70) (-0.32) 
W -0.10 0.98*** -0.03 -0.66*** -0.15 0.20* -0.08 -0.49 -0.08 0.34 (-1.62) (11.05) (-0.37) (-3.67) (-0.77) (1.86) (-0.65) (-1.12) (-0.22) 
KW -0.11* 0.79*** -0.13* -0.80*** -0.23 0.11 -0.04 -0.66* -0.05 0.33 (-1.86) (9.53) (-1.79) (-4.80) (-1.21) (1.11) (-0.36) (-1.72) (-0.15) 
MW 0.02 0.41*** -0.15* -0.65*** -0.11 0.19* -0.17 -0.89** 0.34 0.19 (0.15) (6.80) (-1.80) (-4.16) (-0.64) (1.80) (-1.40) (-2.14) (0.98) 
O -0.13*** 0.38*** -0.12*** -0.93 -0.10 -0.02 0.21 -0.90** -0.10 0.24 (-2.66) (8.28) (-2.60) (-4.54) (-0.47) (-0.15) (1.62) (-2.18) (-0.24) 
 Food and fiber  
CC -0.11** 0.76*** -0.28*** -0.85*** -0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.30 0.52* 0.40 (-2.35) (13.19) (-4.58) (-6.04) (-0.37) (0.54) (0.88) (-1.06) (1.84) 
CT 0.03 0.44*** -0.18*** -0.47*** -0.31 0.25** 0.06 -0.16 -0.15 0.24 (0.52) (8.01) (-3.39) (-2.90) (-1.45) (2.23) (0.50) (-0.47) (-0.39) 
KC 0.00 0.85*** -0.27*** -0.50*** -0.04 0.32 0.02 -0.27 0.16 0.45 (-0.09) (16.37) (-4.31) (-3.41) (-0.30) (3.39) (0.26) (-0.92) (0.54) 
JO -0.11* 0.63*** -0.19*** -0.06 0.05 0.27*** 0.16* -0.17 -0.10 0.38 (-1.66) (13.13) (-3.80) (-0.38) (0.29) (2.61) (1.89) (-0.52) (-0.36) 
SB -0.09 0.79*** -0.11 -0.35* 0.23 0.17 0.13 -0.43 0.02 0.19 (-1.34) (7.40) (-0.96) (-1.76) (1.14) (1.37) (1.02) (-1.11) (0.06) 
 Livestock and meats  
FC -0.09* 0.26*** -0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.10* 0.08 -0.11 -0.26 0.08 (-1.75) (5.66) (-0.84) (-0.22) (0.62) (1.72) (1.38) (-0.60) (-1.43) 
LC -0.11** 0.23*** -0.22*** -0.06 0.08 0.10 0.09* 0.03 -0.14 0.14 (-2.21) (5.05) (-4.94) (-0.70) (0.97) (1.98) (1.72) (0.17) (-0.87) 
LH -0.05 0.68*** -0.37*** 0.11 -0.10 0.08 -0.05 0.12 0.12 0.15 (-0.70) (7.78) (-4.89) (0.92) (-0.76) (1.05) (-0.54) (0.47) (0.39) 
Note: Table 7a lists all the coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses of equation (8a): 
ݎ௧,௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߠଵு௉∆ܪ ௧ܲ ൅ ߠଶு௉∆ܪ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚᇱܺ ൅ ߝ௧,௜. Regressions were calculated by OLS, and Newey-West standard errors are 
calculated for regressions with serial correlated and/or heteroskedastic error terms. CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating Oil, RB=RBOB 
Gasoline, GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, W=CBOT Wheat, KW=Kansas 
City Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange Juice, SB=Sugar, FC=Feeder Cattle, 
LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs; F(-1)=one lagged futures return, HP=hedging pressure, HP(-1)=one lagged hedging pressure, 
DI=Dollar Index, DI(-1) one lagged Dollar Index, SP=S&P 500, SP(-1)=one lagged S&P 500, BIUS=Citigroup WGBI US all 
maturities, BIUS(-1)=one lagged Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, VIX=S&P 500 Volatility Index, VIX(-1)= one lagged S&P 500 
Volatility Index. ***, ***, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 7b: Futures returns as the dependent variable, the “money manager version” 
 F(-1) MM MM(-1) DI DI(-1) SP SP(-1) BIUS BIUS(-1) R² 
adj. 
Energies
CL -0.04 1.29*** -0.22 -1.06*** -0.21 0.46** 0.09 -1.65*** -0.92** 0.42 (-0.63) (6.49) (-1.37) (-4.38) (-1.18) (2.50) (0.48) (-3.12) (-1.98) 
HO 0.00 0.71*** -0.28*** -0.93*** -0.32** 0.42*** 0.19** -1.32*** -0.71** 0.46(-0.08) (10.55) (-3.80) (-6.69) (-2.22) (4.66) (2.05) (-4.68) (-2.47) 
RB -0.02 0.60*** -0.17** -0.89*** -0.17 0.37*** 0.25* -1.83*** -0.64 0.35 (-0.28) (6.27) (-2.00) (-3.33) (-0.90) (2.61) (1.77) (-3.94) (-1.34) 
Metals
GC -0.05 0.42*** -0.06 -0.84*** 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.43** 0.29 0.42 (-1.09) (11.64) (-1.41) (-8.56) (0.69) (0.20) (-0.09) (2.23) (1.49) 
SI -0.05 0.79*** -0.14* -1.69*** -0.13 0.09 0.01 -0.33 -0.09 0.42 (-0.96) (11.51) (-1.90) (-9.98) (-0.71) (0.80) (0.08) (-0.96) (-0.25) 
PL -0.08 0.27*** 0.03 -1.08*** -0.01 0.15 0.05 -0.53 0.10 0.28 (-1.08) (5.19) (0.60) (-4.42) (-0.04) (1.34) (0.52) (-1.33) (0.25)
PA -0.03 0.38*** -0.08 -1.02*** 0.12 0.33** 0.18 -1.38*** -0.06 0.32 (-0.45) (5.57) (-1.32) (-3.68) (0.45) (2.44) (1.42) (-3.05) (-0.11) 
HG 0.06 0.45*** -0.13*** -0.74*** 0.04 0.39*** -0.05 -0.74* -0.15 0.41 (0.95) (8.75) (-3.84) (-3.28) (0.23) (2.86) (-0.43) (-1.88) (-0.34) 
Grains
C -0.13*** 1.25*** -0.26** -0.72*** 0.07 0.09 0.12 -0.95*** 0.14 0.36 (-2.79) (13.10) (-2.50) (-4.28) (0.41) (0.86) (1.12) (-2.78) (0.40) 
S -0.11* 0.73*** -0.09 -0.54*** -0.15 0.11 0.09 -0.74*** -0.05 0.34 (-1.96) (11.80) (-1.40) (-4.27) (-1.04) (0.97) (1.10) (-2.81) (-0.18) 
W -0.12** 0.91*** 0.00 -0.80*** -0.17 0.22* -0.08 -0.48 0.08 0.32 (-2.17) (9.90) (-0.06) (-4.26) (-0.86) (1.89) (-0.61) (-1.12) (0.21)
KW -0.13** 0.87*** -0.15** -0.79*** -0.24 0.18 -0.10 -0.56 -0.01 0.31 (-2.19) (10.67) (-2.03) (-4.67) (-1.23) (1.46) (-0.85) (-1.44) (-0.03) 
M
W 
0.03 0.46*** -0.15 -0.63*** -0.10 0.18* -0.15 -0.89** 0.30 0.15 (0.35) (5.37) (-1.28) (-3.94) (-0.55) (1.68) (-1.24) (-2.08) (0.90) 
O -0.17*** 0.63*** -0.13** -0.96*** -0.04 0.06 0.16 -0.79** -0.29 0.35 (-3.58) (12.43) (-2.35) (-5.15) (-0.21) (0.50) (1.34) (-2.05) (-0.77) 
Food and fiber 
CC -0.15*** 0.71*** -0.25*** -1.00*** -0.04 0.11 0.12 -0.32 0.51* 0.33(-3.13) (10.73) (-3.85) (-6.83) (-0.27) (1.22) (1.24) -(1.06) (1.70) 
CT -0.01 0.54*** -0.19*** -0.45*** -0.32 0.25** 0.07 -0.27 -0.30 0.23 (-0.21) (8.20) (-3.53) (-2.70) (-1.48) (2.14) (0.52) (-0.73) (-0.77) 
KC -0.07 0.92*** -0.31*** -0.60*** 0.03 0.24*** -0.01 -0.36 0.04 0.46 (-1.19) (14.67) (-4.53) (-4.51) (0.17) (3.07) (-0.17) (-1.58) (0.15) 
JO -0.21*** 0.78*** -0.25*** 0.01 -0.11 0.28*** 0.10 -0.07 -0.33 0.45 (-3.42) (14.59) (-6.04) (0.09) (-0.78) (2.84) (1.05) (-0.21) (-1.17) 
SB -0.14** 1.15*** -0.22** -0.40** 0.14 0.19 0.05 -0.35 0.00 0.22 (-2.40) (8.86) (-2.03) (-2.02) (0.73) (1.57) (0.35) (-0.96) (0.01) 
Livestock and meats 
FC -0.09* 0.25*** -0.09*** -0.02 0.04 0.11* 0.10* -0.16 -0.22 0.14 (-1.79) (7.91) (-2.90) (-0.25) (0.46) (1.89) (1.73) (-0.91) (-1.27) 
LC -0.15*** 0.33*** -0.22*** -0.05 0.04 0.11** 0.10** 0.07 -0.14 0.18 (-3.20) (7.46) (-5.18) (-0.62) (0.55) (2.33) (2.00) (0.42) (-0.92) 
LH -0.13* 0.71*** -0.19** 0.06 -0.08 0.06 -0.04 0.10 0.12 0.16 (-1.89) (8.48) (-2.58) (0.45) (-0.66) (0.75) (-0.49) (0.40) (0.38)
Note: Table 7b lists all the coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses of equation (8b): 
ݎ௧,௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߛ௜ݎ௧ିଵ,௜ ൅ ߠଵெெ∆ܯܯ௧ ൅ ߠଶெெ∆ܯܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚᇱܺ ൅ ߝ௧,௜. Regressions were calculated by OLS, and Newey-West standard 
errors are calculated for regressions with serial correlated and/or heteroskedastic error terms. CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating Oil, 
RB=RBOB Gasoline, GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, W=CBOT Wheat, 
KW=Kansas City Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange Juice, SB=Sugar, 
FC=Feeder Cattle, LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs; F(-1)=one lagged futures return, MM= speculative pressure, MM(-1)=one 
lagged speculative pressure, DI=Dollar Index, DI(-1) one lagged Dollar Index, SP=S&P 500, SP(-1)=one lagged S&P 500, 
BIUS=Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, BIUS(-1)=one lagged Citigroup WGBI US all maturities, VIX=S&P 500 Volatility Index, 
VIX(-1)= one lagged S&P 500 Volatility Index. ***, ***, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 8a: Errors of 8a “hedging pressure version” as the dependent variable 
 MM SW OR NR 
 POS POS(-1) R² adj. POS POS(-1) 
R² 
adj. POS 
POS    
(-1) 
R² 




CL 1.13*** -0.24 0.12 -0.89*** 0.22 0.06 -0.10 0.22 -0.00 -1.83*** -0.54 0.05 (7.78) (-1.64) (-5.35) (1.36) (-0.47) (1.05) (-5.16) (-1.53) 
HO 0.19*** -0.07 0.02 -0.83*** 0.13 0.08 -0.49*** 0.04 0.02 0.39*** 0.06 0.02 (3.04) (-1.12) (-6.47) (1.04) (-3.26) (0.24) (2.93) (0.44) 
RB 0.12* -0.03 0.00 -0.64*** -0.02 0.02 -0.83*** 0.14 0.03 0.49** 0.13 0.01 (1.69) (-0.36) (-3.39) (-0.12) (-3.77) (0.66) (2.39) (0.66) 
 Metals 
GC 0.13*** -0.06 0.03 -0.24*** 0.07 0.05 -0.26*** 0.07 0.02 0.39*** 0.08 0.02 (3.86) (-1.62) (-5.01) (1.48) (-3.25) (0.83) (3.60) (0.76) 
SI 0.46*** -0.20*** 0.09 -0.74*** 0.17 0.10 -0.92*** 0.07 0.07 0.28* 0.13 0.00 (6.85) (-2.95) (-7.24) (1.62) (-5.88) (0.45) (1.81) (0.86) 
PL 0.13*** -0.04 0.02 -0.20*** -0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.00 0.19** 0.16* 0.01 (3.26) (-0.99) (-4.47) (-1.01) (-0.27) (0.97) (2.21) (1.81) 
PA 0.16*** -0.07 0.02 -0.43*** 0.12** 0.11 0.20** -0.08 0.01 0.69*** -0.02 0.05 (3.11) (-1.31) (-7.27) (2.11) (1.98) (-0.80) (4.77) (-0.14) 
HG 0.19*** -0.11** 0.05 -0.27*** 0.06 0.03 -0.27*** 0.24*** 0.04 -0.18 0.02 0.00 (4.57) (-2.58) (-3.73) (0.82) (-3.19) (2.88) (-1.47) (0.15) 
 Grains 
C 0.19** -0.06 0.01 -1.03*** -0.04 0.07 -0.17 0.22 0.00 1.19*** 0.59** 0.04 (2.08) (-0.62) (-5.71) (-0.24) (-0.79) (0.99) (3.99) (1.98) 
S 0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.56*** 0.16 0.04 -0.18 0.15 0.00 1.03*** -0.20 0.08 (1.02) (-0.62) (-4.71) (1.36) (-1.49) (1.19) (6.09) (-1.16) 
W 0.11 0.01 0.00 -0.54*** -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.19 0.00 0.74*** -0.02 0.01 (1.41) (0.14) (-3.94) (-0.54) (0.04) (1.09) (2.63) (-0.08) 
KW 0.13 -0.09 0.00 -0.54*** 0.02 0.02 -0.53*** 0.13 0.02 0.69*** 0.14 0.03 (1.63) (-1.10) (-3.50) (0.15) (-3.08) (0.76) (3.94) (0.82) 
MW 0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.16 0.35 0.00 -0.21* -0.08 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.00 (0.65) (-0.65) (0.59) (1.27) (-1.72) (-0.67) (0.50) (0.63) 
O 0.30*** -0.08* 0.07 -0.38*** 0.05 0.02 -0.48*** 0.18** 0.06 -0.19* -0.10 0.01 (5.94) (-1.70) (-3.53) (0.49) (-5.48) (2.09) (-1.95) (-1.06) 
 Food and fiber 
CC 0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.00 -0.85*** 0.49*** 0.07 0.75*** -0.11 0.04 (0.43) (-0.84) (0.26) (0.43) (-5.13) (2.95) (4.37) (-0.65) 
CT 0.10* -0.02 0.00 -0.54*** 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.62*** -0.19 0.03 (1.67) (-0.36) (-5.48) (1.55) (0.24) (0.39) (3.74) (-1.14) 
KC 0.14*** -0.10** 0.01 -0.71*** 0.30** 0.07 -0.16 0.17 0.00 0.34 0.29 0.00 (2.64) (-1.98) (-5.75) (2.53) (-1.14) (1.21) (1.61) (1.39) 
JO 0.18*** -0.10** 0.04 -0.81*** 0.33* 0.05 -0.67*** 0.21*** 0.17 0.52*** 0.04 0.04 (4.32) (-2.42) (-4.67) (1.91) (-9.44) (2.96) (4.69) (0.40) 
SB 0.31*** -0.14 0.01 -1.14*** 0.30** 0.12 -0.72*** 0.27 0.02 1.44*** -0.04 0.10 (2.88) (-1.26) (-7.69) (2.06) (-2.94) (1.12) (7.11) (-0.20) 
 Livestock and meats 
FC 0.13*** -0.10*** 0.05 -0.10 0.04 0.00 -0.12** 0.08* 0.02 -0.15*** 0.07 0.02 (4.52) (-3.32) (-1.24) (0.53) (-2.46) (1.67) (-3.02) (1.49) 
LC 0.15*** -0.08* 0.03 -0.48*** 0.28*** 0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.11 0.00 (3.54) (-1.81) (-5.55) (3.32) (-1.12) (-0.05) (-0.54) (-0.89) 
LH 0.26*** -0.08 0.03 -0.78*** 0.20* 0.11 -0.23** -0.18 0.01 0.88*** 0.13 0.05 (3.73) (-1.17) (-7.38) (1.92) (-2.09) (-1.62) (5.24) (0.75) 
Note: Table 8a lists all the coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses of equation (9): 
ߝ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߜଵ∆݌݋ݏ௧,௝ ൅ ߜଶ∆݌݋ݏ௧ିଵ,௝ ൅ ݑ௧. Regressions were calculated by OLS, and Newey-West standard errors are 
calculated for regressions with serial correlated and/or heteroskedastic error terms. CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating Oil, 
RB=RBOB Gasoline, GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, W=CBOT 
Wheat, KW=Kansas City Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange Juice, 
SB=Sugar, FC=Feeder Cattle, LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs; MM=money managers, SW=swap dealers, OR=other 
reportables, NR=non-reportables; POS=contemporaneous position change of corresponding trader’s category, POS(-1)=one 
lagged position change of corresponding trader’s category. ***, ***, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  
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Table 8b: Errors of 8b “speculative pressure version” as the dependent variable 
HP SW OR NR
 POS POS(-1) R² adj. POS 
POS   
(-1) 
R² 
adj. POS POS(-1) 
R² 




CL -0.64*** 0.10 0.02 -0.27* 0.00 0.00 0.41** 0.13 0.01 -1.35*** -0.22 0.03(-2.97) (0.46) (-1.71) (0.00) (2.08) (0.66) (-4.06) (-0.65) 
HO 0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.30** -0.05 0.01 0.10 -0.16 0.00 0.55*** -0.19 0.04(1.10) (-1.20) (-2.31) (-0.35) (0.66) (-1.09) (4.28) (-1.50) 
RB 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.17 -0.14 0.00 -0.33 0.08 0.00 0.68*** -0.07 0.02(0.30) (-0.39) (-0.92) (-0.76) (-1.52) (0.37) (3.37) (-0.33) 
Metals
GC 0.10** 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.45*** 0.13 0.04 (2.19) (0.31) (0.51) (-0.22) (0.00) (0.59) (4.37) (1.23) 
SI 0.03 0.11 0.00 -0.19* 0.05 0.00 -0.10 0.16 0.00 0.62*** 0.23* 0.04(0.38) (1.26) (-1.91) (0.54) (-0.67) (1.05) (4.46) (1.65) 
PL 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.26*** 0.18** 0.03(1.40) (1.14) (-1.11) (-0.56) (1.58) (1.28) (3.10) (2.09) 
PA 0.17*** -0.04 0.01 -0.18*** 0.08 0.02 0.47*** -0.11 0.06 0.86*** -0.08 0.07(2.76) (-0.69) (-2.96) (1.39) (4.85) (-1.08) (6.02) (-0.55) 
HG 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.05 -0.09 0.00(0.68) (0.45) (0.20) (-0.01) (0.52) (1.36) (0.40) (-0.77) 
Grains
C 0.22** -0.11 0.01 -0.17 -0.41** 0.01 0.84*** 0.09 0.03 1.82*** 0.52* 0.08(2.56) (-1.28) (-0.91) (-2.17) (3.85) (0.40) (6.23) (1.76) 
S 0.13*** -0.01 0.01 -0.15 0.16 0.00 0.34*** 0.07 0.01 1.32*** -0.26 0.12(2.62) (-0.23) (-1.17) (1.26) (2.65) (0.54) (7.74) (-1.49) 
W 0.21*** -0.08 0.01 0.14 -0.16 0.00 0.43** 0.17 0.01 1.05*** -0.09 0.03(2.66) (-1.01) (0.97) (-1.16) (2.46) (0.94) (3.67) (-0.33) 
KW 0.17** -0.06 0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.00 0.13 -0.02 0.00 1.17*** 0.06 0.09 (2.49) (-0.81) (-0.52) (0.16) (0.72) (-0.09) (6.83) (0.37) 
MW 0.19*** -0.10 0.02 0.50* 0.19 0.00 0.12 -0.21* 0.00 0.40*** -0.06 0.03(3.24) (-1.65) (1.79) (0.70) (0.99) (-1.69) (3.76) (-0.56) 
O 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.13 0.00 0.13 -0.25*** 0.02(0.56) (-0.88) (-0.14) (-0.74) (-0.69) (1.59) (1.50) (-2.81) 
Food and fiber 
CC 0.21*** -0.10* 0.03 0.74*** -0.18 0.03 -0.25 0.19 0.00 1.45*** -0.30* 0.15(3.65) (-1.83) (4.15) (-1.02) (-1.36) (1.05) (8.61) (-1.77) 
CT 0.11*** -0.07 0.01 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.45*** -0.09 0.03 0.82*** -0.42** 0.06(2.29) (-1.56) (-1.46) (-0.02) (3.72) (-0.73) (5.02) (-2.56) 
KC 0.12** -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.52*** -0.15 0.03 0.74*** 0.01 0.03 (2.42) (-0.79) (0.18) (0.96) (3.84) (-1.06) (3.60) (0.07) 
JO 0.07*** -0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.13 0.00 -0.06 0.02 0.00 0.75*** -0.06 0.11(1.92) (-0.65) (-0.61) (0.81) (-0.75) (0.28) (7.38) (-0.59) 
SB 0.11 -0.02 0.00 -0.49*** 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.00 1.63*** -0.19 0.13(1.42) (-0.21) (-3.18) (1.57) (0.12) (0.54) (8.35) (-0.97) 
Livestock and meats 
FC 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 (1.30) (0.47) (0.16) (0.99) (1.48) (0.35) (0.12) (0.12) 
LC 0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.28*** 0.10 0.02 0.15** -0.18*** 0.02 0.07 -0.12 0.00(0.26) (-1.64) (-3.30) (1.15) (2.20) (-2.77) (0.57) (-0.99) 
LH 0.22*** -0.22*** 0.02 -0.35*** 0.01 0.02 0.26** -0.34*** 0.03 1.09*** 0.06 0.09 (2.94) (-2.99) (-3.14) (0.07) (2.38) (-3.18) (6.61) (0.38) 
Note: Table 8b lists all the coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses of equation (9): 
ߝ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߜଵ∆݌݋ݏ௧,௝ ൅ ߜଶ∆݌݋ݏ௧ିଵ,௝ ൅ ݑ௧. Regressions were calculated by OLS, and Newey-West standard errors are calculated 
for regressions with serial correlated and/or heteroskedastic error terms. CL= WTI Crude Oil, HO=Heating Oil, RB=RBOB 
Gasoline, GC=Gold, SI=Silver, PL=Platinum, PA=Palladium, HG=Copper, C=Corn, S=Soybeans, W=CBOT Wheat, 
KW=Kansas City Wheat, MW=Minneapolis Wheat, O=Oats, CC=Cocoa, CT=Cotton, KC=Coffee, JO=Orange Juice, SB=Sugar, 
FC=Feeder Cattle, LC=Live Cattle, LH=Lean Hogs; HP=hedging pressure, SW=swap dealers, OR=other reportables, NR=non-
reportables; POS=contemporaneous position change of corresponding trader’s category, POS(-1)=one lagged position change of 
corresponding trader’s category. ***, ***, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table A.1: Correlations between DCOT trader categories 
crude oil heating oil gasoline 
HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR
HP 1 1 1 
MM 0,326 1 0,819 1 0,867 1 
SW 0,187 -0,544 1 -0,028 -0,385 1 0,203 -0,147 1 
OR 0,155 -0,302 -0,275 1 -0,074 -0,408 0,081 1 -0,068 -0,361 0,132 1 
NR 0,099 -0,120 -0,138 -0,181 1 0,664 0,520 -0,329 -0,271 1 0,549 0,399 -0,139 -0,263 1 
gold silver platinum 
HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR
HP 1 1 1 
MM 0,747 1 0,630 1 0,596 1 
SW -0,274 -0,702 1 -0,218 -0,667 1 -0,005 -0,574 1 
OR 0,050 -0,211 -0,184 1 0,059 -0,422 0,098 1 0,260 -0,067 -0,273 1 
NR 0,575 0,488 -0,444 -0,132 1 0,417 0,100 -0,370 -0,042 1 0,314 0,150 -0,324 -0,088 1 
palladium copper corn 
HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR
HP 1 1 1 
MM 0,611 1 0,749 1 0,843 1 
SW -0,061 -0,620 1 -0,013 -0,412 1 0,292 -0,038 1 
OR 0,284 -0,094 -0,267 1 -0,363 -0,652 -0,068 1 0,158 -0,167 -0,118 1 
NR 0,397 0,246 -0,373 0,100 1 0,336 0,149 -0,374 -0,092 1 0,087 -0,054 -0,286 -0,001 1 
soybeans wheat (CBOT) wheat (KCBOT) 
HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR
HP 1 1 1 
MM 0,863 1 0,835 1 0,845 1 
SW 0,230 -0,033 1 0,352 -0,037 1 0,331 0,080 1 
OR 0,102 -0,214 -0,208 1 -0,269 -0,485 -0,274 1 0,128 -0,191 -0,111 1 
NR 0,462 0,373 -0,259 -0,066 1 0,297 0,215 -0,168 -0,227 1 0,269 0,058 -0,278 -0,058 1 
wheat (MGEX) oats cocoa 
HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR
HP 1 1 1 
MM 0,720 1 0,720 1 0,869 1 
SW 0,204 0,042 1 0,363 -0,021 1 0,199 -0,114 1 
OR 0,335 -0,088 -0,034 1 0,139 -0,296 -0,076 1 -0,061 -0,337 -0,034 1 
NR 0,554 0,109 -0,040 -0,118 1 0,471 0,092 0,074 -0,128 1 0,487 0,218 0,067 -0,102 1 
cotton coffee orange 
HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR
HP 1 1 1 
MM 0,795 1 0,860 1 0,836 1 
SW 0,379 -0,056 1 0,274 -0,098 1 0,144 -0,107 1 
OR 0,102 -0,280 -0,048 1 -0,154 -0,445 -0,024 1 0,012 -0,439 0,142 1 
NR 0,597 0,520 -0,091 -0,106 1 0,422 0,298 -0,087 -0,203 1 0,519 0,365 -0,099 -0,265 1 
sugar feeder cattle live cattle 
HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR HP MM SW OR NR
HP 1 1 1 
MM 0,793 1 0,676 1 0,759 1 
SW 0,387 -0,061 1 0,183 -0,071 1 0,304 -0,046 1 
OR 0,024 -0,263 -0,063 1 0,151 -0,323 -0,082 1 0,215 -0,271 -0,072 1 
NR 0,563 0,437 -0,142 -0,174 1 -0,194 -0,527 -0,172 -0,218 1 -0,249 -0,312 -0,257 -0,238 1 
lean hogs 
HP MM SW OR NR 
HP 1 
MM 0,705 1 
SW 0,143 -0,255 1 
OR 0,168 -0,298 -0,162 1 
NR 0,189 0,045 -0,284 -0,137 1 
Note: HP=hedging pressure, MM=money managers, SW=swap dealers, OR=other reportables, NR=non reportables. All 
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